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4Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent decades were marked by a rapid convergence of economies to a global market. Terms,
such as "globalization", "integration" and "contagion" became an integrable part of both aca-
demics￿and ￿nance practitioners￿as well as policy makers￿everyday dictionary. The bene￿ts
and costs of globalization oriented policies became an issues of harsh political and social debates
around the globe. One of the particularly important aspects is the impact of globalization on
the links between the international stock markets. A drastic increase in the cross-border capi-
tal ￿ ows on the one hand and an increasing number of companies choosing to list their shares
abroad on the other raises the question of whether the stock markets became more interde-
pendent. The severe ￿nancial crises the world has witnessed over the last decade emphasized
the importance of deeper understanding these links and the need of evaluating the impact of
globalization on the propagation of ￿nancial crises around the world. However, many gaps still
exist in the literature which concerns the impact of globalization on the comovement between
the international stock markets. The ￿rst part of this thesis focuses on studying the dynamics
of the cross-border transfer of pricing information between the international stock markets.
In Chapter 2 we study the interdependence structure between the major developed stock
markets and how this structure has changed over the last two and a half decades. We make a
distinction between long-run and short-run dynamics. A gradual shift in the dependence struc-
ture is potentially attributed to globalization oriented policies and can be viewed as evidence
that the stock markets have become more integrated over time. On the other hand, temporary
shifts in the dependence structure associated with stock market turbulence can serve as evi-
5dence of ￿nancial crises being "contagious". We make use of copula theory, which allows us to
decompose a multivariate distribution function into its margins and the dependence function,
or the copula. The dynamics of the latter becomes the focus of this chapter.
Our analysis indicates that the stock markets became signi￿cantly more integrated over the
last two a half decades. Also, we ￿nd strong evidence of contagion. The "contagion e⁄ect"
appears to be asymmetric, being signi￿cantly stronger for the negative pricing shocks and
related to the stock market volatility and the economic conditions. These ￿ndings emphasize
an important role of these factors in the international propagation of stock market crises. In
particular, these results help us to understand the October 1987 phenomenon, when the crash
of the US stock markets has rapidly propagated to the rest of the world. Economic costs of
ignoring contagion or its asymmetric nature are signi￿cant as well. Also, by highlighting the
importance of accounting for the shifts in the dependence structure between ￿nancial assets
these results have an important implications for portfolio management strategies.
In Chapter 3 of this thesis we focus on the information transfer mechanism between the
securities listed on both the New-York and Tokyo stock markets, the two largest and most
in￿ uential stock markets in the world. By representing the same underlying fundamental value
on the one hand and being traded on multiple trading locations on the other, cross-listed
securities provide a unique framework for understanding the mechanism of the information
transfer between the markets. In particular, they help us to understand the price discovery
process in a world with ￿nancial systems becoming increasingly more integrated.
We ￿nd signi￿cant evidence of the information asymmetry with the Tokyo market emerging
as the informationally dominant one where the lions share of the price discovery occurs. It takes
more time for the pricing shocks from the Tokyo market to dissipate in the US market than
vice versa, a ￿nding, which suggests that the behavior of the US "twin" can be predicted based
on the information released during the Tokyo trading session. This, in turn, implies that there
exists a potential for designing pro￿table cross-border trading strategies. Moreover, the speed
of the price-discovery appears to be related to the level of the trading activity, proxied by the
trading volume. This result supports other studies, such as Blume, Easley, and O￿ Hara (1994),
who suggest that trading volume provides extra information in addition to the one implicit in
stock prices.
6The second part of this thesis focuses on stock market e¢ ciency, in particular on how fast
the information is impounded in stock prices. The importance of understanding the mechanism
of how the news is re￿ ected in security prices can be hardly overestimated. It is essential
for ￿nance practitioners in their investment decisions, ￿rms￿management in their information
disclosure policies as well as for policy makers whose decisions frequently have a great impact
on the functioning of stock markets. All these aspects are examined in the following essays.
Chapter 4 studies the link between the predictable patterns of stock returns, trading volume,
and volatility. We test a variety of theoretical models which link these variables to the dynamics
of stock returns for a sample of both aggregate stock market indices and individual stocks. A
combination of seminonparametric and parametric methodologies provides us a deeper insight
into the nature of these relations and also contributes to the robustness of our ￿ndings. We
￿nd that the magnitude of the stock returns￿reversals and "momentum" is mainly related
to the stock market volatility and not to volume, whose impact appears to be of a secondary
magnitude. This ￿nding sheds a new light on the previously documented volume-return relation.
However, the trading volume appears to play an important role in the price discovery process
as well as in the comovement between stock prices, a ￿nding, which highlights the importance
of the informational content of the trading volume. Also, these ￿ndings provide an alternative
explanation to the "high volume premium", documented by Gervais et al. (2001).
In Chapter 5 we examine the link between the information disclosure rules and market e¢ -
ciency. We study the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, enacted as a response to
a series of severe corporate scandals, for the market e¢ ciency and the accuracy of the analysts￿
earnings forecasts. We examine whether the enactment of stricter disclosure requirements re-
stored the con￿dence of the stock market investors and the analysts in the information disclosed
by ￿rms￿management, which has been shaken by numerous cases of corporate fraud during the
period 2001-2002.
Using a comprehensive sample of NYSE/AMEX listed ￿rms we ￿nd that the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has been followed by a substantial increase in the speed of adjustment
coe¢ cients. This ￿nding suggests that following the reform the US stock markets became
more informationally e¢ cient. On the other hand, we ￿nd strong evidence of the analysts￿
becoming more "overpessimistic" in their earnings forecasts. We interpret this ￿nding as the
7evidence of analysts becoming more cautious in interpreting the information released by the
￿rms￿management. Overall, these ￿nding highlight a strong link between the quality of the
information disclosure and the e¢ cient functioning of stock markets.
Chapter 6 of this thesis is concerned with strategic timing of information disclosure and the
response of stock prices to the news. We study the alleged tendency of ￿rms to report more
"bad" news close to the weekend, in particular on Fridays, using investors￿distraction as the
weekend approaches. However, if the investors learned about this strategy, we would expect its
bene￿ts to disappear over time. We ￿nd that over the last two decades the ￿rms consistently
released more "bad" news on Fridays than during other weekdays. We also document that
the sensitivity of stock returns to Friday announcements compared to other weekdays has
gradually increased over time, an increase which is particularly pronounced when the "bad"
news is released. Furthermore, we document a strong link between the magnitude of the "Friday
e⁄ect" and the level of the pre-announcement uncertainty. These ￿ndings suggest that the
tendency of ￿rms to release unfavorable announcements on Fridays is indeed related to the
investors￿distraction as the weekend approaches and that the bene￿ts from using this strategy
seem to dissipate over time, a result, which also yields important implications for the ￿rms￿
announcement policies.
Finally, in Chapter 7 we summarize our ￿ndings and present concluding remarks in Dutch
(Samenvatting).
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On the dependence structure,
integration and contagion of the
international stock markets
2.1 Introduction
Understanding the nature and the dynamics of the cross-border transmission of pricing infor-
mation is important, not only for academics in various ￿elds of economics and ￿nance, but also
for practitioners and policy regulators. Identifying and measuring the relative importance of
global pricing factors, investigating whether globalization oriented policies lead to an increase in
intermarket integration, choosing an optimal portfolio ￿these are only a few of examples where
a proper understanding of the international stock markets￿dependence structure plays a crucial
role. As consequence, modeling the comovements between the international stock markets is
an important task in empirical ￿nance.
Among various aspects of stock market comovement, the question whether stock markets
became more integrated and whether pricing shocks are contagious, gained special attention in
the recent literature. An increasing economic integration, followed by a removal of impediments
to international investments, naturally raises the question whether such policy steps resulted
in a greater interdependence between the stock markets, and, if so, it raises the subsequent
9question of the implications for international portfolio diversi￿cation strategies. For instance,
in terms of a traditional correlation analysis, an increase in cross-market correlations, might
substantially reduce the bene￿ts from investing in assets traded on di⁄erent markets, possibly
resulting in a shift from cross-country to, for example, cross-industry diversi￿cation strategies.
In contrast to an increase in market integration, which can be viewed as a long-run shift
in the dependence structure, the contagion phenomenon is most often attributed to short-run
dynamics of stock markets comovements. Among various de￿nitions of what contagion really
means, numerous studies concentrate on the de￿nition proposed by Rigobon (1999), who de￿nes
stock market contagion as a shift (in general, an increase) in the interdependence of the stock
markets during a crisis, in particular, there is contagion when stock markets move more closely
together during turbulent periods. The crash of October 1987, the Latin American "Tequila
crisis" of 1994, the "Asian Flu" in 1997, the devaluation of the Russian debt in 1998 ￿all these
episodes manifest one common characteristic: a rapid propagation of pricing shocks across the
stock markets whose magnitude can hardly be explained by any standard theory based on
underlying fundamental values. These worldwide defaults raise the question whether the very
fact of a ￿nancial crisis in one market increases the probability of its transmission to other
markets, or, in other words, whether ￿nancial crises are "contagious", and, if so, the question
becomes: what are the possible implications for the market microstructure, like tightening the
bounds of circuit breaks, or international ￿nancial policies, such as an increased coordination
by Central Banks? Ignoring potential contagion e⁄ects might also result in substantial utility
losses for investors, see, for instance, Ang and Bekaert (2002).
In this paper we study the dynamics of the dependence structure between stock markets. In
particular, we attempt to answer the following questions. Have the stock markets become more
integrated over the last two and a half decades? Is there any evidence of contagion between
the major stock markets, and, if so, what are the implications of the latter for the international
portfolio diversi￿cation strategies? Did the markets become more interdependent after the
October 1987 crash, and if so, was the increase in interdependence contagion driven?
We do not only investigate the magnitude of the impact of market integration and contagion
on the interdependence structure of the markets, but we also investigate the question whether
this impact is symmetric during the stock markets￿joint up- and downturns, a question which
10has been surprisingly sparsely discussed in the existing literature.1 While being an interesting
theoretical issue in itself, this question is particularly important for investors who choose to di-
versify their portfolios internationally. In this context we draw a connection between the strand
of literature investigating the dynamics of structural shifts in the stock markets comovements
and a growing body of literature on the downside risk and related measures. We make use
of Sklar￿ s (1959) theorem, recently extended by Patton (2001), which allows us to decompose
a multivariate distribution into its marginals and a dependence function or copula. We use a
Markov Dependent Mixture of Copulas (MDMC) model, where the dependence structure shifts
between three primitive regimes, which are modelled by three one-parameter copulas, with up-
per, lower, and zero tail dependence, and where the shifts are governed by ￿rst-order Markov
chains, as in Hamilton (1989). By testing for the presence of an increase in market integration
and contagion within each of these regime, and by evaluating their impacts, we aim to provide
further insights into the dynamics of the stock market comovements.
Our main ￿ndings are as follows. First, we do not ￿nd empirical evidence that the US-Japan
markets have become more integrated. But we do ￿nd strong evidence in favor of an increase
in market integration between the US-UK and the US-Germany markets. Interestingly, for the
UK-US pair this increase is signi￿cantly more pronounced in the upper tail regime, making an
integration process favorable for investors, while the picture is the opposite for the US-Germany
stock markets, which exhibit a sharp increase in the lower tail dependence over the last two
and a half decades. Second, we ￿nd clear empirical evidence of the presence of contagion. In
particular, we ￿nd that the markets tend to become signi￿cantly more interdependent during
highly turbulent periods and economic recessions. Curiously, while increasing the lower tail
regime dependence, we do not ￿nd a contagion e⁄ect in the upper tail dependence regime.
We also quantify the potential utility loss for investors in case they do not account for this
asymmetry, showing the importance of contagion for optimal portfolio choices. Finally, we ￿nd
that all the markets under investigation became more interdependent after the October 1987
crash, but for di⁄erent reasons. While for the US-Japan markets an increase in the comovement
is contagion driven, and, thus, of temporary nature, in case of the US-UK markets the shift
1While some papers investigate the possible asymmetry of a contagion e⁄ect, we are not aware of any study
that investigated and discussed the possible implications of an asymmetric market integration process.
11in the interdependence structure appears to be permanent, due to the investors overreaction
to the crash itself. In case of the US-Germany stock markets both investors￿overreaction and
contagion seem to contribute to an increase in these stock markets comovement.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we brie￿ y overview the
existing literature on the stock markets integration and contagion. In Section 2.3 we describe
the data and present the basic model that will be used in the subsequent analysis. In Section
2.4 we discuss the methodology. In Section 2.5 we present and discuss the estimation results.
Section 2.6 illustrates the practical implications of neglecting contagion e⁄ects. Section 2.7
concludes. Appendices 2.A and 2.B contain a motivation for the models used in our empirical
analysis.
2.2 Literature Review
2.2.1 Have Stock Markets Become More Integrated?
For a long time, the use of international diversi￿cation in portfolio choice has been advocated,
the main reason being the relatively low correlations between national stock markets (see, for
example, Solnik (1974)). The superior risk-adjusted performance of internationally diversi￿ed
portfolios over domestic ones has been widely reported (see, for instance, McDonald (1973),Guy
(1978), Grauer and Hakansson (1987), and Bauman et al. (1998)). Thus, understanding the dy-
namics of the correlation, and the long-run dependence structure between the ￿nancial markets
is of crucial importance for choosing an optimal international portfolio strategy.
There is little doubt about the fact that during the recent two decades the economies have
become increasingly globally oriented, both through more economic links, such as international
trade, and through more ￿nancial channels, due to the removal of impediments to international
investments. Cross-border foreign direct investments of the major industrial countries have
grown from 82.8 billion US dollars in 1980 to 448.3 billion US dollars in 1997, and the portfolio
cross-border investments have increased from 233.4 billion US dollars in 1985 to the impressive
number of 764.3 billion US dollars in 1995 (IMF, 1998). This global trend towards economic
integration leads to the question whether the stock markets have become more interrelated as
well, and, if so, whether the bene￿ts of international portfolio diversi￿cation are as signi￿cant
12as it is argued.
Naturally, most of the empirical work concentrated on studying the stability of the stock
markets correlation matrix across the di⁄erent time-periods. In his critical review Roll (1989)
argues that " ...except for the period immediately around the 1987 crash, there is only meager
evidence that international linkages across markets have become tighter over time". Ratner
(1992) claims that the international correlation coe¢ cients were stable during the period 1973-
1989. On the other hand, Longin and Solnik (1995) ￿nd that the correlation coe¢ cients between
the major stock markets were upward trending over the period of 1960-1995. This result has
been recently con￿rmed by Berben and Jansen (2005), who found a structural shift in the
US-UK and the US-Germany stock markets correlation matrix.
However, the long-run increase in the economic and ￿nancial integration is not the only
possible reason for the markets to become more closely related. Numerous studies claim that
after the worldwide stock market crash of October 19, 1987, the markets have become more
interdependent. During that day all major stock indices have simultaneously plummeted down.
In fact, as it has been noticed by Roll (1989), October 1987 was the only month during the
decade of the 1980-s when every market moved in the same direction. On the day of the
crash, October 19, the S&P500 composite index plunged 22.9 percent, setting o⁄ international
repercussions. On the next day, the NIKKEI 225 index declined 16.1% and other world markets
experienced similar sharp price declines. During the two weeks of the crisis (October 19, and
the preceding drop of October 14) the DAX and S&P 500 su⁄ered a decline of 11%, the FTSE
100 lost 13.5% of its value, and the NIKKEI 225 lost only a "moderate" 6.1%.
The most intriguing feature of this crash is the absence of any reasonable explanation of what
could be the cause for such an abrupt default of the stock markets around the world. Some
authors attribute the crash to the fundamentals (for instance, Mitchell and Netter (1989)),
while others argue that the crash was the burst of the speculative bubble of the mid-80-s (for
instance, Siegal (1988)), lack of market liquidity (for example, Amihud et al. (1989)) or a global
"contagion" scenario (for instance, King and Wadhwani (1990)). Among all these theories
a "contagion" based explanation seems to be the most persuasive one. Shiller (1987, 1988)
provides some survey evidence that there was no clear-cut reaction to any kind of announcement
that triggered the crash. A lot of investors admitted that they had experienced "contagion or
13fear on the day of the crash". In case of Japan, the majority of investors considered the news
about the crash to be the most important issue during the day of the crash, and, in general, the
news from the US was ranked as being more important compared to the news from Japan itself.
Seyhun (1990) studies the trading pattern of the insiders around the market crash and arrives
at the conclusion that a sharp decline of the stock market has been caused by the overreaction
and not due to the fundamentals.
Bertero and Mayer (1990) argue that the stock markets displayed a higher degree of inter-
dependence both during and after the month of the crash. Malliaris and Urrutia (1992) report
an increase in the contemporaneous causality between the major stock markets after the crash.
Masih and Masih (1997) study the interdependence between the stock markets using a Vector
Error Correction (VEC) framework and conclude that, in general, the crash brought about a
greater interaction between the national stock markets. Koutmos and Booth (1995) study the
mechanism of price and volatility spillovers between the New York, London, and Tokyo stock
exchanges. They conclude that the linkages and the interactions among these markets have in-
creased substantially during the post-crash era. Smith (1999) applies a cross-spectral analysis
for the major equity markets and concludes that on average the coherence between the markets
has substantially increased after the crash.
In Figure 2.1 we present the estimates of Kendall￿ s tau for the major developed markets,
estimated with a one-year rolling window. Both the Germany-US couple and the UK-US couple
appear to become increasingly interdependent over time. The UK-US dependence structure
also exhibits a sharp increase around the end of the 1980-s, which might be due to the October
crash. On the other hand, in case of the US-Japan couple, the interdependence between the
stock markets seems to be quite stable over the time. Of course, the issue is whether an increase
in the interdependence structure observed in case of the Germany-US and UK-US couples was
indeed the result of a statistically signi￿cant shift in the long-run dependence, or simply a
temporary increase caused by short-run dynamics.
In general, the studies of market integration and the studies on the pre-and post-crash equity
market linkages agree in one thing: the markets indeed have become more interdependent since
the end of the 1980-s. However, whether this increase in interdependence should be attributed
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Figure 2-1: Empirical Kendals tau of the international vs US stock markets
straightforward, since both events happened during the same time period. Both a sudden shift
in the dependence structure caused by the crash and a gradual adjustment of the dependence
structure to a new and higher level of dependence could produce the shift in the di⁄erent
dependence measures mentioned above. Thus, to get further insight into the nature of this
change, one should also study the dynamics of the latter.
We study the long-run dynamics of the linkages between the major stock markets in a
Markov-Dependent Mixture of Copulas (MDMC) framework. Applying a smooth transition
structural shift approach, introduced by Luukkonen et al. (1988) and Lin and Terrasvirta
(1994) within our framework allows us both to test for the existence of a structural shift and to
decompose the latter, if present, into a crash and long-run integration e⁄ects. In addition, the
mixture of copulas framework allows us to test for symmetry of the structural shift, i.e., whether
the event had its impact on both the upper and lower tail dependence regimes, or maybe only
on one of them. Our results indicate that for the US-Japan markets there is no evidence of
either a structural shift caused by the "Black Monday" crash or a time trend in the dependence
structure which would be consistent with a long-run integration process. On the other hand, in
15case of the US-UK and US-Germany couples we ￿nd strong empirical evidence in favor of both
an October crash impact, resulting in an upward shift of the left tail index, and an increase
in the market integration, resulting in a gradual increase in both the upper and lower tail
indices in case of US-UK and only the lower tail index in case of US-Germany. Interestingly,
for these markets a shift in the interdependence structure appears to be asymmetric, a fact
which potentially has an important implications for the international portfolio diversi￿cation
strategies.
2.2.2 Have developed markets developed contagion?
During the last decade, ￿nancial markets around the world have been highly turbulent. Nu-
merous currency crises followed by stock market crashes, including the "Tequila crash" in 1994
and the "Asian Flu" in 1997, have rapidly propagated from the originating country to other
geographically distant economies, with seemingly no relationship in terms of fundamentals or
in terms of trading or ￿nancial links. This phenomenon has shifted the interest of both econo-
mists and policymakers to an alternative driving force of ￿nancial market comovement, namely
"contagion".
While there exists an extensive body of both theoretical and empirical literature, studying
the contagion phenomenon, one can hardly ￿nd at most two researchers who agree on what
contagion really means. The Worldbank proposes three alternative de￿nitions of contagion:2
1) Broad de￿nition. Contagion is a cross-country transmission of shocks or a general cross-
country spillover e⁄ect. Contagion can take place both during "good" times and "bad" times
and, thus, does not have to be related to a crisis. However, the presence of contagion is
emphasized during crisis times.
2) Restrictive de￿nition. Contagion is the transmission of shocks from some originating
country to other countries, or the cross-country correlation, beyond any fundamental link among
the countries, and beyond common shocks. This de￿nition is usually referred to as an excess
comovement, driven by herding instincts.
3) Very restrictive de￿nition. Contagion occurs when cross-country correlations increase
during "crisis times" relative to correlations during "tranquil times".
2See the World Bank Group website www.worldbank.org for a brief summary of the contagion literature.
16Again, one can easily see that there is quite a thin line between these three de￿nitions. For
instance, if the "crisis period" has been caused by some global shock, say a sudden increase in oil
prices, which has led to a simultaneous decline of the national stock markets, then an increase
in the stock markets comovement can be de￿ned as a contagion e⁄ect according to either the
broad or the very restrictive de￿nition. Thus, an important issue in studying contagion is a
precise de￿nition of what we de￿ne as the contagion phenomenon.
Fundamentals-based contagion is usually referred to as a crisis spreading from a country
where the initial shock occured to other economies by means of real (trade) or ￿nancial links.
The importance of bilateral trade links as a transmission channel of contagion has been stressed
by Glick and Rose (1999). Financial links, on the other hand, are usually referred to as the
situation when the investors holding internationally diversi￿ed portfolios are forced to sell the
assets both in the market hit by the crisis and in the other markets, in order to keep up with
margin requirements (Calvo (1998)). Alternatively, the crisis propagation mechanism can be
explained by the existence of a common creditor country, which will respond to the crisis by the
reduction in its credit lines in historically correlated economies (Folkerts-Landau and Garber
(1998)).
An important class of models relate contagion to investors￿behavior. In their seminal paper,
King and Wadhwani (1994) present a model of international equity markets with incomplete
information and with investors facing a signal-extraction problem. They show that this type
of behavior creates a direct link between the magnitude of the international transmission of
shocks and the volatility, resulting in a volatility driven contagion. Another strand of literature
relates contagion to the existence of multiple equilibria (Obstfeld (1996)), where the currency
devaluation is a sort of "preemptive strike", when the market is dominated by the sentiment
that the currency will be depreciated, turning the investors￿beliefs into self-ful￿lling ones.
The world wide propagation of currency and stock market crises has also inspired an exten-
sive body of empirical literature testing whether contagion is the reason for crises to become
so widely spread. King and Wadhwani (1990) test for an increase in cross-market correlations
between the US, UK, and Japanese equity markets, and ￿nd supporting evidence of an increase
after the US stock market crash. This ￿nding is supported by Lee and Kim (1993), who report
an increase in cross-market correlations for twelve major ￿nancial markets. Baig and Gold-
17fajn (1999) analyze cross-market linkages between the stock market returns, sovereign spreads,
and exchange rates of ￿ve Asian countries before and during the ￿ Asian Flu￿(July 1997-May
1998). They ￿nd that for each variable under investigation there has been a signi￿cant increase
in the cross-country correlations during the turbulent period of currency and stock market cri-
sis. However, as shown by Forbes and Rigobon (1999), this traditional approach might result
in upward biased estimates of the correlation coe¢ cients during the turbulent periods, due to
selection bias, thus, leading to overrejection of the null of no contagion and, thus, a downward
correction for heteroscedasticity has to be made.3 After correcting for heteroscedasticity these
authors ￿nd almost no evidence for a correlation breakdown during the Mexican and Asian
crises.
An alternative approach to control for the selection bias is by taking it into account by
explicitly modelling the probability distribution of asset returns. Eichengreen et al. (1995)
and Bae, Karolyi, and Stulz (2003) estimate the joint "tail" coexceedance probabilities using
a probit and logit framework. This procedure involves choosing a threshold value for the
negative (positive) "extreme" events, where the data is transformed into a binary variable
taking the value 1 or 0, depending on whether the return is above or below the threshold. In
both cases empirical evidence for contagion is reported.4 Edwards and Susmel (2001) study
the comovement of stock markets in Latin America and Asia during the Mexican and Asian
crises using a bivariate SWARCH models and ￿nd strong evidence in favor of variance￿ state-
dependent correlation coe¢ cients, which is consistent with the signal-extraction model of King
and Wadhwani (1994).
In this study we test for the presence of contagion between the major stock markets within
a copula based framework which provides us with direct measures of positive (negative) crises,
namely, the tail indices. Thus, in our framework, we de￿ne a lower tail contagion as a shift
in the lower tail index conditional on a shift in the state of the economy (fundamentals based
contagion) or conditional on an increase in the volatility of ￿nancial markets (pure or volatility
based contagion). Upper tail contagion is de￿ned in a similar way. We ￿nd strong empirical
3A similar remark has been made by Longin and Solnik (2001), who show that for the bivariate normal
distribution with constant correlation, conditioning on large absolute values leads to an increase in the conditional
correlation.
4As pointed out by Dungey et al. (2003), a sample-based choice of a threshold may result in a potentially
non-unique classi￿cation of the data for di⁄erent sample periods.
18evidence in favor of both volatility and fundamentals based contagion for the US-Japan and
US-Germany stock markets and also, though some weaker evidence, of contagion between the
US-UK stock markets. We also quantify a potential utility loss for the investors who do not
account for contagion e⁄ects which appear to be economically signi￿cant as well.
2.3 Data Description and Model Selection
In this section we ￿rst describe the data we use. Then we present the model that we will use
in the subsequent sections to test for the presence of market integration and contagion e⁄ects.
2.3.1 Data Description and Preliminary Analysis
Our basic data set consists of closing stock index levels of the S&P 500 (United States), the
FTSE 100 (United Kingdom), the DAX 30 (Germany) and the Nikkei 225 (Japan), all de-
nominated in US dollars. The data has been obtained from Datastream. Our sample covers
the period from January 1, 1980 to August 31, 2005, consisting of 1339 weekly Thursday-to-
Thursday returns, calculated by taking ￿rst di⁄erences of the logarithmic indices levels.5. In
addition, we include in our data set business cycle indicators as the state-of-economy variables
of the markets mentioned above.6 .
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the USD denominated returns. All variables are
characterized by a high kurtosis. In case of the DAX 30, there is also some evidence of negative
skewness. For the other series the skewness coe¢ cient is insigni￿cant. A Lagrange Multiplier
(LM) test on serial correlation indicates the presence of autocorrelation for the DAX returns.
An ARCH LM test indicates signi￿cant GARCH e⁄ects for all four return series. Based on the
large values of Jarque-Berra statistic we strongly reject the null of unconditional normality for
all four return series.
5Burns et al. (1998) show that aggregation to weekly returns in general allows to avoid the problem of the
non-synchronous trading.
6These indicators are on a monthly basis. They have been purchased from the US Conference Board. For a
full description of how these indices are comprised and other details, see www.conference-board.org.
19Table 1: Summary statistics
DAX 30 FTSE 100 NIKKEI 225 S&P 500
Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error
Mean 0.0006 0.00037 0.0007 0.00028 0.0004 0.004 0.0007 0.0003
St.Dev 0.014 0.0005 0.012 0.00049 0.012 0.00047 0.01 0.0004
Skew -0.35 0.14 -0.54 0.39 -0.03 0.125 -0.48 0.34
Kurt 5.48 0.65 8.62 2.01 4.39 0.3 6.9 2.08
S.Corr.LM 15.26￿￿ 5.85 5.26 3.6
ARCH LM 137.14￿￿ 38.79￿￿ 98.31￿￿ 114.57￿￿
J-B. Stat 393.4￿￿ 1830.25￿￿ 109.53￿￿ 901.94￿￿
Descriptive statistics estimated jointly by (G)MM. Standard errors are Newey-West HAC with 7 lags.
S.Corr.LM denotes a Lagrange Multiplier test on serial correlation between returns
ARCH LM denotes a Lagrange Multiplier test on ARCH e⁄ects in volatility
J-B. Stat denotes Jarque-Berra test statistic applied to returns. ￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
To provide a ￿rst impression on a possible dependence structure between the series, we
estimate for each pair of markets the empirical exceedance probabilities. We de￿ne the empirical
exceedance probability pj(￿j) as the (empirical) probability that market A will be above (below)
its mean by more than j standard errors, conditional on the same state of market B. We take
the US market as the conditioning market B and estimate the empirical exceedance probabilities
over the range of four standard errors with a 0:1 grid, that is j 2 f￿4;￿3:9;:::;3:9;4g. The
results are presented in Figure 1. In general, both the Germany-US and the UK-US stock
markets appear to be jointly negatively skewed. However, while the UK-US markets seem to
have more power in the negative tail, the outcome is quite the opposite for the Germany-US
pair: it seems to exhibit higher upper tail dependence. On the other hand, for the Japan-US
pair the dependence structure seems to be quite symmetric, with no substantial asymmetry
between upper and lower tail probabilities, which, in fact, seem to converge to zero.
In addition, for a ￿rst understanding on how the "tail" asymmetry is evolving over time, we
also plot in Figure 2.2 the di⁄erence between the exceedance probabilities of +(￿)1:8 standard
20errors, i.e., p1:8 ￿ p￿1:8; using a rolling window of two years. All markets seem to exhibit a
gradual increase in the negative asymmetry around the turbulent years 1988-1992 containing
"Black Monday" of October 1987 and the currency crises during 1992-93 in Europe. This
tendency seems to reverse during the mid-1990-s, possibly re￿ ecting the enthusiasm of the
"dot.com" bubble, and seems to become close to zero around the years 2002-2004 in case of the
UK and Japan, while remaining negative for the Germany-US couple.
To summarize our preliminary analysis, we can say that for all the markets the dependence
structure seems to exhibit a substantial degree of time variation. The interdependence between
Germany-US and UK-US seems to be asymmetric, suggesting that modelling this interdepen-
dence using a standard (say, Gaussian or Student-t) framework may result in a serious mis-
speci￿cation. In addition, as is typical for many non-parametric estimators, the coexceedance
probability- and asymmetry measure-estimates su⁄er from a high estimation inaccuracy, mak-
ing it hard to reach speci￿c conclusions regarding the characteristics of the interdependence
structure between the markets. Notice, however, that these are unconditional estimates. It is
possible that, while the unconditional joint distribution is symmetric, the conditional distrib-
ution, conditional on past information, is skewed. Therefore, while not imposing it, we shall
allow for the possibility of asymmetry and time variation in our model, to be presented below.
2.3.2 The Model
Since copula theory allows us to decompose a joint distribution into its margins and a depen-
dence function (the copula), it seems natural to select some "appropriate" model by conducting
a separate speci￿cation search on the margins and on the whole distribution. If, for instance,
the models of the marginal distributions perform well in speci￿cation tests, but the model of
the joint distribution appears to be misspeci￿ed, then the source of the misspeci￿cation seems
to be a wrong choice of the copula function. We ￿rst discuss the modeling of the margins, and
then we turn to the modeling of the copula.
Speci￿cation of the Margins
The series exhibit an unconditional kurtosis which is signi￿cantly higher than the one implied
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Figure 2-2: Empirical coexceedance probabilities and "tail" asymmetry.
22a Non-normally distributed innovations
b GARCH e⁄ects with normally distributed innovations
c Both of them
To make our model su¢ ciently ￿ exible, but at the same time also parsimonious, we model
the margins by means of an AR(q)-GARCH(1,1) process (compare Ramchand and Susmel
(1998), and Berben and Jansen (2005)) with possibly a leverage e⁄ect and Generalized Error
Distribution (GED-) distributed innovations (Nelson (1991)):
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Here ￿(L) denotes a lag-operator polynomial, It is an indicator function which takes the value 1
if ￿t￿1 < 0 and 0 otherwise, and ￿ is the shape parameter of the Generalized Error Distribution,
with "fat tails" corresponding to ￿ < 2 and "thin tails" to ￿ > 2. For ￿ = 2, the GED is
the standard normal distribution. Based on an autocorrelation function (ACF-) analysis we
include an AR(2)- term in the mean equations of the DAX and the Nikkei and no lags in case
of the S&P 500 and the FTSE 100. Appendix 2 contains the speci￿cation search as well as the
resulting margins used in the subsequent analysis.
Speci￿cation of the Copula/the Joint Distribution
Based on our preliminary data analysis, it seems reasonable to model the dependence structure
in a framework which allows for both symmetry and time variation in the tail indices. One way
of achieving this goal might be to model the dependence structure using a two-parameter copula
framework. The problem, however, is that for most two-parameter copulas the tail indices are
interdependent, a fact which would limit the ￿ exibility too much. An alternative approach,
advocated here, is to model the dependence structure by means of a time-dependent mixture of
23one-parameter copulas. Consider three simple one-parameter copulas, CU; with positive upper
tail dependence but no lower tail dependence, parametrized, say, by ￿U > 0 and ￿L = 0, CL;
with zero upper tail dependence and positive lower tail dependence, i.e., ￿U = 0 and ￿L > 0,
and C0 with no upper and lower tail dependence, i.e., ￿U = ￿L = 0. Then we can consider
as copula at time t, conditional upon the available information at time t ￿ 1, the copula Ct,
de￿ned as Ct = CU; with conditional probability pU;t, Ct = CL; with conditional probability
pU;t, and Ct = C0 with conditional probability p0;t = 1 ￿ pU;t ￿ pL;t: Then from the point of
view of an observer who makes inferences based on the information set at time t ￿ 1, both the
conditional upper and lower tail indices can be strictly positive, since they are equal to pU;t￿U
and pL;t￿L, respectively, obviously nesting symmetry as a special case.
Modelling the dependence structure using this conditional mixture framework, we still have
to choose the functional form of the copulas and the probability law governing the time evo-
lution of the copulas￿conditional probabilities or weights (the p-s). For CU we choose the
Gumbel copula, for CL we choose the Clayton copula, and for C0 we choose the Frank copula
(see Appendix B for a brief description of these copulas). Among the Archimedean class of
copulas these are the copulas which are most widely used due to their simple closed form and
nice analytical properties (see, for instance, Valdez (2001), Longin and Solnik (2001) Henessey
and Lapan (2002) and Smith (2003), among others). In addition, we shall assume that the
probability law governing the regimes can be described by a ￿rst-order ergodic Markov process
with time-invariant transition probability matrix P with typical component pij denoting the
probability of entering next period regime j given that currently the system is in regime i,
where i;j 2 f0; U; Lg, so that, for example,
pU;t = pU;0, in case of regime 0 at time t ￿ 1;
= pU;L, in case of regime L at time t ￿ 1;
= pU;U, in case of regime U at time t ￿ 1:
Since the seminal paper of Hamilton (1989) Hidden Markov Models have become a widely used
tool in empirical modelling of the behaviour of ￿nancial markets (see, for instance, Ryden et
al (1998), Ramchand and Susmel (1998), Gordon and St-Amour (2000) to name a few) due to
24their ability to capture endogenous breaks in the distributional properties of asset prices. As
shown in Appendix B, this model is strongly superior compared to the Gaussian and Student-t
copulas, frequently used in empirical research, and it also performs quite well in speci￿cation
tests.
2.4 Methodology
2.4.1 Testing for the Long-Run Trend in the Interdependence Structure
Since changes in the dependence structure cannot reliably be detected by simply splitting the
sample based on data realizations (see, for instance, Boyer (1999)), we allow for a smooth tran-
sition (ST) between two di⁄erent dependence measures, following Lin and Terrasvirta (1994),
and Berben and Jansen (2005). A smooth transition from low to high market intedependence
is also consistent with the concept of increasing market integration, which is more likely to be
a gradual process rather than an abrupt shift in the dependence structure.
Our model consists of a time-varying mixture of the one-parameter copula
Ct = pU;tCU + pL;tCL + (1 ￿ pU;t ￿ pL;t)C0
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In this setup, ￿j can be interpreted as the speed of the structural break, and cj tells us when
"on average" a structural break occurred (Berben and Jansen (2005)). As an extension of the
methodology by Berben and Jansen (2005), we test for an increase in market integration within
each regime separately. In case the markets become more integrated over time, one would
25expect the dependence parameters to be trending upwards. However, it may be the case that
the trend is asymmetric, with a trending upward left tail parameter and a time-constant right-
tail dependence parameter, or that both tail indices are trending upwards but with di⁄erent
speeds. This distinction is crucial for investors who would be interested not only in whether the
markets tend to move more closely together, but also whether an increase in comovement occurs
during only an up- or a downturns or both. While a standard Gaussian ST model7 is unable
do distinguish between these cases, these possibilities are special cases within the framework
presented here.
Clearly, before estimating a ST version of the Markov-dependent mixture, one should test
for the existence of a deterministic trend within one or more of the regimes. Time-constancy




2 within each regime j, or by
setting ￿j equal to zero, for all the regimes j 2 f0;L;Ug. Thus, under the null, some of the
parameters remain unidenti￿ed, implying that the standard tests are inapplicable. To solve
the identi￿cation problem, we follow the Taylor series-approximation approach proposed by
Luukkonen et al. (1988), by modelling an "auxiliary" ST model where the weighting function
g (st;￿;c) ￿ ￿(￿(st ￿ c)) is replaced by its ￿rst-order Taylor series approximation e g (st;￿;c)
around ￿ = 0:
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where the remainder term R(￿) is of order ￿2: After plugging this approximation into our
























1):(see also Berben and Jansen
(2005)). A standard LM test for testing the null hypothesis e ￿j = 0, corresponding to dependence
constancy within regime j, can then easily be constructed.
An alternative scenario for the long-run dynamics is a sudden shift in the dependence
structure, because of some extreme event, such as the October crash of 1987. Numerous stud-
ies indicate that around the date of this crisis the markets became more interdependent. A
7See, for instance, Berben and Jansen (2005).
26question which naturally arises, is whether the impact of the crash was completely transitory,
fully permanent, or maybe a combination of these two, i.e., a sudden shift in the dependence
structure immediately after the crash, with a subsequent gradual adjustment of the market
interdependence to its original level (a semi-permanent impact) or to a new level (a long-run
increase in market integration). To model these possibilities, we assume that within each regime
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where Iac is the indicator function which takes the value 1 for observations after October 19,
1987, and zero otherwise (an "after crisis" dummy), and Ibc (the "before crisis" dummy) takes
the value 1 for observations up to and including the crash week, and zero otherwise. Then a












2 & ￿j = 0
while a permanent impact yields as null hypothesis
H0 : ￿j = 0:
Again, after approximating g (st;￿;c) ￿ ￿(￿(st ￿ c)) by e g (st;￿;c); and some algebraic manip-
ulations, the following equations to be used in testing, can be obtained
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27Then, testing the null of a permanent vs a semi-permanent change boils down to testing the
null of e ￿
j
3 = e ￿
j
4 = 0; and testing for dependence constancy is equivalent to testing e ￿
j





4 = 0. Since, obviously, the model with constant parameters is nested within the model with
a permanent structural break, and the latter is a special case of the semi-transitory model, we
proceed in two steps. First, for each pair of markets we test the null of dependence constancy
against the alternative of a permanent break via the LM test for the standard ST model. At the
second stage, for those markets where the null of dependence constancy has been rejected, we
estimate an auxiliary model under the restriction ￿j = 0, and test the null of a permanent vs a
semi-permanent break via the LM test, by applying it to the scores of the auxiliary model. For
those markets where the null of dependence constancy vs the alternative of permanent impact
has not been rejected, we estimate an auxiliary model under the restriction e ￿
j
2 = e ￿
j
3 = e ￿
j
4 = 0;
and then test the null of the dependence constancy vs the alternative of a semi-permanent
break, again via the LM test with the scores of the auxiliary model.
2.4.2 Testing for the Presence of Contagion
We de￿ne contagion as a shift in the dependence structure between stock markets as a result of a
shift in the volatility or a change in a state of economy. Since contagion is usually associated with
a crisis period, we concentrate our attention on the propagation mechanism of extreme positive
(negative) shocks from one stock market to another, the tail dependence indices. In order to
test for the presence of contagion, we ￿nd it useful to consider the following reparametrization
of the dependence parameters for the Gumbel and Clayton copulas, which in our framework,








28where the conditional upper and lower tail indices are parametrized as a logistic function of the
state of the economy (Ze ) and the volatility shift covariates (Zh)
￿U;t =
exp(￿u + ￿us;uZus;t + ￿f;uZf;t + ￿h;uZh;t)
1 + exp(￿u + ￿us;uZus;t + ￿f;uZf;t + ￿h;uZh;t)
￿L;t =
exp(￿l + ￿us;lZus;t + ￿f;lZf;t + ￿h;lZh;t)
1 + exp(￿l + +￿us;lZus;t + ￿f;lZf;t + ￿h;lZh;t)
In this framework, the no volatility based (or "pure") contagion hypothesis corresponds to the
case where ￿h;u = ￿h;l = 0; while the no contagion case is obtained by setting all ￿-s equal to
zero. Also, note that, while nesting as a special case symmetric volatility e⁄ects in case of both
positive and negative shocks, similarly as in King and Wadhwani (1990), we also allow for an
asymmetric impact on the upper and lower tail indices.8
Obviously, a particularly important issue is the choice of covariates. Since the volatility
based contagion is usually considered as an abrupt shift in the interdependence, we introduce a
threshold GARCH e⁄ect within the dependence structure of our model. Speci￿cally, we de￿ne





1 if hA;t > TA and hB;t > TB
0 otherwise,
where TA and TB denote the threshold values for markets A and B, respectively.9 In other
words, we allow both upper and lower tail indices to shift in case both markets are expected
to be highly turbulent during the next period. Since, by de￿nition, tail indices are invariant
with respect to which market we de￿ne as the economy where initial shock has occured, it
is important to concentrate on the joint volatility of the markets and not on the separate
volatilities e⁄ects.
As discussed above, the fundamentals based propagation mechanism of shocks between the
stock markets depends (at least in theory) on various macroeconomic and ￿nancial variables,
such as the trade balance, openness of the economy to foreign capital in￿ ows and out￿ ows,
8Bae, Karolyi and Stulz (2003) report mixed evidence on the asymmetric contagion e⁄ects.
9A slightly di⁄erent type of threshold e⁄ect has been used by Longin and Solnik (1995).
29etc., which obviously are not available at a weekly or monthly frequency. Therefore, we use a
Conference Board Coincidence index which describes an overall level of the economic activity












1 for decrease in US business cycle
0 otherwise
where "foreign" stands for Germany,UK, or Japan, depending on which pair of market is stud-
ied, and an increase (decrease) in the business cycle indicators is measured as a log-di⁄erence
between the level of the indicator in the current and preceding months. In other words, we
allow for "jumps" in the upper and lower tail indices, due to a high turbulence or worsening
economic conditions.
Two issues should be kept in mind in case of this "generalized" contagion model. First,
note that by including the state of the economy indicators in our model, we extend the in-
formation set, on which we condition the joint distribution of stock market returns. That is,
our information set Ft￿1 now includes the whole history of the returns of both stock markets
and the information regarding the state of both economies, on which we should condition both
the margins and the copula. To keep our model parsimonious, we allow the state of economy
variables to a⁄ect the conditional mean of the stock market returns by including the state of
the economy covariates Zf;t and Zus;t in the conditional mean equations for each stock market.
Second, it is important to realize that the business cycle indicators are reported with a time
delay. For instance, the US business cycle indicators for October are published at the end of
November, while the Germany, UK, and Japan business cycle composites generally become
available at the end, middle, or beginning of December. Taking this time-lag into account is
important for a proper de￿nition of information available to the investors.
10The data, at a monthly frequency, has been purchased from the Conference Board (www.conference-
board.org) and transformed into weekly frequency by simply taking the same value of the indicator for all
the weeks of the particular month.
302.5 Empirical Findings
In this section we present and discuss our empirical ￿ndings. In subsection 2.5.1 we test for
the presence of and estimate the long-run trends in the dependence structure of the developed
stock markets. Next, we test for the presence and examine potential implications of contagion
for the comovement between the stock markets in subsection 2.5.2
2.5.1 Testing for and Estimating the Long-Run Trends in the Interdepen-
dence Structure
We begin with presenting and discussing the results of the structural shift tests as discussed in
Section 2.4. In the upper panel of Table 2 we present the p-values of the LM test for a single
smooth structural break, which may be consistent with an increase in market integration. For
each pair of markets the test has been performed both for the individual regimes and for the
entire dependence structure. The results clearly indicate that, in general, the null of no time-
trend cannot be rejected at any legitimate level of signi￿cance. However, it is possible that the
time path of a structural change has been subject to abrupt shifts, such as the October crash of
1987, which has not been detected by the ST LM test. Therefore, we next turn to the two-stage
testing procedure for the semi-permanent structural break as described above.
The p-values of the two-stage procedure are presented in the middle and lower panels of
Table 2, respectively. The high p-values clearly indicate that for all pairs of markets the null
of a constant dependence parameter vs a permanent break, in general, cannot be rejected for
any of the three copulas.11 In addition, there is no evidence for a semi-permanent shift for
the US-Japan markets. On the other hand, there is strong empirical evidence in favor of a
semi-permanent structural shift in the upper tail (the Gumbel copula, j = U) and there is also,
somewhat weaker, evidence of a semi-permanent shift in the lower tail dependence regime (the
Clayton copula, j = L) in case of the UK-US and US-Germany markets.
In order to assess the robustness of our results, we conduct the following test. For every
copula, where a structural shift has been detected, we calculate the LM test statistic over the
entire range of the observations by shifting a presumed structural break date by a window of
11We have also conducted a joint LM test for the whole distribution function which is asymptotically distributed
under the null as ￿
2
3: The results are very similar to the individual copulas tests.
3150 observations (i.e., approximately one year) both backward and forward with respect to the
crash date (thus, shifting forward and backward the indicator function Iac). As a result, for
each copula we obtain a series of LM test statistics. For both the US-UK and US-Germany
couples, the Clayton copula - LM test statistics remain signi￿cant only in the neighborhood
of the crash, supporting the idea that both a shift caused by the October crash and long-
run dynamics are present in the lower tail dependence structure. On the other hand, the
Gumbel copula LM statistics is above the critical values over the entire range, implying that
the upper tail dependence structure most likely is subject to a gradual rather than an abrupt
change. Thus, for the US-UK markets we estimate the model with a semi-permanent shift in
both the Gumbel (j = U) and Clayton (j = L) copulas and for the US-Germany couple the
semi-permanent shift is allowed only in the Clayton copula.
32Table 2:Results of the structural break tests
2.1: Smooth structural shift
S&P-DAX S&P-FTSE S&P-NIKKEI
Gumbel (U) 0.85 0.96 0.96
Clayton (L) 0.84 0.81 0.91
Frank (0) 0.79 0.46 0.92
2.2: Permanent structural shift
Gumbel (U) 0.75 0.96 0.59
Clayton (L) 0.39 0.93 0.93
Frank (0) 0.54 0.88 0.67
2.3: Semi-permanent structural shift
Gumbel (U) 0.83 0.009 0.14
Clayton (L) 0.007 0.07 0.52
Frank (0) 0.76 0.89 0.31
In this table we present the results of the structural break
tests under three alternative scenarios, as discussed in
Section 2.4. The reported numbers are the corresponding
p-values for each scenario, for each dependence regime, and for
each pair of the stock markets respectively
Next, we present the estimation results of the ST-MDMC model applied to the US-UK and
the US-Germany markets and the standard MDMC model applied to the US-Japan markets.
For the sake of saving space we only present the estimates of the time-varying parameters of the
copulas. For each pair of markets and for each copula we present the equation which governs
the evolution of the corresponding copula over time. For the US-UK pair both upper and lower
tail regimes are characterized by a low degree of dependence before the crash (in case of the
Gumbel copula the markets seem to be nearly independent). In case of the Gumbel copula the
Black Monday crash has resulted in a very moderate upward shift in the upper tail dependence,
a ￿nding which supports the results of the robustness test, implying that the October crash
had no permanent impact on the upper tail regime. However, the picture is completely reversed
33for the lower tail regime, where the October crash has resulted in a signi￿cant increase in the
dependence parameter, which has been followed by the gradual adjustment to the new and
higher level of interdependence, consistent with a long-run integration process. These ￿ndings
are also in line with the classical overreaction picture, namely, that the investors became more
sensitive to the "bad" news immediately after the crash (see Figure 2.3). For both copulas the
di⁄erence between ￿1 and ￿3 is statistically signi￿cant, supporting the idea that over time the
markets became more integrated. Interestingly, there is also a statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence
between the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients (the ￿-s) which is much higher for the Clayton
copula than for the Gumbel copula, possibly implying that the investors are more sensitive to
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j￿2 ; to keep them positively. The high
estimation inaccuracy of the ￿
j-s is partially due to the delta method based standard errors, and also due to the
fact that a wide range of ￿
j-s can produce almost the same ￿ (see Lin and Terrasvirta (1994)).
34For the US-Germany pair, as in the case of the US-UK pair, the markets appear to be
almost independent in the lower tail dependence regime at the beginning of the 1980-s. As in
the case of the US-UK markets the October Crash resulted in a sharp increase in the lower tail
index. However, in contrast to a rather gradual market integration process, as it appears in
the US-UK case, in case of the US-Germany couple the adjustment to a new dependence level
is almost immediate and occurs around 1992-1993. Compared to these markets the US-Japan
pair exhibits a remarkably stable dependence structure with Kendall￿ s tau ranging between 0.16
and 0.24, though exhibiting some long-run swings, possibly due to the dependence cycles (see
Figure 5). Also, for the US-Japan pair both upper and lower tail regimes appear to be nearly
independent, with low and statistically insigni￿cant dependence parameters of the Gumbel and
Clayton copulas, implying that the Japanese stock market is less integrated with the US market
than the European markets.
An important issue is whether the long-run market integration process is symmetric or
whether it exhibits some degree of asymmetry. This issue is particularly important in the face of
recently repeated statements that the recent globalization oriented trend increases the comove-
ment between equity markets and, thus, reduces the bene￿ts from international diversi￿cation.
However, neither correlation coe¢ cients nor any other overall measure of interdependence does
provide us with information regarding the direction of this increase, thus, implicitly assuming
that the increase has been symmetric, or that the investors have mean-variance preferences,
or any other type of preferences which solely depend on the overall measures of risk. There
is a growing body of evidence that a downside risk, that is, a probability that the value of
the portfolio will fall below some threshold level, plays an important role in portfolio selection
decisions (see, for instance, Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Ang, Chen, and Xing (2004)).
Both one-sided constraints, such as short-selling restrictions and institutional and banking reg-
ulations, such as the Value at Risk, imply that partial dependence measures are much more
important than an overall measures of dependence. In addition, numerous experimental evi-
dence supports the prospect theory of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and the disappointment
aversion theory of Gul (1991), suggesting that individuals tend to treat gains and losses dif-
ferently. Our ￿ndings, however, suggest that for the US-UK markets the long-run integration
process not only increased the overall dependence between the ￿nancial markets, but also in-
35creased the probability of a joint positive comovement compared to the probability of observing
a joint negative comovement, which, in light of the evidence mentioned above, implies that the
integration process of the US and UK stock markets appears to be favorable for the majority
of investors. On the other hand, for the US-Germany markets the integration process resulted
in an increase in the lower tail index, increasing the probability of joint negative comovements,
leading to a signi￿cant reduction of the international diversi￿cation bene￿ts.
To demonstrate this point for the US-UK and the US-Germany markets, we plot the time
path of the "booming-crash" odds, which we de￿ne as the ratio between the upper and lower
tail indices (pU;t￿U and pL;t￿L). In other words, we analyze the ratio between the probability
that market A will boom, given that market B is booming as well, and the probability that
market A will crash, given that market B has collapsed. This ratio provides useful information
about the tail behavior of a portfolio comprised of these two market indices and, thus, allows us
to analyze the impact of both the October crash and the market integration on the bene￿ts of
international diversi￿cation strategies. In order to concentrate solely on the long-run e⁄ects, we
replace the time-varying upper and lower regimes ￿lter probabilities by their ergodic estimates
which are equal to 0.384 and 0.127, respectively, for the US-UK markets, and 0.141 and 0.35
for the US-Germany markets.
The results are presented in Figure 2.3. For the US-UK markets the odds appear to be
upward trending until the end of 1990-s, with an abrupt downward shift due to the October
crash. From the end of 1990-s, the odds exhibit a reversed trend, reaching the "steady state"
level (ignoring short-run dynamics) of 1.67 compared to 0.6 at the beginning of the 1980-s,
exhibiting an increase of almost 200%, implying that, due to the market integration process,
US-UK diversi￿ed portfolios became conditionally more positively skewed. On the other hand,
for the US-Germany markets both the October crash and the market integration process resulted
in an abrupt downward shift in the odds, leading to a reduction from 2.73 at the beginning of
the 1980-s to 0.38 by the middle of 2005.
To summarize this section, a number of important ￿ndings should be mentioned. By apply-
ing a smooth-transition methodology as proposed by Luukkonen et al. (1988) to the MDMC
model we ￿nd strong empirical evidence of a long-run market integration process in case of the
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Figure 2-3: Long-run integration, October Crash and the dependence structure of the stock
markets
37we also ￿nd a solid empirical evidence of a structural break in the lower tail index, following
the October crash. Our results also suggest that in case of the US-UK markets an increase
in the market integration resulted in a decrease in the downside risk, a ￿nding which has im-
portant implications for the optimal portfolio choice, making the diversi￿cation between these
two markets more favorable. On the other hand, in case of the Germany-US stock markets,
an increase in the market integration resulted in an increase in the downside risk, potentially
leading to a signi￿cant reduction of the bene￿ts for a diversi￿cation between these two markets.
Consistent with other related studies no evidence for a time-trend or a permanent shift in the
dependence structure of the US-Japan stock markets has been found. However, an interdepen-
dence structure can also be subject to the temporal shifts, caused by short-run dynamics, such
as contagion. This will be the issue of the following subsection.
2.5.2 Testing for and Estimating Contagion Phenomenon
In this subsection we estimate and examine the impact of contagion phenomenon on the co-
movement between the major developed stock markets. For each pair of markets we estimate
two models: a "pure" or volatility based contagion model where the tail indices are allowed to be
volatility dependent and a "generalized" model where both volatility based and fundamentals
types of contagion e⁄ects are allowed, as discussed in Section 4. The reason for this distinction
is that we are also interested in testing whether the volatility based contagion e⁄ects, reported
by other authors, are indeed driven by volatility or that these e⁄ects are simply due to the fact
that ￿nancial markets become increasingly turbulent during economic recession periods and,
therefore, can be considered as a fundamentals based contagion as well.
Table 3 presents the estimation results of the "pure" contagion and generalized contagion
models. As the volatility threshold value we chose the three times unconditional volatility of
the GARCH (1,1) model.13 For the sake of saving space, only the estimates of the tail indices
(which constitute the main interest of this section) are reported.
The estimation results of the "pure" contagion model indicate that in case of the UK-
US markets both contagion coe¢ cients are insigni￿cant, implying that the null of no "pure"
contagion cannot be rejected. This ￿nding is in line with Longin and Solnik (1995) and Ang
13The results are fairly robust to di⁄erent choices of the threshold value.
38and Bekaert (2002a). Also, for Japan-US and Germany-US the upper tail contagion coe¢ cients
are insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. On the other hand, we ￿nd a strong empirical evidence
for these markets in favor of the lower tail volatility contagion, where the contagion coe¢ cients
are positive and signi￿cant. It is particularly important to emphasize the economic signi￿cance
of the volatility contagion e⁄ect. In case of the Germany-US couple, turbulent periods result in
an increase in the lower tail dependence index, conditional on being in the lower tail dependence
regime, from 0.114 to 0.645. The increase in the overall lower tail dependence is substantial
as well, shifting from a moderate 0.014 to 0.08 percents. The impact of volatility in case of
Japan-US is even more striking. Conditional on being in the lower tail dependence regime,
the lower tail dependence index increases from 0.05 to approximately 0.5 during the turbulent
periods.
In order to assess the importance of the contagion e⁄ects it may be useful to go back to
the October crash of 1987. In the previous section we found that the "Black Monday" crash
resulted in an upward shift in the interdependence structure for the US -UK and US-Germany
stock markets, while no such evidence could be found in case of the US-Japan markets. On
the other hand, numerous papers indicate that after the crisis, these markets became more
interdependent. An alternative explanation could be a temporary shift in the dependence
structure due to contagion e⁄ects.
In Figure 2.4, we plot the overall Kendall￿ s tau implied by the "pure" contagion model for
the Japan-US stock markets around the crash date. As can be clearly seen, during and up to
about seven months after the crash these markets have been characterized by unusually high
volatility and also by an increased interdependence. Our estimation results also indicate that
during this period the stock market volatilities indeed exceeded the threshold. These ￿ndings
support the view that a reason for the October crisis to become so widely spread was contagion
and the temporal increase in stock market intedependence was partially contagion based.
39Table 3: Contagion models
S&P-DAX S&P-FTSE S&P-NIKKEI
Coe⁄. Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error
￿u 0.44 0.12 -0.25 0.11 -0.98 0.97
"Pure" contagion model ￿h;u 0.27 0.26 0.61 0.44 -5.01 98.22
￿l -2.05 0.61 1.07 0.26 -2.98 1.52
￿h;l 2.65 0.78 -0.51 1.46 3.01 1.52
Log-ld 8664.17 8841.3 8491.45
￿u 0.38 0.15 -0.17 0.13 -0.98 0.67
￿h;u 0.15 0.28 0.56 0.46 -2.31 5.23
￿f;u 0.14 0.23 -0.02 0.32 -0.38 0.86
￿us;u 0.16 0.27 -0.13 0.3 -0.05 0.89
Generalized contagion model ￿l -4.99 1.48 0.8 0.29 -2.94 1.62
￿h;l 5.62 1.29 -0.16 1.29 2.98 1.61
￿f;l 2.68 1.06 -5.76 9.27 -0.14 0.7
￿us;l 2.06 1.03 1.15 0.41 1.28 0.73
Log-ld 8665.72 8848.74 8494.13
In this table we present the maximum likelihood estimates of contagion models for each pair of
the stock markets. The speci￿cations considered are the pure and generalized contagion models










Here, ￿U;t and ￿L;t are the time-varying upper and lower tail indices of the Gumbel and Clayton copulas,
Zh;t is the indicator function of the volatility threshold and Zus;t (Zus;t) is the indicator function
of the US (foreign) business cycle.
Next, we also present the estimation results of the generalized contagion model, where the
tail indices are allowed to be a⁄ected by both volatility and fundamentals. Since preliminary
estimation of the business cycles composite loadings in the mean equations yielded highly
insigni￿cant estimates for all the markets, we decided to exclude the state of the economy
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Figure 2-4: Volatility based contagion and October Crash: US-Japan stock markets
business cycle indicator results in an empirically signi￿cant increase in the lower tail index, with
p-values calculated from the Table 3 equal to 0.045 and 0.005, respectively. There is also some
(though weaker) evidence of a fundamentals based contagion in case of the Japan-US markets
with p-value of the US business cycle indicator coe¢ cient equal to 0.08. On the other hand, as
in the case of volatility contagion, there is no empirical evidence in favor of positive quadrant
contagion, where the coe¢ cients are both economically and statistically insigni￿cant. It is
noteworthy that for the Germany-US and Japan-US markets the coe¢ cients of the volatility
based contagion remain signi￿cant after controlling for the fundamental e⁄ect implying that
an increase in the stock markets interdependence due to a high turbulence or a change in the
economic conditions are two potentially distinct phenomena.
To provide some intuition regarding the signi￿cance of volatility and fundamentals based
contagion for each pair of markets we plot the coexceedance probabilities, as we de￿ned them
in section 2.3. As in section 2.3, we distinguish between positive and negative coexceedance
probabilities. An important di⁄erence is that here we plot conditional coexceedance proba-
bilities implied by the model, where a distinction is made between no contagion, volatility
41based contagion, and volatility and fundamental contagion. That is, pj(￿j) without contagion
is de￿ned as the conditional probability that the return on market A will be above (below) its
mean by more than j standard deviations, conditional on the same state for market B when
there is neither "excess" market turbulence nor decrease in economic activity. By allowing for
the stock markets￿volatilities to pass the threshold we estimate pj(￿j) in the presence of the
volatility based contagion. Allowing, in addition, for the decrease in the coincidence index gives
us the estimate of pj(￿j) when both volatility based and fundamental contagion are taken into
account. As in the previous sections, we take the US stock market as market B and replace the
time-varying ￿lter probabilities by their ergodic estimates. For the Germany-US and Japan-US
stock markets we present both volatility and volatility and fundamental contagion e⁄ects, while
for the UK-US case we present the fundamental contagion e⁄ect alone, since for these markets
a volatility based contagion appears to be both economically and statistically insigni￿cant.
The coexceedance probabilities plots are presented in Figure 2.5. As for the UK-US stock
markets, the impact of worsening economic conditions on the dependence structure appears to
be quite weak, the result which holds for both positive and negative quadrant contagion, where,
for the range higher than 4 standard errors, the coexceedance probabilities virtually coincide.
This follows directly from the estimation results which show that there is no signi￿cant contagion
e⁄ect on the upper tail index and there is weak e⁄ect on the lower tail index which increases
from 0.12 to 0.l5. The results, however, are strikingly di⁄erent for the Germany-US and Japan-
US markets which appear to be characterized by a strong asymmetry of both volatility and
fundamental contagion e⁄ects. While being economically signi￿cant for the moderate range
(up to 2 standard errors) of the coexceedance, the impact of contagion quickly decays and
becomes almost zero for the positive quadrant coexceedance probabilities. This comes in sharp
contrast with the negative quadrant contagion e⁄ects. For instance, the probability that the
German stock market will plunge down by more than six standard deviations, given the same
condition for the US stock market, is about 0.3 during turbulent periods and 0.4 during the
turbulent periods followed by an economic recession, while being almost zero during the tranquil
periods. A similar picture can be observed in case of the Japan-US markets, with 0.1, 0.4, and
almost 0 probabilities, respectively. It is important to note that, though, generally, contagion
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Figure 2-5: Contagion between international stock markets
43to be economically signi￿cant in the "moderate" coexceedance regions. Consider, for instance,
the estimated probability that the return of market A will be below its mean by at most one
standard deviation, given the same condition for the US market. In case of a no contagion
scenario for the Germany-US, UK-US, and Japan-US markets, the estimates are 0.435, 0.475,
and 0.395, respectively. Conditional on a high expected turbulence, these estimates increase
to 0.5 and 0.42 for Germany-US and Japan-US, while, in case of both a high turbulence and
worsening fundamentals, p(0;￿1) is equal to 0.647 and 0.51, respectively. Consistent with our
earlier ￿ndings, in case of the UK-US markets contagion e⁄ects in the moderate range of
coexceedance are weak as well, resulting in an increase in p(0;￿1) from 0.475 to 0.517.
2.6 Contagion - Practical Implications
The practical implications of our ￿ndings are quite straightforward. Neglecting the contagion
e⁄ects (particularly those which appear to be both statistically and economically signi￿cant)
might result in potentially severe deviations from the optimal portfolio choice. Not taking into
account the jumps in the dependence structure might lead to a systemic overestimation of the
stock market interdependence during the tranquil periods and/or the periods of economic re-
covery, while possibly resulting in an underestimation of the former during turbulent periods
or during economic recessions. As a result, investors might tend to overvalue (undervalue) the
bene￿ts from international diversi￿cation during turbulent (tranquil) periods, possibly shifting
from cross-industry to cross-market portfolios, and vice versa, resulting in potential signi￿cant
losses of utility. Moreover, taking into account the presence of contagion, while not accounting
for its asymmetric nature (for instance, by estimating the state-dependent correlation coe¢ -
cients as in Edwards and Susmel (2001), or the threshold-dependent correlations as in Longin
and Solnik (1995), or by using any other state-dependent overall measure of dependence), in
general, might cause the investor to overestimate the bene￿ts of the international diversi￿cation
as well. What is then the potential utility loss for an investor who either does not take into
account the contagion e⁄ect or disregards its asymmetric nature? We quantify this by means
of the following simple numerical example.
Consider a simple one-period optimal portfolio choice where the investment opportunity set
44consists of a domestic and a foreign broad market index with log-returns ra and rb, respectively,
and a risk-free asset with log-return rf: Further, let us assume that the investor￿ s preferences




where W = ￿a exp(ra)+￿b exp(rb)+￿f exp(rf) denotes the investor￿ s wealth at the end of the














where Ep denotes expectation under the "true" probability measure, which takes both contagion
and its asymmetric e⁄ects into account, corresponding to the "generalized" contagion model.
The vector of portfolio weights of an investor who does not take contagion into account, and
who maximizes the expected utility using a model with no contagion e⁄ects (that is, all ￿-s
are equal to zero) is denoted by ￿n: Similarly, the vector of "optimal" portfolio weights of
an investor who does not take into account the asymmetric nature of contagion (that is, the
investor estimates a "generalized" contagion model under the restriction that the ￿-s are equal
in both tail indices) is denoted by ￿s:
We set ￿ being equal to 5 and the risk-free rate to 3% in annual terms. Following Ang and
Bekaert (2002a), we calculate the ammount of wealth e w required to compensate an investor for
using suboptimal portfolio weights, i.e., ￿n or ￿s instead of ￿￿: For instance, for the "contagion
ignoring" investor
~
w is given by:
Ep(U(W￿ jW0 = 1)) = Ep(U(Wn jW0 = e wn))
The compensation required in cents per dollar of wealth can be expressed as w = 100￿(e wn￿1):
45Table 4: Compensation (cents per 1$)
pU = 0:375;pL = 0:25 pU = 0:25;pL = 0:5 pU = 0:125;pL = 0:75
No cont. Sym. cont. No cont. Sym. cont. No cont. Sym. cont.
US-Germany 2.5 2.53 2.7 2.8 3.04 3.04
US-UK 0.02 0.02 2.4 1.08 2.62 2.27
US-Japan 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.08 0.04 0.21
In this table we calculate a compensation required for ignoring contagion e⁄ects or its asymmetric
nature. Compensation is expressed in cents per dollar of investment for an investor who
completely ignores contagion e⁄ects (No cont.) and for an investor who ignores the asymmetry
of contagion e⁄ects (Sym. cont). Compensation is calculated for three di⁄erent sets of the
upper and lower tail dependence regime probabilities pU and pL
The results are presented in Table 4. For each pair of markets we ￿nd a required compensa-
tion for using ￿n and ￿s, instead of the optimal portfolio weights, under three di⁄erent sets of
conditional regime probabilities. For the US-Germany markets the cost of completely ignoring
contagion is extremely high, varying between 2.5 and 3.04 cents per dollar. The magnitude
of utility loss is especially striking if we take into account that our calculations are based on
a one-period model, and, thus, the cost will be expected to increase with an increase of the
investment horizon. For the US-Japan markets the compensation for ignoring contagion is sub-
stantial as well, though of a lower magnitude. Naturally, the compensation tends to increase
with an increase in the lower tail regime probability. Ironeously, the cost of completely ignor-
ing contagion and the cost of taking it into account while ignoring its asymmetric nature are
almost the same. While at ￿rst sight this may seem surprising, it is quite intuitive since, by
ignoring the asymmetry of contagion, we "smooth" the magnitude of the shift in the lower tail
index between the upper and the lower tails. By doing so, we overestimate the former, while
underestimating the latter, an operation which naturally causes the investor to overestimate
the bene￿ts of international diversi￿cation as in case of completely ignoring contagion e⁄ects.
462.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we study the dynamics of interdependence between the major stock markets of
the world. We make a distinction between long-run dynamics, namely the market integration
process, and short-run dynamics, namely contagion. We model the dependence structure of
the stock markets in a Markov-dependent mixture of copulas framework, which allows for both
asymmetry and time variation in the tail indices.
Our major ￿ndings are
a) The US-UK and US-Germany stock markets have become signi￿cantly more interdependent
over the last two and a half decades, due to the market integration process. No evidence
of time-trend has been found in case of the US-Japan stock markets.
b) The implications of the market integration process for the international portfolio diversi-
￿cation bene￿ts vary between the markets. While an increase in the US-Germany stock
market comovement reduces the bene￿ts of cross-market diversi￿cation, in case of the
US-UK markets an increase in the stock markets comovement appears to be favorable for
investors.
c) We ￿nd strong empirical evidence of contagion between the major stock markets. In partic-
ular, we document an increase in stock markets comovements during economic downturns
and periods of high market turbulence. Interestingly, the contagion e⁄ects are asym-
metric. The costs of ignoring contagion or ignoring its asymmetric nature appear to be
economically signi￿cant.
d) The stock markets became signi￿cantly more interdependent after the October crash of
1987, but the nature of, and the reasons for the shift in the stock markets comovement
appear to be di⁄erent. While for some markets an increase in the interdependence has
been mainly contagion driven, for others it seems to be the result of investors￿overreaction
to the crash itself.
By extending the existing literature on market integration and contagion in a number of
di⁄erent aspects, our ￿ndings also raise a number of important questions. Why are the contagion
47e⁄ects asymmetric? Does this re￿ ect investors￿loss aversion? What determines the magnitude
of the contagion e⁄ects (microstructure, transaction costs)? Which global factors became more
important, leading to an increase in market integration? All these, and other issues, will require
further research.
2.A Speci￿cation of competing models
a Gaussian (Normal) copula.
For the conditional Gaussian copula we adopt the structure proposed by Patton (2001) with




















with the time evolution of the correlation coe¢ cient described by the following equation






where ut;vt are the integral transforms of the conditional marginal densities as speci￿ed above,
￿￿1 denotes pseudo-inverse of the Standard Normal distribution and ￿(x) =
1￿exp(x)
1+exp(x) in order
to keep the correlation coe¢ cient in (￿1;+1) range. The upper and lower tail dependence
coe¢ cients for the conditional Gaussian copula are
￿L;t = ￿U;t = 0























v denoting a pseudo-inverse of Student-t distribution with v degrees of freedom. We
assume the same time evolution equation for the correlation coe¢ cient as in Gaussian case and
keep the number of dof constant to make the comparisson of these two models more tractable.
The upper and lower tail dependence coe¢ cients for the conditional Student-t copula are







Note that though we keep the number of degrees of freedom constant, time variation in the tail
indices is allowed due to the time varying correlation.
c Markov Dependent Mixture of Copulas










u￿￿ + v￿￿ ￿ 1
￿￿1=￿










with ￿ 2 (￿1;1) and ￿U = ￿L = 0: The Frank copula exhibits asymptotic independence
in both tails.
49Conditional regime probabilities can be calculated using the Hamilton (1994) ￿lter. The
upper and lower tail dependence coe¢ cients for this model are
￿U;t = pU;t ￿ (2 ￿ 21=￿)
￿L;t = pL;t ￿ 2￿1=￿
2.B Evaluation of the Margins and Copula
For the evaluation of the margins we adopt the test suggested by Diebold et al. (1998) who
show that a time sequence of integral transforms of correctly speci￿ed conditional density
should be distributed iid U(0,1) over time. Following their suggestion we divide this test into
two separate steps. First, we test the null of the independence by the BDS test of Brock,
Dechert, and Sheinkman (1987) to the integral transforms of the estimated density function.
The test for the uniformity is conducted by looking at the plot of the empirical distribution
and its con￿dence interval. Though this test is conditional on the estimated parameters values,
it appears to perform quite well in Monte-Carlo studies (see Diebold et al. (1998) for futher
details).
As speci￿cation test for the copula and joint distribution function we apply a so-called
"hit-test" suggested by Cristo⁄ersen (1998) and extended by Engle and Manganelli (1999) and
Patton (2001) which tests the ability of the model to predict whether the future realization
of a random variable will be in a particular range. The major advantage of this test is that
testing the predictive power of a model in di⁄erent regions provides us with important clues
about what is wrong with the model if the null of correct speci￿cation is rejected.
In addition, we compare the performance of our model to the performance of the Gaussian
and Student-t copulas. We base our comparisson on the test proposed by Rivers and Vuong
(2002) who show that a properly scaled averaged di⁄erence between the evaluation criterions (in
our case log-likelihood values of the non-nested models) asymptotically has a standard Normal
distribution. The scaling factor can be easily computed using the Newey-West approach.
Table B.1 presents the results of the BDS test performed on the integral transforms of the
conditional marginal densities. The results show that the null of independence of the integral
50transforms cannot be rejected for all the markets included in our study. In addition, we study
the empirical distributions of the integral transforms. The null that integral transforms are
uniformly distributed cannot be rejected for all the markets. Overall, these ￿ndings suggest
that GARCH-GED model ￿ts the data reasonably well.
Table B.1: BDS independence test

































The numbers are asymptotic and bootstraped p-values based on 5000 replications.
Under the null of correct speci￿cation of the density function the integral transforms are i.i.d. distributed
Bootstraped p-values are in parentheses.
In Table B.2 we present the estimated parameters of the GED-GARCH margins for each
one of the markets.14. For all the series the shape parameter ￿ is signi￿cantlly smaller than
2, implying that the null of normally distributed innovations can be rejected. The persistence
parameters in the volatility equations (Lag ht and Lag ￿2
t) are highly signi￿cant indicating the
typical phenomenon of volatility clustering. In addition, for all the series the leverage e⁄ect
(Lever.) is highly signi￿cant implying that the e⁄ect of past innovations is sign dependent.
14Since we estimate the models in a single step ML framework, for each model we also obtain the estimates
of the margins. However, since they appear to be very similar we report the estimates of the margins estimated
separately from the copulas in order to save the space.
51Table B.2: Estimates of the marginal distributions
DAX 30 FTSE 100 NIKKEI 225 S&P 500
Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error Coe⁄ Std Error
Const￿ 0.0008 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0007 0.0003 0.0009 0.0002
AR(2) 0.044 0.0288 0.056 0.028
Constht 6:7 ￿ 10￿6 1.5￿10￿6 1.9￿10￿5 3.3￿10￿6 6.7￿10￿6 1.9￿10￿6 4￿10￿6 1.1￿10￿6
Lag ht 0.841 0.023 0.75 0.038 0.856 0.024 0.85 0.028
Lag ￿2
t 0.071 0.027 0.037 0.029 0.037 0.018 0.03 0.022
Lever 0.063 0.031 0.102 0.05 0.141 0.034 0.15 0.03
￿ 1.49 0.073 1.25 0.04 1.597 0.092 1.56 0.073
Log-ld 4024.2 4201.91 3972.07 4443.35
In Table B.3 (a) we also present the results of the hit-tests applied to each one of the copulas.
As testing regions we chose the lower 20%-20% region (denoted as Region 1 in the table), the
upper 20%-20% region (Region 3) and the 40%-60% region (Region 2) based on the empirical
quantiles of the series. The ￿rst two regions will give some indication on the capability of the
model of predicting the joint extreme realizations, while the third one tests the goodness-of-￿t
with respect to the "normal" realizations.15
For all markets a Gaussian copula is rejected using both the individual "extreme" regions
tests and the joint tests. The main reason for the misspeci￿cations appears to be a systematic
underestimation of the upper and lower tails probabilities, suggesting that the zero tail depen-
dence imposed by the Gaussian copula is too restrictive. The performance of the Student-t
copula is somewhat better. For the UK-US pair it passes all the individual and the joint test.
However, for the Germany-US pair it does not pass the lower "extreme" region test and the
joint test while for the Japan-US pair it does not pass both the lower and average regions tests,
and also fails to pass the joit test.
Compared to these competing, frequently used models a Markov-Dependent Mixture model
provides a signi￿cant improvement in ￿tting the data. Both for the Germany-US and UK-US
pairs it passes all the individual and the joint tests. For Japan-US it passes the upper and the
15One can also add the regions with asymmetric extremes, but in our case the number of such observations is
extremely small (even zero in some cases).
52average region tests, but fails the lower region test. It is noteworthy that the reason for rejecting
the null of correct speci￿cation is that the coe¢ cient of the cumulative sum of the lower tail
extremes is highly signi￿cant, suggesting possible higher order-dependence than the ￿rst-order
dependence imposed by the model. This can be due to a contagion e⁄ect which, combined with
volatility clustering, may result in time-dependent parameters within dependence regimes.
Table B.3: Goodness-of-￿t tests
Table B.3(a):Results of the hit-test
S&P-DAX S&P-FTSE S&P-NIKKEI
Region 1 0.014 0.028 0.000
Gaussian Region 2 0.058 0.754 0.434
Region 3 0.000 0.001 0.342
Joint 0.000 0.008 0.29
Region 1 0.076 0.279 0.001
Student-t Region 2 0.151 0.746 0.042
Region 3 0.019 0.074 0.133
Joint 0.022 0.351 0.007
Region 1 0.075 0.308 0.003
MDMC Region 2 0.81 0.747 0.871
Region 3 0.641 0.091 0.354
Joint 0.131 0.356 0.019














?The numbers in Table B.3 (a) are the p-values of the LR test. In Table B.3 (b)
the numbers are the R&V statistics with p-values in parentheses.
The results of Rivers and Vuong (2002) test are presented in Table B.3 (b). We separately
53evaluate the performance of MDMC model versus Gaussian and Student copulas for each pair
of markets under the investigation. The results indicate that the null of equivalence of MDMC
and Student-t copulas is strongly rejected for both US-UK and US-Germany stock markets
in favor of Markov-mixture model, which is quite consistent with the results of hit-test, the
result which olso holds for the Gaussian copula. In case of US-Japan the MDMC model also
outperforms (though insigni￿cantly) a Student-t copula, while signi￿cantly outperforming the
Gaussian copula.
54Chapter 3
It Takes Two to Tango:




The purpose of this paper is to study the mechanism of pricing information transmission between
cross-listed securities, that is, stocks of the same ￿rm listed on multiple markets. Globalization
oriented policies accompanied by a removal of impediments to international investments led
to an increasing number of companies from overseas that have chosen to either raise capital
through global equity issues or prepare for future capital raising by cross-listing. Already in
1997 about 1300 foreign companies had their shares listed on the US stock exchanges which
constitutes an increase of 75 percent since 1991 (Karolyi (1998)).
Studying the dynamics of the information transfer between the securities listed on multiple
markets is important for several reasons.When an identical asset is traded on more than one
location we would expect the price discovery process to be global rather than local. First, when
an asset is traded on multiple markets investors will attempt to extract the information from
55the "foreign" prices of the same asset in addition to the news revealed at their own market
(see, for instance, King and Wadhwani (1990)). Second, if cross-border trading is allowed any
substantial deviation from the price equality likely will rapidly vanish by opening an arbitrage
opportunity. Thus, studying the pricing process of cross-listed securities allows us to study to
which extent stock markets are e¢ cient in re￿ ecting new information. Studying the patterns
of the information transmission between multiple listed shares may also reveal important clues
on the role of the stock markets￿micro-structure in the trading process and in the degree of
inter-market integration (Werner and Kleidon (1996), Harris, McInish and Wood (2002)).
In this research we investigate the information transfer mechanism between American De-
positary Receipts (ADRs) of Japanese corporations traded on the New York stock exchange and
their underlying shares listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange, two of the major stock exchanges
in the world. We seek to contribute to the current state of literature in a number of ways.
First, we propose to investigate the information transfer mechanism by studying the trans-
mission of the ￿rst three moments of the returns distribution, namely mean, volatility, and
skewness. While most of the studies concentrate on the transmission of returns it is not so clear
why the analysis should be limited to the investigation of the dynamics of the ￿rst moment
only. Numerous studies relate the volatility to the dynamics of the information ￿ ow. There is
also a growing body of evidence that a downside risk, that is, a probability that the value of
the portfolio will fall below some threshold level, plays an important role in portfolio selection
decisions (see, for instance, Harvey and Siddique (2000) and Ang, Chen and Xing (2004)),
suggesting the importance of accounting for the skewness as well.
Second, we study the role of trading volume in the cross-markets return spill-over. A
number of theoretical contributions suggest the existence of such a link (Campbell et.al (1993),
Blume, Easley, and O￿ Hara (1994), Wang (1994)). In Campbell et al. (1993) the trading
volume provides an additional information to the external observer (econometrician) but not
to the investors. Blume, Easley and O￿ Hara (1994), on the other hand, introduce a model with
asymmetric information where the volume may provide information about expected future
returns to investors as well. In this study we shall demonstrate that cross-listed securities
provide us with a unique setup to study the role of volume in the stock return dynamics.
In terms of methodology we model the joint distribution of an ADR and the corresponding
56ordinary share returns as a bivariate Vector Error Correction (VEC)-GARCH process with
skewed Student-t innovations (Hansen, (1994)). Such a model suits our purposes well and is
also shown to perform well when applying diagnostic tests. Within this framework we study the
dynamics of the mean, the variance, and the skewness spill-overs between the ADRs and their
underlying Tokyo listed shares. Next, we study the role of trading volume in the conditional
mean dynamics of the ordinary share and ADR returns by means of both non-parametric (White
and Hong (1993)) moment- and parametric (regression based) tests.
Our key ￿ndings are as follows. First, at the return level we ￿nd that the major channel of
information transmission is via cross-border trading induced by the price di⁄erential between
the Tokyo and New-York closing prices. Interestingly, the adjustment mechanism exhibits some
non-linear dynamics which is consistent with cross-border trading by investors facing di⁄erent
levels of transaction costs. We also ￿nd that the US investors tend to overreact to news from
Tokyo but not vice-versa. Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that at the return level the Tokyo stock
exchange emerges as the dominant market, while the US stock exchanges play a satellite role.
Second, we ￿nd signi￿cant cross-market volatility spill-overs and also some limited evidence of
a cross-market leverage e⁄ect. However, in contrast to a ￿rst moment (return) transmission
mechanism, we ￿nd no evidence of asymmetry in volatility spill-overs. Third, we ￿nd some
evidence of cross-market skewness dynamics. In particular, we ￿nd that conditional on the
past history of positive pricing shocks on the Tokyo (US) stock markets, the skewness of the
ADR (ordinary share) returns is forecasted to be more negative. This ￿nding is consistent
with the stochastic bubbles hypothesis, extended to a multiple markets setup. Finally, we
￿nd strong empirical evidence of the Tokyo (US) trading volume a⁄ecting the intensity of the
pricing information transmission from the Tokyo to the US (US to Tokyo) stock exchanges. In
particular, our ￿ndings suggest that a cross-market price di⁄erential accompanied by a high
trading volume on the Tokyo (US) markets is more likely to be corrected at the opening of
the US (Tokyo) stock exchanges not being transmitted to the next trading day. Curiously, the
impact of the Tokyo Stock Exchange trading volume is transmitted to the subsequent trading
day on the US stock markets, while the impact of the US trading volume appears to have no
impact of the opening of the Tokyo stock exchange. These ￿ndings support the idea that the
trading volume provides additional information to information already implicit in stock prices.
57The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we brie￿ y review the
existing literature on the cross-listed securities and price-volume relationship. Section 3.3 de-
scribes the data. In Section 3.4 we discuss the methodology used in this research. In Section
3.5 we present and discuss the estimation results. Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
The majority of non-US companies cross-list their shares in the form of American Depositary
Receipts (ADRs). An ADR is a negotiable certi￿cate which indirectly represents the ownership
of shares of a foreign corporation for domestic investors. The US depositary bank holds the
shares in the country of origin and converts all related payments into US dollars. Each receipt
denotes a speci￿c number of shares it can be converted into according to a speci￿ed conversion
rate.1 Since an ADR and the underlying share represent the same value, a natural question is
whether they share the same price generating process, and, in particular, it becomes relevant
to understand the features of the information transmission mechanism of such a share, traded
in a "global" market.
Trading in identical ￿nancial assets in di⁄erent markets depends on various factors, such
as transaction/communication costs, exchange rate risk, di⁄erent timing zones, etc. At one
extreme, for su¢ ciently high costs there will be no inter-market trading (perfectly segmented
markets). On the other hand, zero transaction costs in the presence of no restrictions on the
cross-market capital ￿ ows will equalize the prices of any (simultaneously) traded identical assets,
eliminating any arbitrage opportunities. In this case we would say that markets are perfectly
integrated (Garbade and Silber, (1979)). In reality, however, due to both di⁄erent time zones
and non-negligible transaction costs, international markets are more likely in the intermediate
region of partial integration. In the context of cross-listed securities this means that the price
adjustment does not occur immediately, giving rise to one of the following possibilities:
a) The price adjustment between two markets A and B is symmetric.
b) The magnitude of price adjustment of the security traded on market B to the information
1For a comprehensive survey of ADRs see Karolyi (1998).
58revealed on market A is higher than the one of market A.
Situation b) is de￿ned by Garbade and Silber (1979) as the "dominant-satellite markets"
relationship, where market A is de￿ned as the dominant one and B as the satellite market.
An asymmetric transmission of information has been con￿rmed by a number of empirical
studies. Most of these studies concentrate on the return spill-overs (￿rst moment transmission)
between the markets. Neumark et al. (1991) study the behavior of multiple-listed US securities
traded on the New York, London, and Tokyo Exchanges. Based on their ￿ndings, the New
York stock exchange emerges as the dominant market for US cross-listed ￿rms. In a more
recent study Eun and Sabherwal (2003) examine the contribution of cross-listings for the price
discovery for a sample of Canadian ￿rms whose stocks are listed on both the Toronto exchange
and US markets. They ￿nd that US prices adjust more to the prices on the Toronto stock
exchange than vice versa. The idea of the domestic stock exchange playing the leading role in
the information transmission process is supported by Hauser et al. (1998) and Lieberman et
al. (1999) in their studies of multiple-listed Israeli ￿rms, Kadapakkam and Misra (2003) for
Indian GDRs listed on the London Stock Exchange, Eun and Jang (1997) for stocks cross-listed
on the New-York, London and Tokyo stock exchanges, and other contributions. On the other
hand, Phylaktis and Manalis (2005) in their study of stocks listed on Greek and German stock
markets report the dominant role of German markets in the price discovery process.
Several studies investigate the mechanism of the information transfer between stocks listed
on central and regional stock exchanges. Hasbrouck (1995) studies the dynamics of the pricing
process of the Dow stocks listed on the NYSE and regional US stock exchanges. He ￿nds
that the price discovery is concentrated at the NYSE while the regional markets behave as the
satellite ones, but not as pure satellites, suggesting that the price discovery process takes place
on both "central" and regional stock markets. Similar results are reported by Harris et al.
(1995).
An overall conclusion from these and other studies is that, at the return level, domestic
stock markets emerge as the informationally dominant ones. Surprisingly, however, none of
these studies considers the question whether this information transfer asymmetry extends to
the dynamics of higher moments, such as the variance or the skewness which, undoubtedly, play
an important role in ￿nancial decision making. For instance, Hong and Stein (2003) develop a
59model showing how skewness is related to the dispersion of information among investors. Bates
(1997) interprets the conditional skewness inferred from option prices as a measure of crash
expectations. Therefore, we believe that studying the dynamics of these moments will provide
a much more comprehensive picture of the information transfers between markets.
A second common feature shared by these studies is that they investigate the uncondi-
tional dynamics of the price-discovery process, thus implicitly assuming that the intensity of
the pricing information transfer is constant over time. We empirically test the validity of this
assumption by studying the role of the trading volume in the cross-market information trans-
mission dynamics. An extensive body of the literature relates the magnitude of the conditional
serial correlation to lagged volume (turnover). Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993) study
the impact of lagged volume on equity returns in a theoretical model, making a distinction
between "liquidity" traders, who trade for some exogenous reasons and mean-variance utility
maximizers. The latter are ready to absorb a buying/selling pressure of the "liquidity" traders in
exchange for an increase in expected return, leading to a return reversal. Since a buying/selling
pressure is re￿ ected in a high number of transactions, an abnormal lagged volume increases
the likelihood of observing a subsequent return reversal. Blume, Easley, and O￿ Hara (1994)
and Wang (1994) develop theoretical models in which investors receive the signals with di⁄er-
ent quality (precision). In these models the lagged volume provides an additional information
which cannot be extracted by looking at the price statistics alone.
The dynamics of the serial correlation of stock returns and the role of trading volume in the
latter has also been studied by an extensive body of empirical work. Dufee (1992) studies the
relation between serial correlation and trading volume using aggregate monthly data. He reports
a statistically signi￿cant relationship between volume shocks and return reversals. Conrad,
Hameed, and Niden (1994) examine the pro￿tability of weekly contrarian strategies based on
high/low volume ￿ltration for the stocks listed on the US stock markets. They report that
a high number of transactions is associated with return reversals in subsequent period, while
a low volume is more likely to generate momentum. Bremer and Hiraki (1999) explore the
serial correlation-volume dynamics of the stocks listed on the TSE. They report that loser
stocks with high trading volume tend to have larger price reversals in the following week. On
the contrary, Cooper (1999) reports that for large capitalization stocks a decline in volume is
60associated with return reversals and vice versa. A positive relationship between the magnitude
of momentum and lagged turnover is also reported by Lee and Swaminnathan (2001) and Chan
et al. (2000). Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) study the lead-lag patterns of the stocks
listed on NYSE/AMEX. They ￿nd that daily and weekly returns on high volume portfolios
lead returns on low volume portfolios; they explain this phenomenon by the di⁄erential speed
of adjustment of high and low volume portfolios to the information in market returns.
Examining the role of the trading volume in the dynamics of the price discovery process of
cross-listed stocks has a number of important advantages. First, studying the volume-return
interactions for the same security listed on multiple markets is a natural generalization of the
studies mentioned above. Second, cross-listed shares provide a unique opportunity to discrim-
inate between a non-informative role of volume (that is, volume serving as a proxy) as in
Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993), and the informative role of the former as in Wang
(1994) and Blume, Easley, and O￿ Hara (1994). Our approach is based on a simple idea that
if trading volume serves solely as a proxy then the impact of an increase of the Tokyo trading
volume on the subsequent return of the ADR in New York and the impact of an increase of the
New York trading volume on the subsequent return of the ordinary share should be symmetric
since we are dealing with the same security listed on di⁄erent trading locations. This will not
be the case if trading volume conveys an additional information to the investors.
3.3 Data Description
Our sample consists of ten Japanese corporations, whose stocks are simultaneously listed on
both the New York and Tokyo stock exchanges. Each ￿rm is a renowned corporation whose
shares are actively traded on both stock markets. Names of the companies and their brief
description can be found in Appendix 3.A.
In our study we use the daily opening and closing prices as well as the trading volumes on
the Tokyo and New York stock exchanges. The New York opening prices are obtained from
Datastream International. The New York closing prices and trading volume are obtained from
the CRSP ￿les. The Tokyo opening and closing prices and the trading volume of the ordinary
61shares are obtained from the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) data archive.2 The opening (10:00
AM) and closing US dollar/yen exchange rates are used to convert US prices into domestic
ones (yens). This data was obtained from Datastream International and the Federal Reserve
database, respectively. Our sample covers the period from January 2001 up to December 2004,
giving rise (after excluding holidays) to 946 daily observations per series.
In Table 1 we present the descriptive statistics of the daily close-to-close log-returns on
the ordinary shares and their yen-denominated ADRs. Most of the stocks exhibit a negative
(though statistically insigni￿cant) time drift during the sample period. Also, all the stocks
are characterized by a relatively high variance. On the other hand, for most of the stocks
the skewness coe¢ cients are statistically insigni￿cant. Based on the high estimated values of
kurtosis, the null of normality is strongly rejected for all series.
2We thank Akiko Kamesaka and Uri Ben-Zion for kindly providing us this data.
62Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Ordinary Share ADR





















































































































































































The numbers without parentheses are the sample moments of the close-to-close returns
The numbers in parentheses are the sample moments of the open-to-close returns
V (S,K) denote p-values of the variance (skewness, kurtosis) equality tests for the ADR against its corresponding
ordinary share. For the tests applied to the close-to-close returns the p-values are without parentheses
while for the open-to-close returns the corresponding p-values are reported in parentheses.
As a preliminary comparative analysis we compare the unconditional moments, namely the
variance, the skewness, and the kurtosis of the ADR and its underlying ordinary share. For each
company we test the null that the coe¢ cients of the variance (skewness, kurtosis) are equal for
both the ordinary share and the ADR, and we present the resulting p-values in the last three
columns, denoted by V, S, and K, respectively. In general, for the majority of companies
the null hypothesis of equal skewness cannot be rejected. The same observation holds for the
kurtosis, although for most of the companies the estimated values of the kurtosis are higher for
the ordinary shares. On the other hand, for most of the ￿rms the estimated variances of the
ordinary share returns are higher than the ones of the corresponding ADR and for ￿ve out of
63ten ￿rms this di⁄erence is also statistically signi￿cant. Noting that close-to-close returns on
Tokyo and New-York overlap (see Table 2), and ,thus, part of the information from the trading
on the domestic (o⁄shore) market is potentially re￿ ected in the prices of the ADR (ordinary
share), we conduct the same analysis for the open-to-close returns which do not overlap. Sample
estimates of the variance, skewness, and kurtosis of the open-to-close returns, as well as the
results of the equality tests for each ￿rm are presented in parentheses. Overall, for skewness and
kurtosis the results of the equality tests remain unaltered. On the other hand, the null of equal
variances is now strongly rejected for nine out of the ten companies.3 This may be due to the
fact that during a Tokyo business day trading is a⁄ected by both global and company-speci￿c
news releases, while during a trading day in New York only the ￿rst factor a⁄ects the ADR￿ s
returns.
3.4 Methodology
3.4.1 Modeling Cross-Market Moment Dynamics
In this study we adopt a fully parametric approach by modeling the joint distribution of the
ADR and the underlying stock returns, an approach which will allow us to model the dynamics
of the ￿rst three moments in a joint framework.
Table 2
Trading hours of TSE and New York in local times
Stock market Tokyo time New York time
Tokyo 9:00 am-3:00 pm 7:00 pm￿-1:00 am
New York 11:30 pm.-6:00 am￿￿ 9:30 am.-4:00 pm
Notice: * denotes previous day while ** denotes the next day.
It is important to realize that while there is a considerable overlap between close-to-close
returns on both markets, the trading hours of Tokyo and New York do not overlap, with the
Tokyo Stock Exchange preceding the New York trading hours (see Table 2). Therefore, we
3In order to take into account possible e⁄ects of common currency denomination we conducted these tests
with both yen and local currency denominated ADRs. The results remained virtually the same.
64choose to work with open-to-close returns, which will allow us to condition sequentially the
return on one market on the information revealed during the preceding trading day at the
other one. To set forth notations, we shall denote by the index t the time period between 7:00
pm the evening before day t and 4:00 pm at day t by New York time, and we shall denote by
the indices d and f open-to-close returns of the ordinary share and its ADR, respectively.
Speci￿cation of mean dynamics
The speci￿cation of the mechanism which governs the mean dynamics requires some elabo-
ration. Building on the existing literature, we identify two major channels through which the
information transfer might occur. The ￿rst possible channel of the information transmission
is lagged return on the security from the last trading period (o⁄shore market for Tokyo and
domestic market for New York) (see Lau and Diltz (1994), Bae, Cha and Cheung (1999)), which
measures the extent to which news revealed during a trading on one market is re￿ ected in the
price of the same security traded at the other market. Second, we include a "purchasing parity"
(PP) correction term which is the log-di⁄erence between the last pair of closing prices on the
domestic and o⁄shore markets (see Hasbrouck (1995), Harris et.al (1995), Lieberman, Ben-Zion
and Hauser (1999)). If the markets are e¢ cient enough, together with negligible transaction
costs, we would expect this correction term to be stationary with zero unconditional mean to
exclude any long-run pro￿ts from the cross-market trading.4
While it may seem reasonable to assume linearity of the return spill-over mechanism, this
assumption can hardly be justi￿ed in modeling the PP error correction mechanism. For the
sake of simplicity, let us assume that there are only two groups of investors trading on each
market: institutional investors and private traders, who face di⁄erent levels of the cross-border
transaction costs cI and cP, with cI < cP: Then, as long as the PP correction term ￿t is smaller
in absolute value than cI; there will be no adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. On the
other hand, if the deviation is large enough to exceed cI; this will induce cross-border trading
by the institutional investors, but not by the private traders. Analogously, for j￿tj > cP both
institutional and private traders will be involved in cross-border trading. In other words, we
would expect the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium to be dependent on the
4We formally test the null of the unit root in the error correction term via Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
and Phillips-Perron tests. For all the ￿rms the null of non-stationarity has been strongly rejected suggesting that
the prices on the domestic and foreign markets are cointegrated.
65magnitude of the deviation from the latter, namely, on j￿tj:
Of course, this simple example is only a crude approximation to the real world. In addition
to direct transaction costs, cross-border trading involves indirect costs, such as exchange rate
and liquidity risks. Also, investors may vary in their attitude toward risk, implying that highly
risk averse investors will be involved in cross-border trading only for j￿tj being su¢ ciently high.
In other words, we would expect the "portion" of PP deviation corrected at the opening of the
market to be increasing in j￿tj. Consequently, we would expect the portion of the deviation
corrected during the following trading day to be decreasing in j￿tj. An overall expected impact
of the PP deviation on the stock (ADR) return will therefore involve a kind of trade-o⁄between
an increase in j￿tj and decrease in the speed of adjustment, implying a sine-type curve. An
alternative scenario, on the other hand, is that the portion of PP deviation corrected during
the stock market opening is decreasing in j￿tj which can be the case if, for instance, the cross-
border traders wait for additional information to arrive during the following trading day. In
this case the error-correction dynamics will still be non-linear, but monotonically increasing in
￿t: Clearly, in this framework a simple linear adjustment mechanism arises as a special case.
The tests we use, as well as the empirical results of these tests, are presented in Table B.1
(see Appendix 3.B.1). For the ordinary shares only in case of four out of ten ￿rms we are
able to reject the null of a linear error correction mechanism. Also, for those ￿rms where the
null is not rejected the speed of adjustment appears to be both statistically and economically
insigni￿cant, implying that, in general, the adjustment process is likely to be completed at the
opening of the Tokyo stock market. However, the results are strikingly di⁄erent in case of the
ADRs, where the hypothesis of a linear adjustment is strongly rejected for all ￿rms, implying
that the information transfer from Tokyo to New-York is not completed at the opening of the
US stock market and that the adjustment to the long-run equilibrium occurs in a non-linear
fashion.
Based on these ￿ndings we propose to model the mean dynamics using the following VEC-
VARMA setup:
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￿f;t = pd;t ￿ pf;t￿1
￿f;t = rf;t ￿ ￿f;t





where rd;t (rf;t) are the (open-to-close) log-returns on the ordinary share (ADR) and pd;t(pf;t)
are the logs of closing prices for the ordinary share (ADR). The magnitude of the PP adjustment
coe¢ cients ( -s) depends on the magnitude of the deviation from the long-run equilibrium. We
expect  1 and  2 to be signi￿cantly positive and negative, respectively, in case of scenario 1,
or both signi￿cantly positive in case of scenario 2. In addition, we allow the expected returns
of the ordinary share (ADR) to be dependent on its own lagged innovations as well as on
the lagged innovations of the o⁄shore (domestic) market via ￿ and
￿
￿. We also allow for the
autoregressive dynamics and the cross-market spill-overs which are measured by the ’ and
￿
’
coe¢ cients. This speci￿cation seems ￿ exible enough to capture the relevant patterns of the
transmission of pricing information between the markets. The choice of the lag-order for M1;
M2 and N1;N2 is based on controlling for the serial and cross-autocorrelation of returns, while
the choice of M3; M4 and N3;N4 is based on controlling for the cross-and-serial correlation of
the estimated residuals.
Speci￿cation of the volatility dynamics
GARCH-type models have been proven to be quite successful in capturing the clustering
nature of volatility (Bollerslev, Chou, and Kroner (1992), Andersen and Bollerslev (1998)).
Also, multivariate GARCH models provide a ￿ exible framework for studying the volatility
spill-over mechanism between markets (see Karolyi (1995) and Kearney and Patton (2000),
among others). Thus, the following speci￿cation of the volatility dynamics is assumed
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where zd;t(zf;t) are the standardized innovations de￿ned as ￿d;t=h0:5
d;t and ￿f;t=h0:5
f;t, respectively.
Here, we assume a simple EGARCH(1,1)-type structure adjusted to the fact that trading occurs
sequentially and not simultaneously. The intensity of the cross-market volatility spill-overs is
measured by the coe¢ cients ￿ and ￿￿; where the latter measures the intensity of the cross-
market leverage e⁄ect. An important advantage of an EGARCH-model is that, in contrast to
the standard linear GARCH models, no restrictions on the coe¢ cients are required to keep the
volatility estimates in a positive range and, thus, no a priori assumptions about the sign of the
spill-over e⁄ects have to be made.
Speci￿cation of skewness dynamics and conditional distribution
In contrast to an extensive body of academic literature on modeling the dynamics of the
conditional variance, the literature studying the dynamics of higher order moments, and, in
particular, the dynamics of the conditional skewness is quite sparse. Hansen (1994) studies
the higher moment dynamics of the weekly Dollar/Swiss Franc exchange rate. He reports an
inverse relationship between the skewness and the variance of the exchange rate. In a more
recent study Harvey and Siddique (2000) ￿nd that when past stock returns have been high,
skewness is forecasted to become more negative. A similar result is reported by Chen, Hong,
and Stein (2001), who study the skewness dynamics of the individual stocks in a cross-sectional
setting, and Hueng and McDonald (2005), who apply a time-series approach to aggregate stock
market data. Hueng and McDonald (2005) also report positive and signi￿cant e⁄ect of the
conditional variance on skewness. Jondeau and Rockinger (2003) study the higher moment
dynamics of the major stock markets and report a substantial degree of persistence in the
dymanics of conditional skewness. Therefore, it is important to conduct some preliminary
analysis of the skewness dynamics, before we impose any structural form on the latter.
Based on our preliminary analysis, we were not able to detect any persistence in the skewness
parameter for the stocks included in our sample (see Appendix 3.B.2 for the description of the
tests). This suggests that if the skewness parameter is time varying, this can be due to the
68cross-market skewness spill-overs.
To complete the speci￿cation of the model we have to make an assumption about the
distribution of the standardized innovations. A number of ￿ exible distributions allowing for
conditional asymmetry has been used in the literature (see Hansen et al., 2002) for a survey).
Here, we assume that the standardized innovations z￿s follow a skewed Student-t distribution
( Hansen, 1994) with a time-varying parameter ￿ 2 (￿1;1) which determines the shape of the
distribution function.5 For ￿ > 0 the mode of the density is to the left of zero and the variable
is skewed to the right, and vice-versa, when ￿ < 0.
zd;t ￿ ST(￿d;t;￿d)
zf;t ￿ ST(￿f;t;￿f)
We assume the following motion law for the shape-parameter for each market









￿d;t = ￿1 +
2
1 + exp(wd;t)














f;t) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if ￿d;t(￿d;t) > 0; Iv
d;t(Iv
f;t) is the
indicator function taking the value 1 if ￿2
d;t > hd;t (￿2
f;t > hf;t), and the transformation ￿1 +
2
1+exp(x) is applied to keep the shape parameter in the (￿1;1) range. Here we allow for two
possible channels of cross-market dynamics with asymmetry. The ￿rst one is via the past history
of pricing shocks on the o⁄shore market (for Tokyo) and the domestic market (for New-York),
which is measured by ￿2. One of the possible explanations of how the asymmetry in the stock
5A brief review of Hansen￿ s Student-t distribution is provided in Appendix 3.C. This density function has
been used by Jondeau and Rockinger (2003) and Hueng and McDonald (2005) in their studies of higher moment
dynamics in stock and foreign exchange markets.
69returns can be related to the past history of the latter comes from the stochastic bubble models
pioneered by Blanchard and Watson (1982), where the asymmetry is due to the popping of the
bubble. Here the past history of pricing shocks comes to measure whether there has been a
"momentum" in stock returns which usually precedes the bursting of a bubble during the last
two trading weeks. Based on this theory we would expect ￿2 to be signi￿cantly positive. The
second channel is via an increase in the volatility of the stock return, which is measured by
the deviation of ￿2 from its expected value, namely ht and allows for the possible e⁄ect of the
volatility on skewness, as reported by Hueng and McDonald (2005).
3.4.2 Investigating Return-Volume Dynamics
De￿ne by vd and vf the levels of the trading volume on the Tokyo and the US stock markets,
respectively. We are interested in understanding the role of the trading volume in the price
generating process of the cross-listed securities. The issue of particular interest is the role of
the trading volume in the mean dynamics of the stock returns. On the one hand, studying
the role of the trading volume in the price discovery process provides us important clues for
understanding the dynamics of the convergence of stock price towards its fundamental value.
On the other hand, studying the ability of the trading volume to predict future stock returns
may also be of interest for practitioners. Thus, the following hypothesis are tested
E(rd;t
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1;rf;t￿1;vf;t￿1) = E(rd;t
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1;rf;t￿1)
E(rf;t
￿ ￿￿f;t;rd;t;vd;t) = E(rf;t
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1;rf;t￿1)
The ￿rst hypothesis states that conditional on the past ADR return rf;t￿1 and the error cor-
rection term ￿d;t￿1; the return on the domestic stock is mean independent from the trading
volume on the foreign market. Under the second hypothesis, conditional on the stock return
on domestic market rd;t and the error correction term ￿f;t; the trading volume on the domestic
market plays no role in the mean dynamics of the return on the ADR.
A nonparametric approach seems to be an appropriate starting point in order to reduce
the probability of rejecting the null due to incorrect parametric assumptions. There exist
70various nonparametric approaches to test the abovementioned hypothesis. Some tests involve
estimation of the conditional means both under the null and the alternative, while other test
for the omitted variable, and, in general, require the estimation of the mean under the null
only. Taking into account the "curse of dimensionality" we choose to proceed with an omitted
variable-type test. More speci￿cally, let y be the variable of interest and let x be the explanatory
(conditioning) variable. Also, let z be a potentially omitted variable. Finally, let f(x) be the
expectation of y conditional on x. The following M-test is considered
E f(y ￿ f(x)) ￿ zg = 0
The mean independence of y from z conditional on x implies that the deviations of y from its
conditional mean f(x) will also be uncorrelated with z. Therefore, this test can be viewed as
a nonparametric moment test. De￿ne by
^
M the sample analogue of E f(y ￿ f(x)) ￿ zg. Our





ass ! N(0;V f(y ￿ f(x))(z ￿ E(z jx)g):
The test statistic and its limit distribution under the null are derived by White and Hong
(1993). By replacing V (￿) by its sample analogue, this statistic can easily be calculated. It
is also reported to perform well in simulation studies (see Euwals, Melenberg, and Van Soest
(1998)). Since most of the studies reviewed suggest that the trading volume a⁄ects the return
dynamics via auto (cross) correlation, it seems reasonable to test whether the return-volume
interaction term should be included in the speci￿cation of the conditional mean. Therefore, for
the ordinary share we de￿ne y = rd;t, x = (rf;t￿1;￿d;t￿1), and z = (rf;t￿1 ￿ vf;t￿1;￿d;t￿1 ￿ vf;t￿1)
and for the ADR y = rf;t, x = (rd;t;￿f;t) and z = (rd;t ￿ vd;t;￿f;t ￿ vd;t). In other words, for each
market we consider two M-tests. The reason for splitting the test into two parts is twofold.
First, the trading volume can potentially play a role in either the return spillover or the error
correction dynamics or in both of them. Second, by splitting the test we reduce the dimension
of the non-parametric estimate and thus reduce the "curse of the dimensionality" problem.
Calculation of test statistic requires non-parametric estimates of f(x) and E(z jx) implying
that the results of the test are potentially sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. To take this
71potential sensitivity into account we adopt the following strategy. First, for each test we choose
the bandwidth for f(x) and E(z jx) based on cross-validation6. Then we calculate the value
of the statistic both for the "optimal" (cross-validated) values of the bandwidth and for its






them has a ￿2(1) distribution under the null. We base our inference on the following rule. If
all statistics exceed the critical value of a ￿2(1) distribution then the null is rejected. If all
statistics are below the ￿2(1) critical value, then we do not reject the null. Otherwise, we look
at the maximum value of the test statistics and compare it to the "pseudo" critical value from
the Bonferonni inequality.7 If the maximum test statistic exceeds the "pseudo" critical value,
the null is rejected as well. In all other cases, we consider the results as inconclusive.
In order to assess the robustness of our results and also to get some further insights into the
return-volume dynamics we also test the null parametrically. More speci￿cally, for each ￿rm
we estimate the following two regressions
1) Tokyo:rd;t = ￿d +  d;t￿d;t￿1 +
￿
’d;trf;t￿i + ￿d;t




￿ +  d;3
￿




’d;t = ’d;1 + ’d;2
￿
vf;t￿1
2) New-York: rf;t = ￿f +  f;t￿f;t +
￿
’f;trd;t + ￿f;t




￿ +  f;3
￿









v denotes the normalized trading volume (that is, the demeaned volume scaled by its
estimated standard deviation).8 The reason for the normalization is that for all ￿rms trading
6Throughout this paper we use a Gaussian kernel.
7Using Bonferonni inequality as the upper bound for obtaining critical values is not new. For instance, it is
used by Foster, Smith and Whaley (1997) in their study of the distribution of the maximal R
2
8We use the total number of shares of a speci￿c ￿rm traded on a particular trading day on the Tokyo (US)
stock markets (adjusted to the conversion rate) as a measure of the trading activity. The same measure has
been used by Andersen (1996), Bremer and Hiraki (1999), Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001), and others.
An alternative widely used measure is the individual turnover which is de￿ned as the number of shares traded
divided by the number of shares outstanding. As a common practice this measure is used to reduce the low-
72is concentrated on the domestic market and, therefore, in order to compare the magnitude of
the volume e⁄ect it seems appropriate to measure the trading activity on both markets using a
common measurement scale. We allow the trading volume to a⁄ect the intensity of the cross-
market information transfer via the return spill-over (measured by ’2) and through the error
correction mechanism (measured by  3). The null of no cross-market volume e⁄ects can be
tested by looking at the signi￿cance of ’2 and  3 individually as well as by testing the null
’2 =  3 = 0: In addition, since the price di⁄erential ￿ is related to the trading on both domestic
and foreign markets we also let the intensity of the error correction to be dependent on the
lagged trading volume on the TSE (for the ordinary share) and on the US markets (for the
ADR) via the coe¢ cient  4.
3.5 Empirical Results
In this section we present and discuss our empirical ￿ndings. First, we present the estimates
of the cross-market moment dynamics estimated within a bivariate skewed Student-t model
framework, as described in the subsection 3.4.1. Next, we present our ￿ndings on the trading
volume-mean return dynamics in the subsection 3.5.2.
3.5.1 Cross-Market Moment Dynamics
In Table 3.A. we present the estimates of the conditional mean equations of the ordinary shares
and the ADRs. In case of the ordinary share only four out of ten stocks exhibit statistically
signi￿cant cross-market information spillover which mainly occurs via the adjustment of the
PP deviation, while, in general, the return spillover coe¢ cients (
￿
’￿ s) are both statistically and
economically insigni￿cant. These ￿ndings support the results of our preliminary analysis by
indicating that the information transmission at the return level is completed at the opening of
the Tokyo stock exchange.
On the other hand, in case of the ADRs the estimates of the conditional mean dynamics
frequency variations in the data (Campbell, Grossman, and Wang (1993)) or to control for the size e⁄ect (Lee
and Swaminathan (2000)). Obviously, the size e⁄ect is not the issue to be concerned about in our setup, since
we are dealing with the same ￿rm and with the same underlying market value for both the ordinary share and
the ADR. Also, due to our relatively small (in a "long-run" terms) sample we believe that the impact of the
low-frequency events is of low magnitude.
73exhibit a strikingly di⁄erent pattern. For all companies the coe¢ cients of the PP correction
term are positive and both statistically and economically signi￿cant. Also, for all the ￿rms
a non-linear term of the PP adjustment has a negative sign and is statistically signi￿cant for
eight out of ten companies in the sample, which is consistent with our cross-border trading
costs hypothesis. Similar to the ordinary shares, the coe¢ cients of the (contemporaneous)
cross-market return spill-overs, in general, are statistically insigni￿cant, suggesting that, for
both the Tokyo and the US market, cross-border trading induced by the cross-market price
di⁄erential appears to be the major channel of the information transmission at the return level.
However, the information revealed during the trading day on the Tokyo stock exchange is not
fully re￿ ected in the opening prices of the ADRs, having a highly signi￿cant impact during the
trading day on the US markets. Consistent with other studies, these ￿ndings suggest that the
price discovery process is concentrated at the domestic (Tokyo) stock market.
While, in general, we ￿nd no evidence of contemporaneous cross-market return spillovers,
the coe¢ cients of the lagged return spill-overs, namely the
~
’i-s (for i > 1) and the
￿
￿-s provide
an additional insight into the dynamics of the information transfer between the markets. While
being statistically insigni￿cant in case of the ordinary shares, these coe¢ cients are signi￿cantly
negative for most of the ADRs, suggesting that not only the news from Tokyo has an impact
during the trading day in New-York but also that the US investors systematically overreact
to the latter. Overall, these ￿ndings suggest that at the return level the Tokyo stock market
emerges as the dominant one while the US market appears to play a satellite role in the infor-
mation transmission mechanism. However, this may not necessarily be the case for the higher
moment spill-overs. Thus, we turn now to the analysis of the variance and skewness dynamics.
In Table 3.B. we present the estimates of the variance equations. For all the ￿rms we
￿nd statistically signi￿cant volatility spill-overs both from the Tokyo to the US markets and
vice versa. Also, for ￿ve out of ten companies in our sample we ￿nd that the volatility of
the ordinary share (ADR) return is negatively correlated with the lagged return innovations
from the o⁄shore (domestic) markets, a ￿nding which can be attributed to the cross-market
leverage e⁄ect. Curiously, this e⁄ect appears to be much more pronounced for the shares
traded on the Tokyo exchange than for the ADRs. When one compares the intensity of the
cross-market volatility spill-overs, this e⁄ect has to be taken into account, since the intensity is
74sign dependent. Thus, we base our comparison by testing the following hypothesis
H0: ￿d + ￿￿
d IL;d = ￿f + ￿￿
f IL;f
where IL;d (IL;f) takes the value 1 if ￿￿
d (￿￿
f ) are statistically signi￿cant, and zero otherwise.
The resulting p-values are reported in the +(￿) labeled row, where +(￿) denotes the test for
asymmetric spillovers which does not (does) take into account the leverage e⁄ect, respectively.
The results clearly indicate that, in general, the null of symmetric volatility spillovers cannot be
rejected for most of the ￿rms at any legitimate size level. This comes in sharp contrast with the
￿ndings of Xu and Fung (2002) who study the mean/variance dynamics of the China-backed
stocks listed on the Hong-Kong and New-York stock exchanges. They report that the stocks
listed on the o⁄shore market (namely, New-York) play a bigger role in the volatility spillover
process than those listed on the domestic one. This can be due to the fact that the Hong-Kong
monetary policy closely follows the US Federal Reserve interest rate movements to avoid interest
rate arbitrage (Xu and Fung (2002)), which makes the Hong-Kong stock market sensitive to
any macroeconomic news released during the trading day in New-York. Also, numerous studies
indicate that the US market plays a major role in the information transmission to the national
stock markets in general, and to emerging markets in particular. The Tokyo stock exchange,
on the other hand, is a developed market which is also relatively isolated from the US stock
market compared to other developed and emerging markets (see, for instance, Berben and
Jansen (2005)).
In Table 3.C. we report the estimates of the skewness/kurtosis dynamics. For four out of
ten ￿rms in the sample we ￿nd strong empirical evidence of cross-market dynamics in the shape
parameter which governs the asymmetry of the distribution of the returns. More speci￿cally,
we ￿nd that conditional on the past history of positive pricing shocks on the foreign (domestic)
markets, the distribution of the ordinary share (ADRs) returns becomes more negatively skewed,
which is consistent with the dynamics predicted by the stochastic bubble models. Thus, we
complement and extend the results reported by Harvey and Siddique (2000) to our multiple
markets setup. On the other hand, in contrast to the ￿ndings of Hueng and McDonald (2005)
we ￿nd no evidence that skewness is changing during the turbulent periods. The results remain
75unaltered for di⁄erent speci￿cations of the turbulent periods.9 The most natural explanation of
this contradiction comes from the fact that Hueng and McDonald (2005) study the conditional
distribution of stock market indices. The skewness of a stock market index portfolio, like every
portfolio, can be decomposed into a skewness term of the individual assets and the coskewness
terms, namely the dependence structure between the returns of the individual stocks. Numerous
papers report shifts in the dependence structure of the stock returns during the periods of high
market turbulence (see Longin and Solnik (1995), Ramchand and Susmel (1998), Edwards and
Susmel (2001), among others). Thus, shifts in the skewness of the stock market returns are
potentially attributable to the shifts in the interdependence structure of the individual assets.
These shifts in conjunction with the clustering nature of the stock returns volatility can also
explain the high persistence of the skewness reported by Jondeau and Rockinger (2003).
Since the speci￿cation of the conditional distribution function plays an important role in this
research, we conduct a number of diagnostic tests. The results are presented in Table 4. The
Ljung-Box test applied to the normalized and normalized squared innovations, in general, fails to
detect signi￿cant autocorrelations, suggesting that the conditional mean/variance speci￿cations
capture the dynamics of the information transfer reasonably well. As an overall test we study the
distribution of the probability integral transforms, which, under the null of correct speci￿cation,
follows an i.i.d U(0;1) distribution (Diebold et al. (1998)). High p- values of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov (K-S) test indicate that the null of i.i.d U(0;1) distribution cannot be rejected at any
reasonable size level. Also, the plots of the empirical distribution of the integral transforms are
all very close to the one implied by the uniform distribution, a ￿nding which in conjunction
with high p-values of the BDS test applied to the integral transforms supports the results of the
K-S test10. Based on these results we conclude that our model appears to be an appropriate
framework for studying the dynamics of the pricing information transfer.
Up to this point we did not consider the impact of any conditional variable other than
the error correction itself on a price discovery process. As dicussed in Section 3.2 one of the
variables which potentially can e⁄ect the dynamics of the price discovery process is the trading
9Among di⁄erent variants of this model we replaced the counting "turbulence" function by the conditional
cross-market variance, its own lagged variance, and also tried a counting function with di⁄erent lag lengths. The
results remained qualitatively the same.
10The data required to reproduce these results is available from the authors upon request.
76volume. The role of the trading volume in the price discovery process will be the focus of the
following subsection.
Table 3.A. : Conditional mean dynamics
Ordinary Share -TSE












































































rd;t and rf;t are returns on the domestic (Tokyo) and foreign (US) markets
￿d;t = pf;t ￿ pd;t and ￿f;t = pd;t ￿ pf;t￿1 are the cross-market price di⁄erentials








￿ are the time-varying speed of
adjustment parameters, ￿d;t and ￿f;t are return innovations on the Japanese and US stock
markets, respectively. ￿(￿￿) denote signi￿cance at 10 (5)%
77Table 3.A (continued) : Conditional mean dynamics
ADR - NYSE (NASDAQ)


















































































































rd;t and rf;t are returns on the domestic (Tokyo) and foreign (US) markets
￿d;t = pf;t ￿ pd;t and ￿f;t = pd;t ￿ pf;t￿1 are the cross-market price di⁄erentials








￿ are the time-varying speed of
adjustment parameters, ￿d;t and ￿f;t are return innovations on the Japanese and US stock
markets, respectively. ￿(￿￿) denote signi￿cance at 10 (5)%
78Table 3.A (continued) : Conditional mean dynamics
Ordinary Share -TSE













































































rd;t and rf;t are returns on the domestic (Tokyo) and foreign (US) markets
￿d;t = pf;t ￿ pd;t and ￿f;t = pd;t ￿ pf;t￿1 are the cross-market price di⁄erentials








￿ are the time-varying speed of
adjustment parameters, ￿d;t and ￿f;t are return innovations on the Japanese and US stock
markets, respectively. ￿(￿￿) denote signi￿cance at 10 (5)%
79Table 3.A (continued) : Conditional mean dynamics
ADR - NYSE (NASDAQ)




































































































rd;t and rf;t are returns on the domestic (Tokyo) and foreign (US) markets
￿d;t = pf;t ￿ pd;t and ￿f;t = pd;t ￿ pf;t￿1 are the cross-market price di⁄erentials








￿ are the time-varying speed of
adjustment parameters, ￿d;t and ￿f;t are return innovations on the Japanese and US stock
markets, respectively. ￿(￿￿) denote signi￿cance at 10 (5)%
80Table 3.B : Conditional variance dynamics
Ordinary Share - TSE
















































































































+(￿) 0:49(0:49) 0:31(0:31) 0:35(0:07) 0:15(0:04) 0:57(0:94)




















To test whether volatility spillovers are asymmetric the following hypotheses
are tested : H0 : ￿d = ￿f and H0 : ￿d + ￿￿
d = ￿f + ￿￿
f : The resulting
p-values are reported under +(￿) headings, respectively. ￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
81Table 3.B (continued) : Conditional variance dynamics
Ordinary Share - TSE













































































































+(￿) 0:21(0:61) 0:69(0:55) 0:11(0:44) 0:14(0:14) 0:15(0:15)




















To test whether volatility spillovers are asymmetric the following hypotheses
are tested : H0 : ￿d = ￿f and H0 : ￿d + ￿￿
d = ￿f + ￿￿
f : The resulting
p-values are reported under +(￿) headings, respectively. ￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
82Table 3.C : Skewness/kurtosis dynamics
Ordinary Share - TSE









































ADR - NYSE (NASDAQ)









































log-ld 5556.25 5422.32 5363.62 5201.04 5438.16
























f;t) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if ￿d;t(￿d;t) > 0
Iv
d;t(Iv
f;t) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if ￿2
d;t > hd;t (￿2
f;t > hf;t)
￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
83Table 3.C (continued) : Skewness/kurtosis dynamics
Ordinary Share - TSE





















































































log-ld 5445.21 5611.35 5576.86 5277.56 5869.64
























f;t) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if ￿d;t(￿d;t) > 0
Iv
d;t(Iv
f;t) is the indicator function taking the value 1 if ￿2
d;t > hd;t (￿2
f;t > hf;t)
￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
84Table 4 : Diagnostic tests
Ordinary Share - TSE
Canon Fuji Hitachi Kyocera Matsushita
LBz(10) 0.92 0.85 0.94 0.47 0.72
LBz2(10) 0.69 0.39 0.28 0.06 0.46
K-S 0.21 0.84 0.64 0.75 0.96
ADR - NYSE (NASDAQ)
LBz(10) 0.91 0.59 0.32 0.25 0.67
LBz2(10) 0.98 0.95 0.57 0.11 0.14
K-S 0.75 0.55 0.93 0.94 0.81
Ordinary Share - TSE
Nissan Honda Sony TDK Toyota
LBz(10) 0.24 0.86 0.88 0.74 0.98
LBz2(10) 0.77 0.77 0.62 0.88 0.72
K-S 0.99 0.95 0.94 0.77 0.95
ADR - NYSE (NASDAQ)
LBz(10) 0.29 0.06 0.51 0.53 0.21
LBz2(10) 0.36 0.42 0.1 0.77 0.08
K-S 0.99 0.96 0.87 0.94 0.97
LBz(z2) denotes p-values of Ljung-Box test applied to the standardized
return innovations and its￿squares. K-S denote p-values of the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test of i.i.d U(0,1) applied to the probability integral transforms
of the estimated density function for each ordinary share-ADR pair
3.5.2 Volume-Return Dynamics
We start with the analysis of the results of the nonparametric ommited variable tests. In the
upper panel of Table 5 we present the results of White and Hong M-test applied to the open-
to-close returns. For each ordinary share and for each ADR under investigation we considered
two tests (as discussed in the previous section), namely Test 1 and Test 2. In case of each test
85we calculated nine test statistics based on the "optimal" (cross-validation based) bandwidth h￿
and its fractions of (1 ￿ ￿) and (1 + ￿), for ￿ lying in the (0,1) range. For most of the cases
we chose ￿ = 0:25:11 For each test we present statistics with the minimum and the maximum
value as [min;max]: Bonferroni "pseudo" critical values for this nine-trials based test are 6.45
and 7.69 for 10 and 5 percent size level, and the standard ￿2(1) critical values are 2.7 and 3.84,
respectively.
As can be seen from Table 5, for the ordinary shares only in case of two out of ten ￿rms we
are able to reject the null that the US trading volume a⁄ects the intensity of the information
transfer. For the rest of the ￿rms, based on the low values of the test statistics, we are not
able to reject the null at any reasonable size level. On the other hand, for the ADR the null is
strongly rejected for eight out of ten ￿rms in our sample. The evidence of the Japanese trading
volume playing a signi￿cant role in the pricing information transmission is particularly strong,
taking into account the conservative nature of the Bonferroni inequality based test. Also, in
case of the ADRs the test statistic appears to be substantially sensitive to the choice of the
bandwidth which justi￿es the use of the Bonferroni bounds.
To shed some further light on the role of the trading volume in the cross-market return spill-
over mechanism, we apply the same nonparametric test to the close-to-open returns. The results
are presented in the lower panel of Table 5. Not surprisingly, for all ￿rms under investigation
we ￿nd the trading volume on the TSE a⁄ecting the transfer of the pricing information from
Tokyo to New-York at the opening of the US stock markets, which is consistent with the results
of the results of Table 3.A. However, in case of the ordinary shares the di⁄erence between the
results of the White and Hong test applied to the open-to-close and close-to-open returns is
indeed striking. While for only two out of ten ￿rms we ￿nd empirical evidence of the US trading
volume a⁄ecting the dynamics of the close-to-open returns on the Tokyo stock exchange, for
the close-to-open returns we ￿nd such evidence for nine out of ten companies, with Fuji being
the only exception as in this case the results are inconclusive. Based on the previous estimation
results the US markets clearly emerge as the satellite ones and, therefore, it is possible that
the impact of the US markets￿trading volume, while being signi￿cant, is completed at the
11In a few cases we had to "oversmooth" the cross-validation based bandwidth to prevent the kernels to reach
their numerical zero boundaries.
86opening of the Tokyo stock exchange, as it was found to be the case with the cross-market
return spill-overs and error-correction dynamics. These ￿ndings indicate that this is indeed
the case suggesting that the transmission of the pricing information is bidirectional with the
trading volume playing an important role in the latter.
Next, we turn our attention to the results of the regression analysis. In Table 6 we present
the results of the parametric tests based on the regressions 1) and 2) estimated by the SUR
approach with open-to-close returns. We report the estimates of the coe¢ cients of the volume-
return interaction terms since they constitute the major interest of this subsection. Similar to
the results of the W&H test reported in the upper panel of Table 5 in case of the ADRs, for
eight out of ten companies we ￿nd empirical evidence of the Tokyo trading volume a⁄ecting the
transmission of pricing information from Tokyo to New-York. Overall, for six out of ten com-
panies the impact of the Tokyo trading volume is statistically signi￿cant, based on the results
of both parametric and non-parametric tests. On the contrary, only for two ￿rms the impact of
the trading volume was found to be bidirectional, with the TSE trading volume a⁄ecting the
returns of the ADR and vice versa. For most of the ￿rms the volume-return interaction term
does not appear to contribute to the cross-market return dynamics with
^
 2 being statistically
insigni￿cant. On the contrary, for most of the ADRs the Tokyo trading volume is inversely
related to the share of the PP deviation corrected during the subsequent trading day in New-
York with
^
 f;3 being signi￿cantly negative. One of the possible interpretations of this result
is that the cross-market divergence between the price of the ADR and its underlying share is
more likely to be corrected at the opening of the US market when it is accompanied by a high
trading volume during the previous trading day on the TSE, a ￿nding which is consistent with
the hypothesis of the trading volume conveying additional information to the one implicit in
stock prices. One can think of the stock price as a linear combination of two stochastic terms,
an implicit "e¢ cient" price which represents the "true" fundamental underlying value and the
divergence from the latter induced by the bid-ask spread (see, for instance, Hasbrouck (1995)).
Then, when the trading on both markets is not synchronous, the price di⁄erential between the
ADR and its underlying share will convey useful information regarding the change in the "fun-
damental" value. When the investors are heterogeneous in terms of their private information
the trading volume provides additional information to the one implicit in the cross-market price
87di⁄erential regarding the change in the "fundamental" value which is in line with our ￿nding
that the major impact of the trading volume on the cross-market return dynamics is via the
PP error correction mechanism.
To gain additional insight into the return-volume relationship it could be useful to estimate
the same regressions with the close-to-open returns. However, due to a substantial time overlap
between the close-to-open return on the one market and open-to close return on the other, the
SUR estimates are likely to be biased due to the endogeneity problem. A standard approach
to deal with this problem is to use an instrumental variable approach instead. Since most of
the regressors in our regression setup, such as the returns and the trading volumes are likely to
be jointly determined, ￿nding an appropriate set of instruments becomes quite a complicated
issue. Instead, we estimate the same regression with the close-to-close returns for both markets
as in Lieberman, Ben-Zion, and Hauser (1999). On the one hand, for the close-to-close returns
the endogeneity problem is less likely to arise, while on the other hand, a comparison of the
impact of the trading volume on the open-to-close and close-to-close returns dynamics (an
overall impact) will allow us to draw some conclusions regarding the role of the former in the
dynamics of the close-to-open returns.
The estimation results are presented in Table 7, where, as before, for the sake of saving
space, only the estimates of the volume-return dynamics are presented. For most of the ADRs
the estimates of  3 which, in the close-to-close return setup measure the overall impact of
the TSE trading volume on the error-correction intensity are either positive and statistically
signi￿cant or positive and insigni￿cant. The only exception is Nissan where
^
 3 is negative but
statistically insigni￿cant. This comes in sharp contrast with the same estimates for the open-
to-returns where the estimate of the loading on the error-correction-volume interaction term
is signi￿cantly negative for most of the ￿rms. Turning to the close-to-close return dynamics
of the ordinary shares we ￿nd that for all the ￿rms the estimates of  3 are positive and also
statistically signi￿cant in case of nine out of ten companies, while being statistically insigni￿cant
for the open-to-close returns. Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that for the cross-listed securities
the intensity of the pricing information transfer from the domestic to the foreign (foreign to
domestic) markets increases with an increase in the volume during the last trading period.
Also, consistent with the dominant-satellite markets hypothesis, the impact of the US trading
88volume appears to be completed at the opening of the Tokyo stock exchange, while the impact
of the trading volume on the TSE is not completed at the opening of the US stock markets and
transmitted to the following trading day. We hypothesize that these ￿ndings support the idea
that the trading volume provides additional pricing information to the investors. An alternative
explanation can be the "visibility" hypothesis raised by Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin (2001)
who claim that positive shocks in the trading volume make the stock more "visible", attracting
new investors. While this hypothesis may explain the positive relationship between the trading
volume and the intensity of the error-correction mechanism, we do not see how it might explain
the cross-market asymmetry found in the volume-return dynamics. Therefore, the informative
role of the trading volume seems to be a more plausible explanation.
To check the robustness of our ￿ndings we re-estimate our regression models with two
alternative measures of volume. First, following Lee and Rui (2002) we use detrended volume
calculated as the sample innovation from the following regression
vi;t = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 + ￿i;t
for each ￿rm under investigation and for i = fd;fg. For a number of ￿rms in our sample the
trading volume is signi￿cantly increasing over time which can be due to an increase in the total
number of shares outstanding. Second, it is possible that the shocks to the trading volume
rather than the trading volume itself convey additional information. There is an extant amount
of evidence of the clustering nature of the trading volume and, therefore, it seems reasonable
to control for its predictable component. We calculate the shocks to the trading volume as the
residuals from the following regressions







for each ￿rm in our sample and for i = fd;fg. For some ￿rms in our sample the lagged trading
volume on the Tokyo and US stock markets explains up to 50 percent of the total variation
of the current trading volume which con￿rms the statistical and economic signi￿cance of the
predictable component. The results remain unaltered under the three di⁄erent speci￿cations of
89the trading volume supporting the robustness of our ￿ndings.
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this research we investigate the dynamics of the pricing information transmission between
the stocks of Japanese ￿rms listed on both the Tokyo and US stock markets. Unlike previous
studies, we extend our analysis beyond the investigation of the mean dynamics, by studying the
cross-market volatility and skewness spill-overs. We estimate a bivariate VEC-GARCH model
with skewed Student-t innovations which allows for a dynamic speci￿cation of the conditional
variance and skewness. In addition, we examine the role of the trading volume in the dynamics
of the pricing information transfer between the markets by means of both non-parametric and
parametric tests. Our key results are as follows.
First, at the return level we ￿nd that the major channel of information transmission is via
the error-correction mechanism of the cross-market price di⁄erential. Interestingly, the error-
correction mechanism exhibits non-linear dynamics consistent with di⁄erent levels of transaction
costs faced by cross-border investors. In addition, it appears that the US investors tend to
overreact to the news revealed during the trading on the Tokyo stock exchange but not vice
versa. Overall, consistent with other studies, we ￿nd that the Tokyo stock market emerges as
the dominant one while the US stock exchanges behave as the satellite ones.
Second, we ￿nd signi￿cant bidirectional volatility spill-overs between the ordinary shares and
their ADRs. However, in contrast to the ￿rst moment dynamics, no evidence of asymmetry
in the cross-market variance dynamics can be found. Also, for some stocks we ￿nd that the
intensity of the volatility spill-over is sign dependent, a ￿nding which can be attributed to the
cross-market leverage e⁄ect.
Third, we ￿nd some preliminary evidence of cross-market skewness dynamics. In particular,
we ￿nd that conditional on the past history of positive pricing shocks on the US (Tokyo)
stock exchange, the distribution of the ordinary share (ADR) return is forecasted to be more
negatively skewed, a dynamic pattern consistent with the stochastic bubbles hypothesis, thus
extending the results of Harvey and Siddique (2000) to a multiple-market setup.
Finally, we ￿nd solid empirical evidence of the trading volume a⁄ecting the intensity of
90the pricing information transfer between the markets via the error-correction channel. More
speci￿cally, the "arbitrage" opportunity induced by the cross-market price di⁄erential is more
likely to be eliminated at the opening of the US (Tokyo) stock market when the former is
accompanied by a high trading volume on the Tokyo (US) stock exchange during the preceding
trading day. In this particular context, our results both complement and provide an interesting
extension to the ￿ndings of Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) who ￿nd that high-volume stocks
adjust more rapidly to new information. Interestingly, the impact of the US trading volume
appears to be completed at the opening of the Tokyo stock exchange while the impact of
the Tokyo trading volume is transmitted to the following trading day on the US stock markets.
This asymmetry suggests that investors tend to extract additional information from the trading
volume in addition to the information present in stock prices.
Our ￿ndings suggest a number of interesting issues for further research as well. First,
the asymmetry found in the mean but not in the volatility spill-overs raises the question of
the determinants of the stock return variance, and, in particular, the contribution of global
(macro-economic) and ￿rm-speci￿c news in the latter. In this context, an event study of
the impact of macroeconomic and ￿rm-speci￿c announcements on the volatility of cross-listed
securities might provide interesting insights. Second, it would be interesting to test whether the
trading volume a⁄ects the intensity of the information transmission at the aggregate market
level. In particular, since a high trading volume is usually associated with a high volatility,
the question whether shifts in the stock market interdependence structure during turbulent
periods are volatility- or volume-driven appears to be of particular importance for the analysis
of potential bene￿ts from cross-market diversi￿cation. Finally, while we ￿nd solid empirical
evidence of predictability of cross-listed stock returns contradicting the notion of semi-strong
market e¢ ciency, from the practical point of view it would be interesting to test whether this
predictability can be exploited to earn economically signi￿cant pro￿ts. In light of our ￿ndings,
cross-market investment strategies built on the price-di⁄erential/volume ￿lters seem to be a
natural starting point.
91Table 5 : White and Hong (1993) minimum/maximum statistics
Table 5.A : Open-to-close returns
ADR Ordinary Share
Test 1 Test 2 Test 1 Test 2







































Table 5.B : Close-to-open returns
ADR Ordinary Share































































H0 : E f(y ￿ f(x)) ￿ zg = 0; ￿(B)(￿￿(B)) indicates 90% (95%) signi￿cance based on Bonferroni bound
Ordinary Share Test 1: y = rd;t;x = ￿d;t￿1;z = ￿d;t￿1 ￿ vf;t￿1; Test 2: y = rd;t;x = rf;t￿1;z = rf;t￿1 ￿ vf;t￿1
ADR Test 1: y = rf;t;x = ￿f;t;z = ￿f;t ￿ vd;t; Test 2: y = rf;t;x = rd;t;z = rd;t ￿ vd;t
92Table 6 : Volume-return dynamics (open-to-close returns)
Ordinary Share - TSE































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.54 0.22 0.1 0.18 0.75































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.04 0.002 0.057 0.12 0.69
Tokyo regression :rd;t = ￿d +  d;t￿d;t￿1 +
￿
’d;trf;t￿i + ￿d;t
 d;t =  d;1 +  d;2
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1
￿ ￿ +  d;3
￿




’d;t = ’d;1 + ’d;2
￿
vf;t￿1
New-York regression : rf;t = ￿f +  f;t￿f;t +
￿
’f;trd;t + ￿f;t




￿ +  f;3
￿










vf;t) - standardized trading volume on Tokyo (New-York) market
rd;t(rf;t)-open-to-close return on Tokyo (New-York) market
￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
93Table 6 (continued) : Volume-return dynamics (open-to-close returns)
Ordinary Share - TSE
































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.47 0.029 0.11 0.55 0.22































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.37 0.024 0.008 0.002 0.18
Tokyo regression :rd;t = ￿d +  d;t￿d;t￿1 +
￿
’d;trf;t￿i + ￿d;t
 d;t =  d;1 +  d;2
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1
￿ ￿ +  d;3
￿




’d;t = ’d;1 + ’d;2
￿
vf;t￿1
New-York regression : rf;t = ￿f +  f;t￿f;t +
￿
’f;trd;t + ￿f;t




￿ +  f;3
￿










vf;t) - standardized trading volume on Tokyo (New-York) market
rd;t(rf;t)-open-to-close return on Tokyo (New-York) market
￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
94Table 7 : Volume-return dynamics (close-to-close returns)
Ordinary Share - TSE

































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.02 0.025 0.11 0.0000 0.093
































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.0003 0.08 0.0018 0.12 0.11
Tokyo regression :rd;t = ￿d +  d;t￿d;t￿1 +
￿
’d;trf;t￿i + ￿d;t
 d;t =  d;1 +  d;2
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1
￿ ￿ +  d;3
￿




’d;t = ’d;1 + ’d;2
￿
vf;t￿1
New-York regression : rf;t = ￿f +  f;t￿f;t +
￿
’f;trd;t + ￿f;t




￿ +  f;3
￿










vf;t) - standardized trading volume on Tokyo (New-York) market
rd;t(rf;t)-close-to-close return on Tokyo (New-York) market
￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
95Table 7 (continued): Volume-return dynamics (close-to-close returns)
Ordinary Share - TSE
































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.026 0.046 0.004 0.011 0.96

































H0 : ’2 =  3 = 0 0.91 0.29 0.0000 0.09 0.02
Tokyo regression :rd;t = ￿d +  d;t￿d;t￿1 +
￿
’d;trf;t￿i + ￿d;t
 d;t =  d;1 +  d;2
￿ ￿￿d;t￿1
￿ ￿ +  d;3
￿




’d;t = ’d;1 + ’d;2
￿
vf;t￿1
New-York regression : rf;t = ￿f +  f;t￿f;t +
￿
’f;trd;t + ￿f;t




￿ +  f;3
￿










vf;t) - standardized trading volume on Tokyo (New-York) market
rd;t(rf;t)-close-to-close return on Tokyo (New-York) market
￿(￿￿) indicates signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
963.A The List of Sample Companies
Firm Name Industry Code Japan Listing US Listing US listing date
Canon 3577 TSE NYSE 14/09/2000
Fuji Photo Film Co. Ltd 3861 TSE NASDAQ 10/03/1993
Hitachi Limited 3570 TSE NYSE 14/04/1982
Kyocera Corporation 3663 TSE NYSE 23/05/1980
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co 3600 TSE NYSE 13/12/1971
Nissan Motor Co Ltd. 3711 TSE NASDAQ 16/03/1994
Honda Motor Co Ltd 3711 TSE NYSE 11/02/1977
Sony Corporation 3651 TSE NYSE 17/09/1970
TDK Corporation 3679 TSE NYSE 15/06/1982
Toyota Motor Corporation 3711 TSE NYSE 29/09/1999
3.B Speci￿cations tests
3.B.1 Error-Correction Dynamics
In this part of the Appendix we conduct speci￿cation tests of the dynamics of the error cor-
rection mechanism of the cross-listed securities. Under the null hypothesis the error correction
occurs in a linear fashion, that is, m(xj) = E(rjxj) = ￿+￿ ￿xj. We formally test the hypothe-

























estimate under the null estimated by least squares and v1 = f(xj)￿1￿2 R
K( )2d  with f(￿)
being a density function of x evaluated at the point xj and K(￿) being a kernel. Under the
null of correct parametric speci￿cation the limit distribution of the test statistic is standard
normal. Following Gozalo, we look at the supremum of
^
T evaluated at d randomly chosen






97which has ￿2(d) distribution under the null. Since the results of the non-parametric test can be
sensitive to the choice of the bandwidth we also estimate polynomial approximation of m
npby
least squares and test the null that the coe¢ cients of the high-order terms are jointly equal
to zero via a standard Wald test. The number of high-order terms is chosen by minimizing
Akaike Information Criterion. For each ￿rm the null of a linear adjustment mechanism is
tested separately for the ordinary share and its ADR.
Table B.1:Tests of the linearity of the error-correction dynamics
ADR Ordinary share
Sup(T) G Wald Sup(T) G Wald
Canon 0.011 0.022 0.00 0.03 0.27 0.008
Fuji 0.03 0.035 0.00 0.22 0.91 0.035
Hitachi 0.024 0.06 0.02 0.14 0.06 0.31
Kyocera 0.006 0.045 0.002 0.09 0.34 0.003
Matsushita 0.012 0.02 0.00 0.5 0.98 0.45
Nissan 0.03 0.021 0.004 0.26 0.56 0.4
Honda 0.06 0.21 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00
Sony 0.01 0.023 0.00 0.03 0.34 0.75
TDK 0.05 0.65 0.05 0.16 0.89 0.5
Toyota 0.013 0.023 0.002 0.03 0.08 0.18
The numbers reported are the p-values of the Gozalo and Wald speci￿cation tests
as described in Appendix 3.B.1. Throughout this paper we use a Gaussian kernel.
The results are fairly robust to di⁄erent choices of the bandwidth
3.B.2 Skewness Dynamics
Let us de￿ne by zd;t and zf;t the standardized errors for the ordinary share and its underlying
ADR, respectively, which can be consistently estimated within a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood
framework. Since by the de￿nition the skewness st = Et￿1(z3
t) as a preliminary analysis it seems
reasonable to study the dynamics of z￿ s and, in particular, to test for the non-linear dependence
and for the possibility of autoregressive dynamics. We test the former via BDS while the latter
is tested via the autocorrelation function (ACF) of the cubic standardized innovations. The
98results are presented in Table B.2.
For most of the companies, we ￿nd no evidence of an autoregressive non-linear dependence
for the normalized innovations. The analysis of the autocorrelation function also suggests that,
in general, there is no evidence of skewness being persistent. Overall, our preliminary analysis
fails to detect any autoregressive dynamics in the conditional distribution of the standardized
innovations




2 4 2 4 ￿￿1 ￿￿5 ￿￿10 ￿￿1 ￿￿5 ￿￿10
Canon 0.61 0.53 0.79 0.29 0.03 0.001 0.004 0.005 -0.007 0.001
Fuji 0.67 0.49 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.04 0.007 0.002
Hitachi 0.92 0.28 0.97 0.11 -0.02 -0.03 0.007 0.02 -0.002 0.006
Kyocera 0.79 0.26 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 -0.08￿￿ 0.003
Matsushita 0.34 0.21 0.49 0.34 -0.03 -0.01 0.057 0.03 -0.06￿￿ 0.058
Nissan 0.65 0.21 0.93 0.96 0.03 0.03 0.057 0.01 -0.02 0.02
Honda 0.29 0.41 0.98 0.46 0.02 0.072￿￿ 0.031 0.007 0.02 0.02
Sony 0.3 0.07 0.8 0.72 0.01 0.004 0.003 0.15￿￿ 0.001 -0.01
TDK 0.98 0.75 0.63 0.88 0.006 -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.024 0.048
Toyota 0.86 0.64 0.23 0.16 -0.007 0.01 -0.005 0.008 -0.03 0.018
BDSzd and BDSzf are the p-values of the BDS test applied to the standardized returns on the Tokyo/US markets
￿￿1, ￿￿5 and ￿￿10 are the sample serial correlations of the cubic standardized returns on the Tokyo/US markets
3.C Hansen￿ s Skewed Student-t Density- A Brief Review
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It can be shown that this is a proper density function with a mean of zero and a unit
variance (see Hansen (1994), Appendix 1). Furthemore, Jondeau and Rockinger (2003) show
that the formulae for skewness and kurtosis are given by
E(z3) = (m3 ￿ 3am2 + 2a3)=b3
E(z4) = (m4 ￿ 4am3 + 6a2m2 ￿ 3a4)=b4
where the constants m2;m3 and m4 are given by
m2 = 1 + 3￿2
m3 = 16c￿(1 + ￿2)
(￿ ￿ 2)2
(￿ ￿ 1)(￿ ￿ 3)




(1 + 10￿2 + 5￿4) for ￿ > 4
100Chapter 4
Trading Volume, Volatility and
Return Dynamics: Individual and
Cross-Market Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to study the dynamic relationship between stock returns, trading
volume, and volatility. Both trading volume and volatility attract a lot of attention of both
academics and practitioners. This indicates their potential importance as indicators of the
current stock market activity on the one hand, and a potential source of information regarding
the underlying fundamentals, and, thus, the future behavior of stock markets, on the other
hand. Obviously, if stock markets are informationally e¢ cient, that is, if all information is
fully incorporated in the stock prices, studying the links between future stock returns, volume,
and volatility would be pointless. However, numerous pricing anomalies reported in the ￿nance
literature suggest that the price discovery process is not immediate. But then both trading
volume and volatility might serve as useful indicators regarding the extent to which pricing
information is impounded in security prices and, thus, they may have some predictive power
regarding the future behavior of stock prices.
This research is motivated by a rapidly growing ￿eld of academic literature which focuses
101on the predictability of stock returns and, in particular, the role of the trading volume and the
volatility in the dynamics of the price discovery process. A surge in academic literature, both
theoretical and empirical, on the volume (volatility)-return relation re￿ ects the need of further
understanding of the underlying processes generating trading on the other hand and security
price changes on the hand. In particular, since volume and volatility both serve as measures of
information ￿ ow (see, for instance, Andersen, 1996), examining the links between stock returns,
volume, and volatility provides a further understanding of how new information is impounded
in stock prices. However, the interest in this ￿eld is not limited to the academic community
only. Nowadays, stock markets are becoming increasingly more complex in their structure but
also more competitive on the other. The increased accessibility of information and investors
searching for arbitrage opportunities caused many previously recorded pricing "anomalies" to
disappear or to lose their economic signi￿cance (Schwert, 2003). In this context, a deeper
understanding of the role of the trading volume and the volatility in the dynamics of security
prices may help investors to identify future patterns of the stock market which can be exploited
in their investment decisions.
This paper has three contributions to the literature. First, the majority of studies examining
the role of the trading volume and volatility in the dynamics of the stock returns do this in a
parametric setting, usually postulating some parametric speci￿cation for the return generating
process. This approach may lead to erroneous conclusions due to potential model misspeci-
￿cation. Instead, in our study we rely on a nonparametric approach, an approach which is
not only easy to implement, but also does not require any speci￿c assumptions regarding the
data generating process. Second, while most of the previous studies concentrate on examining
only one speci￿c relationship (volume-volatility, volatility-autocorrelation, and so on), we study
the dynamics of the stock returns by controlling for both trading volume and volatility e⁄ects.
This approach, as we show, sheds a new light on some stylized facts described in the empirical
volume-return literature. Finally, we extend our analysis to a multiple market setting, where we
study the role of the trading volume and volatility in a cross-border information transfer, based
on a large sample of cross-listed ￿rms. Using cross-listed securities (instead of market indices)
allows us to study the mechanism of the cross-border information transfer, while controlling for
the individual ￿rm characteristics.
102Our major ￿ndings are as follows. First, we ￿nd no evidence of the trading volume having
any direct impact on the serial correlation of stock market returns. Second, we ￿nd that the
serial correlation of stock market returns is inversely related to the stock market volatility.
Moreover, we ￿nd that while the high frequency returns are reported to be unconditionally
positively serially correlated, taking into account volatility e⁄ects, the serial correlation coe¢ -
cients turn out to be negative during periods of high market turbulence. Third, we ￿nd that an
increase in the volume leads to a subsequent increase in the stock market volatility. Together,
these three ￿ndings shed a new light on the volume-return reversal relationship documented
by many studies. In contrast to these studies our ￿ndings suggest that it is the stock market
volatility that plays a major role in the magnitude and the sign of the return reversal, while
trading volume plays a secondary role. Finally, we ￿nd that the trading volume plays an impor-
tant role in a multiple market setting, and, in particular, in the price discovery process and in
the co-movement between stock markets, supporting the informative role of the trading volume
for investors.
This remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 4.2 we review the existing
literature on the volume-volatility-return dynamics. Section 4.3 describes the data. In Section
4.4 we discuss the methodology used in our study. In Section 4.5 we de￿ne our hypotheses.
Estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 4.6. Finally, in Section 4.7 we make
our concluding remarks and discuss some potential directions for further research.
4.2 Literature Review
In this section we review the existing literature on the relationship between trading volume,
volatility, and stock returns. We start in subsection 4.2.1 with a brief review of the academic
work which focuses on the impact of the trading volume on the serial correlation of stock
returns. Next, in subsection 4.2.2 we summarize the literature on the volatility-serial correlation
dynamics. Subsection 4.2.3 provides a brief summary of the studies examining the trading
volume-expected returns and trading volume-volatility relationships. Finally, in subsection
4.2.4 we review the literature on the volume-return dynamics in a multiple market setup.
4.2.1
1034.2.2 Trading Volume and Serial Correlation Relations
A number of theoretical models linking the lagged trading volume and serial correlation of
stock returns have been proposed. Campbell, Grossman and Wang (1993) introduce a model
where such a link is related to non-informational trading. In their model there are two types
of investors both with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) utility function. The ￿rst
type has a constant risk aversion parameter, while the risk aversion of the second type may
change over time. Trading is induced by, and is positively related to the changes (in absolute
value) in the risk aversion of the type 2 investors, which leads to an increase in the expected
return rewarding the type 1 investors for accommodating the buying/selling pressure. The
implications of this model are that the serial correlation of the stock returns is negatively
related to the trading volume. Wang (1994) generalizes the model of Campbell et al. (1993)
by allowing for information asymmetry among the investors. In his model informational and
non-informational trading lead to a di⁄erent dynamic relationship between the trading volume
and the serial correlation of the stock returns. Llorente, Michaely, Saar, and Wang (2002)
present a simpli￿ed version of the Wang (1994) model in which investors trade either to share
risk or to speculate on private information. In their model returns generated by risk-sharing
trades exhibit a negative autocorrelation while the returns generated by the speculative trades
are positively serially correlated.
The relationship between the lagged trading volume and the serial correlation of stock
returns has been a focus of a substantial body of empirical studies as well. Dufee (1992) studies
the relation between the serial correlation and trading volume using aggregate monthly US data.
He reports a statistically signi￿cant relationship between volume shocks and return reversals.
Campbell et al. (1993) report a negative relationship between the lagged trading volume and
the serial correlation of stock market returns for the US data at a daily frequency. Conrad,
Hameed, and Niden (1994) examine the pro￿tability of weekly contrarian strategies based on
a high/low volume ￿ltration for stocks listed on the US stock markets. They report that a
high number of transactions is associated with a return reversal in subsequent periods, while a
low volume is more likely to generate momentum. Bremer and Hiraki (1999) explore the serial
correlation-volume dynamics of the stocks listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. They report
that loser stocks with a high trading volume tend to have larger price reversals in the following
104week. On the contrary, Cooper (1999) reports that for large capitalization stocks a decline in
volume is associated with return reversals and vice versa. A positive relationship between the
magnitude of momentum and the lagged turnover is also reported by Lee and Swaminnathan
(2000), and Chan et al. (2000). Overall, these ￿ndings suggest that the likelihood of observing
a reversal or "momentum" in stock returns is related to trading volume.
4.2.3 Stock Return Volatility and Serial Autocorrelation Relations
The link between volatility and serial correlation in stock returns has been suggested by Sentana
and Wadhwani (1992) in their so-called "feedback trading" model. In this model two types of
investors are assumed to be present: mean-variance (or "smart money") traders and feedback
traders, whose demand is assumed to be a function of past stock returns. This function is
increasing in past returns if the investors follow a "positive feedback" investment strategy
("momentum") and decreasing if they follow a "negative feedback" ("contrarian") strategy.
Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) show that in equilibrium the serial correlation of the stock
returns is decreasing (increasing) in the stock return volatility if the investors are "momentum"
("contrarian") traders.
A number of empirical studies has been conducted in this ￿eld. LeBaron (1992) explores
the relation between serial correlation and volatility for several di⁄erent stock return series at
both daily and weekly frequencies for the US markets. He reports a negative relation between
the serial correlation of the stock returns and the volatility, a ￿nding which is consistent with
investors following a "positive feedback" strategy. Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) report similar
results based on a large span of daily data on a US aggregate stock market index. Koutmous
(1996) extends these previous studies beyond the US market borders by studying the impact
of volatility on the serial correlation for several other national markets. His ￿ndings are similar
to those reported by LeBaron (1992) and Sentana and Wadhwani (1992), suggesting that the
volatility-serial correlation relationship is not likely to be induced by the microstructure speci￿cs
of a particular market.
1054.2.4 Expected Return-Volume and Volatility-Volume Relations
A number of studies examine the relationship between the lagged trading volume and expected
returns. Gervais et al. (2001) suggest that the existence of such a link can be attributed to the
so-called "visibility" hypothesis. They argue that an unusually high volume makes the stock
more "visible" to investors and, thus, attracts new traders. In the presence of short-selling
constraints an additional buying pressure will dominate, thus, leading to higher returns in the
following periods. On the other hand, Baker and Stein (2003) propose an alternative view by
interpreting liquidity indicators (and among them trading volume/share turnover) as a measure
of investors￿sentiment. In their model they assume the existence of irrational investors who
underreact to the information contained in the order ￿ ow, thus, boosting liquidity. In the
presence of short-selling constraints this class of investors is active in the market only when
their sentiment is positive. Therefore, a high trading volume is an indicator that the market
is overvalued, leading to subsequent lower returns. Brennan and Subrahmanyam (1996), and
Brennan, Chordia, and Subrahmanyam (1998) ￿nd that a high share turnover is associated
with lower future returns in a cross section of individual ￿rms. On the other hand, Gervais
et al. (2001) report that investment strategies based on buying the stocks which experienced
an unusually high volume and selling those with previously a low volume, yield positive and
statistically signi￿cant returns. For the aggregate stock markets, Jones (2001) ￿nds that a high
turnover leads to subsequent lower returns of the Dow-Jones index.
In contrast to the trading volume-expected return theories, the link between trading volume
and volatility is mostly related to a "mixture of distribution" or "information ￿ ow" hypothesis,
introduced by Clark (1973). This hypothesis posits a joint dependence of returns and volume
on an underlying information ￿ ow variable. Since there is a wide consensus that the trading
volume is highly positively autocorrelated, one of the implications of this theory is that the stock
return volatility should also be positively related to the lagged trading volume. Lamourex and
Lastrapes (1990) ￿nd strong evidence of the trading volume positively a⁄ecting the variance for
a sample of common stocks traded on the US market. Andersen (1996) develops an empirical
return volatility-volume model based on a microstructure framework. Lee and Rui (2002) report
a positive feedback relationship between the trading volume and volatility on the US, UK, and
Japanese stock markets. Similar results are reported by Gerlach et al.(2006) for selected samples
106of Asian and European stock markets.
The documented volatility-volume and volatility-autocorrelation relations are particularly
important in the context of this study. Together, these ￿ndings present an alternative explana-
tions for the reported volume-autocorrelation relation. It is possible that trading volume a⁄ects
the serial correlation of stock returns not directly, but indirectly via volatility, This hypothesis,
among others, will be tested in the following sections.
4.2.5 Volume, Volatility, and Return Dynamics in a Multiple Asset Frame-
work.
While there exists an extant body of academic literature studying the relations between trading
volume, volatility, and the dynamics of stock returns in a single asset (or market) framework, the
literature discussing these dynamics in a multiple asset/market framework is quite sparse. Tak-
ing into account that stock markets are becoming increasingly sophisticated and more globally
integrated this gap is indeed surprising. Studying the role of the trading volume and volatility
in the dynamics of stock returns in a multiple asset framework may provide important clues on
optimal portfolio selection, while examining the volume-volatility-return dynamics in a multiple
market framework may contribute to our understanding of the cross-border information ￿ ow
mechanism between the markets.
Chordia and Swaminathan (2000) study the possibility of using the trading volume to fore-
cast short horizon returns on stocks traded on the US stock markets. They ￿nd that daily
returns of stocks with low trading volume are led by those with high trading volume. They
attribute this ￿nding to actively traded stocks having a higher speed of adjustment to new
information. Lee and Rui (2002) report the US trading volume having a signi￿cant causal
e⁄ect on the returns and volatility of the UK and Japanese stock markets. Gagnon and Karolyi
(2003) study the impact of the trading volume on the spill-overs between and the comovement
of the Japanese and US stock market indices. They ￿nd that following days with a high vol-
ume the cross-market correlation coe¢ cients become signi￿cantly smaller. They attribute this
￿nding to the trading volume serving as a proxy for liquidity shocks, as in the Campbell et
al. (1993) model. These ￿ndings provide some preliminary evidence of the role of the trading
volume in a multiple asset/market setting, a role which will be further studied in this paper.
107However, in contrast to Lee and Rui (2002) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2003) who examine the
role of the trading volume in the dynamics of the aggregate stock market indices, we focus on
the cross-listed securities. By studying the same security listed on multiple markets it allows
one to control for various ￿rm-speci￿c characteristics, which could potentially a⁄ect the role of
trading volume in the dynamics of stock returns.
4.3 Data Description and Preliminary Data Analysis
Our dataset consists of daily data on the closing trading level and volume of nine major de-
veloped stock markets: the US, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy, the Netherlands,
Canada, France, and Australia. We also include the Hong-Kong stock market which is consid-
ered to be the largest and one of the most in￿ uential among the emerging stock markets. All
data has been obtained from Datastream International. In Table 1 we list our speci￿c indices,
the sample period, and the number of observations for each market after excluding holidays,
and the trading days with missing observations.
As for the cross-listed securities, our dataset also includes all Canadian ￿rms which were
listed on both the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and the NYSE/AMEX during the period
January 2000-December 2005 as ordinary shares (CRSP code 12). To be included in our sample
a company must have at least one year of data after excluding two months since its listing or
before its delisting, in order to take care of potential post-listing or pre-delisting e⁄ects. After
deleting a number of companies with missing observations from our sample this screening rule
leaves us with a total number of 107 ￿rms.
The descriptive statistics of the daily close-to-close log returns on the national stock market
indices are reported in Table 1. All markets exhibit a positive (though statistically insigni￿-
cant) drift over time. The stock market returns also appear to be slightly negatively skewed,
implying that there is a higher probability of observing negative returns. For Canada, the
Netherlands, Germany, and Australia the skewness sample estimates are also statistically sig-
ni￿cant. On the other hand, for all markets the sample estimates of the kurtosis are signi￿cantly
higher than the one implied by the normal distribution, a ￿nding which is supported by the
high values of the Jarque-Bera statistic. Most of the unconditional non-normality seems to
108be due to leptokurtosis. Some of the stock markets￿daily returns also exhibit positive and
statistically signi￿cant ￿rst-order autocorrelation which, however, seems to dissipate rapidly at
the higher-order lags, suggesting that the potential reason for this serial autocorrelation is the
non-synchronous trading of the index components.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of daily market returns
Country US UK Canada Japan Italy
Market Index S&P 500 FTSE 100 TSX TOPIX DS Index
Sample Period 01/91-12/2005 06/88-12/2005 01/91-12/2005 01/91-12/2005 01/91-12/2005
No obs. 3782 4451 3777 3708 3790
Mean 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
St.Dev 0.01 0.011 0.009 0.012 0.013
Skewness -0.09 -0.12 -0.71￿ 0.06 -0.16
Kurtosis 6.88￿￿ 6.15￿￿ 10.44￿￿ 5.95￿￿ 5.81￿￿
￿t;t￿1 -0.002 0.019 0.11￿￿ 0.086￿￿ 0.059￿￿
J-B stat. 2376.1￿￿ 1855.9￿￿ 9054.63￿￿ 1349.9￿￿ 1264.7￿￿
Country Netherlands Hong-Kong Germany France Australia
Market Index DS Index Hang-Seng DS Index CAC 40 AORD
Sample Period 02/86-12/2005 01/91-12/2003 06/88-12/2005 01/92-12/2005 03/00-12/2005
No obs 4995 3504 4431 3311 1444
Mean 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003
St.Dev 0.01 0.017 0.011 0.014 0.007
Skewness -0.49￿￿ -0.015 -0.66￿￿ -0.089 -0.93￿￿
Kurtosis 10.16￿￿ 12.3￿￿ 10.12￿￿ 5.46￿￿ 10.55￿￿
￿t;t￿1 0.01 0.034￿ 0.053￿￿ 0.016 -0.015
J-B stat. 9681.6￿￿ 12609.9￿￿ 9702.4￿￿ 836.6￿￿ 3639.4￿￿
￿t;t￿1 is the estimate of the ￿rst-order serial correlation between the stock index returns
J-B stat. is the value of a Jarque-Berra statistic applied to a stock index returns
￿(￿￿) denotes signi￿cance at 10 (5) %. For kurtosis denotes that the latter is signi￿cantly di⁄erent from 3
Next, we turn to a preliminary analysis of the trading volume series. In this research we
109de￿ne "trading volume" as the total number of shares traded at a particular day. Both earlier
(Gallant and Tauchen (1992)) and more recent studies (including, for example, Lee and Rui
(2002)) report non-linear trends in the trading volume series. Since we wish to work with






which is obtained as the estimated residual from the regression
vt = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 +
￿
vt:
In Table 2 we present the sample estimates of the regression ￿-s. For all markets we ￿nd
highly signi￿cant non-linear time trends, with the slope coe¢ cients being highly statistically
signi￿cant. Also, based on standard unit root tests, such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and
Phillips-Perron tests, we conclude that the trading volume series are trend stationary. While
the higher-order coe¢ cients appear to be signi￿cant as well, an examination of the de-trended
volume plots suggests that including a linear and quadratic time trend removes any visible
time trend from the trading volume series. Thus, following Lee and Rui (2002) for the national
stock market indices we shall adopt these de-trended volumes as the basic measure of trading
activity in the subsequent analysis. To assess the robustness of our ￿ndings, we shall also
consider alternative methods of removing low-frequency variations which will be discussed in
the following sections.
110Table 2: Time trend in trading volume


































ADF stat. -6.06￿￿ -6.63￿￿ -12.11￿￿ -10.42￿￿ -7.07￿￿


































ADF stat. -4.35￿￿ -5.89￿￿ -4.91￿￿ -4.55￿￿ -10.9￿￿
Estimated regression: vt = ￿0 + ￿1t + ￿2t2 +
￿
v
ADF stat. denotes statistic of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test applied to
the estimated residuals
￿
v:￿(￿￿) denotes signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
Next, we present descriptive statistics for the sample of ￿rms, whose shares are cross-listed
on both the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) and the US stock markets (NYSE/AMEX). For
each statistic (mean, standard deviation, etc) we present a cross-sectional average of its sample
estimate for all the ￿rms included in our sample. We start with an analysis of the descriptive
statistics of the daily close-to-close log returns, which are presented in the upper panel of Table
3. Both the New York and Toronto listed shares exhibit a positive and statistically signi￿cant
drift. Also, during our sample period both the New York and Toronto shares are characterized
by a relatively high volatility, about 47 percent in annual terms. This could be due to the fact
that our sample includes the period of the "dot.com" bubble collapse and also the period of
high turbulence during the second half of 2002, which followed the series of severe bankruptcy
scandals. Interestingly, the average estimates of the volatility of the US and Canada-listed shares
are very close. Since the volatility is often considered to be a proxy for the information ￿ ow
(see, for instance, Andersen (1996), among others), this preliminary ￿nding suggests that the
intensity of the information ￿ ow on the domestic and foreign market is of a similar magnitude.
111This may be due to the fact that both stock exchanges have perfectly overlapping trading hours.
As a result, the information revealed during a business day on one market is rapidly re￿ ected in
the stock prices on the other market. Stock returns on both market also appear to be slightly
positively skewed, though the average estimates of the skewness lack statistical signi￿cance. The
returns on both market are leptokurtic with the average estimates of the excess kurtosis being
highly statistically signi￿cant. For both markets we ￿nd no evidence of returns being serially
correlated. However, the returns appear to be cross-autocorrelated with the average estimates
of the cross-autocorrelation coe¢ cients being positive and statistically signi￿cant. Also, the
squared returns exhibit a substantial degree of serial and cross-autocorrelation, suggesting the
presence of ARCH and volatility spillover e⁄ects.
Descriptive statistics of the daily trading volume are presented in the lower panel of Table
3. On average, the trading volume appears to be higher on Toronto Stock Exchange, suggesting
that the trade is concentrated on the domestic market. A comparison of the estimates of the
standard deviations suggests that trading on the TSE is also more volatile. Both market volumes
are signi￿cantly positively skewed and also leptokurtic. Interestingly, the average estimate of
the kurtosis is substantially higher for the TSE, a ￿nding which again suggests that trading on
the domestic market appears to be more turbulent. Finally, consistent with other studies, the
market trading volumes exhibit both an economically and statistically signi￿cant positive serial
correlation. Also, the estimates of the cross-market serial correlation, Corr(vUS;t;vCAN;t￿1) and
Corr(vCAN;t;vUS;t￿1), suggest the existence of cross-market volume spill-overs.
112Table 3: Cross-listed ￿rms-descriptive statistics
Table 3.A: Descriptive statistics of daily returns
Mean St.Dev Skew. Kurt
New-York Toronto New-York Toronto New-York Toronto New-York Toronto
0.0004￿￿ 0.0004￿￿ 0.03 0.029 0.1 0.016 13.21￿￿ 10.18￿￿
Corr(rUS;t;rUS;t￿1) Corr(rCAN;t;rCAN;t￿1) Corr(rUS;t;rCAN;t￿1) Corr(rCAN;t;rUS;t￿1)










0.126￿￿ 0.121￿￿ 0.114￿￿ 0.11￿￿
Table 3.B: Descriptive statistics of trading volume (thousands of shares)
Mean St.Dev Skew Kurt
New-York Toronto New-York Toronto New-York Toronto New-York Toronto
619.2￿￿ 875.6￿￿ 614.3 836.7 5.18￿￿ 5.99￿￿ 60.79￿￿ 77.8￿￿
Corr(vUS;t;vUS;t￿1) Corr(vCAN;t;vCAN;t￿1) Corr(vUS;t;vCAN;t￿1) Corr(vCAN;t;vUS;t￿1)
0.508￿￿ 0.34￿￿ 0.251￿￿ 0.25￿￿
rUS(rCAN) denotes log-return of the cross-listed shares on the New-York (Toronto)
stock exchange. vUS(vCAN) denotes trading volume of the cross-listed share on the US (Toronto)
stock exchange. ￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at 5%, for kurtosis denotes signi￿cant di⁄erence from 3
4.4 Methodology
The major interest of this research is to study potential interactions between trading volume,
volatility, and the dynamics of stock returns. We start the analysis with a model which requires a
minimal set of assumptions, and, thus, reduces the possibility of reaching the wrong conclusions
due to misspeci￿cation of the functional form. Let y be the dependent variable, x be the
explanatory (conditioning) variable and let E(￿) denote the expectation operator. The following
decomposition of y can be considered
y = m(x) + ￿; E(￿jx) = 0
113with m(x) being (by de￿nition) the conditional expectation of y given x. For instance, y can
be the return of a speci￿c stock market index and x can be the corresponding lagged trading
volume. Then, by testing the null hypothesis that
@m(x)
@x = 0 we test for the presence of a causal
e⁄ect between trading volume and stock market returns. Clearly, a correct speci￿cation of m(￿)
plays a crucial role. Therefore, we start our analysis within the semi-nonparametric framework.
More speci￿cally, we use a Flexible Fourier Form (FFF) series approximation as proposed by
Gallant (1982). Within this framework the estimate of the conditional moment m(x) is given
by
^
m(x) = an + bnx + cnx2 +
X Mn
2
‘=1(’‘;n cos(‘x) + ￿‘;n sin(‘x));
where x is the conditioning variable which in our case is the lagged trading volume
￿
v or the
conditional volatility h, Mn is the total number of trigonometric expansion terms to be chosen,
and [a;b;c;’;￿] is the vector of parameters which can be estimated either via least squares or
using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood framework. This method can easily be extended to more
complex moment based estimators: for instance, the conditional variance of the stock market
returns can be estimated via a two-step procedure. First, the conditional expectation of the
stock market returns is estimated within the FFF framework. Next, the squared deviations
from the conditional mean are calculated and used as the dependent variable to estimate the
conditional variance. A similar approach can be used to estimate more complex moments, such
as the ￿rst-order conditional autocovariance, etc. For instance, one can consistently estimate the
dynamics of the conditional ￿rst-order autocorrelation coe¢ cient by estimating the conditional
variance and the ￿rst order autocovariance of the stock returns, which might provide a valuable
insight into the role of the trading volume and the volatility in the dynamics of stock return
reversals/momentum over time. However, a number of issues should be kept in mind while
applying a FFF series approximation. First, as pointed out by Gallant (1982), the conditioning
variable x should be restricted to lie between (0;2￿) (see also Pagan and Ullah,1994). When
the conditioning variable is the detrended volume
￿







we apply a simple logistic transformation to the detrended volume. When the conditioning
variable is the volatility h we replace it by x = 2￿ h￿103
1+h￿103. A second issue concerns the choice of
the truncation window. Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut rule of how to choose the number
of expansion terms. Andrews (1991) ￿nds that Mn can be of the order of magnitude between
114O(n1=3) and O(n1=5). Obviously, this is not too helpful, even if we would know what the
"optimal" order of expansion should be, since it still leaves us with an unknown constant
factor. Hence, we choose M n to be equal to n1=4; which leads to a value of M equal to eight
for most of the indices in our study. In the following sections we shall also test the robustness
of our ￿ndings to alternative choices of the truncation window.
Estimating the conditional moments of the stock returns within the FFF framework provides
a straightforward and easy to implement way to study the predictive power of the trading volume
and the stock return volatility. Indeed, all issues investigated in this study can be reformulated
in terms of restrictions on the dynamics of the conditional moments, and in this context the
FFF methodology seems to be a natural way to proceed, since it provides consistent estimators
(under appropriate regularity conditions, including Mn ! 1), while, from the perspective of
calculating the estimator, it is a standard parametric approach. But, as is typical for any
non-parametric estimator, it su⁄ers from the"curse of dimensionality" requiring quite a lot of
observations for accurate estimation when more regressors are considered at the same time.
Therefore, we shall also study the predictive power of the trading volume and volatility within
the parametric framework, as will be discussed in the following sections.
4.5 Hypotheses Development
4.5.1 Individual Stock Markets
We start with the hypotheses development for the single-market setup. De￿ne by r the daily
close-to-close log-return of a speci￿c stock market index. Also, let v and h stand for the trading
volume and the volatility of that particular stock market index, respectively. For the trading













115The ￿rst hypothesis postulates no causal e⁄ects between the stock market returns and the
corresponding lagged trading volume. More speci￿cally, it corresponds to the "pure" ability of
the trading volume to forecast stock returns, as reported by Gervais, Kaniel, and Mingelgrin
(2001) and Stein and Baker (2003). The second hypothesis postulates that the lagged trading
volume has no impact on the volatility of the stock market returns. By testing this hypothesis
we study the validity of the "information ￿ ow" hypothesis which suggests that trading volume
might a⁄ect the variance of the stock returns. Finally, under H3 the lagged trading volume is
postulated to have no impact on the conditional autocovariance of the stock market returns.
By testing this hypothesis we test the class of models which relate the trading volume to the
magnitude of the reversals or momentum in the stock returns. This class of models includes,
among others, the ones proposed by Campbell et al. (1993) and Wang (1994) and implies
that the lagged trading volume should have a statistically signi￿cant impact on the conditional
autocovariance and autocorrelation dynamics of the stock returns, and, thus, is an important
factor in forecasting whether stock returns will continue or revert during the following trading
period.
Next, we formulate hypotheses for the volatility-returns relationship. Let ht be the variance
of the stock market returns at time t + 1, conditional on the information available at time t.









Hypothesis number four postulates that there is no causal e⁄ect of the stock return variance
on the expected return. By testing this hypothesis we test the basic mean-variance version of
the risk-return trade o⁄. Taking as a proxy for ht the volatility estimates from GARCH-type
models, testing this hypothesis has a straightforward interpretation of a non-parametric test
for the presence of GARCH-in-mean e⁄ects, which takes into account the potential non-linear
dependence of the risk premium on the level of the volatility. Hypothesis H5 postulates that the
stock market volatility has no causal e⁄ect on the autocovariance of the stock market returns.
This hypothesis corresponds to the "feedback trading" model of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992)
116which relates the magnitude of the stock return reversal to the level of the volatility. Again,
taking GARCH-type estimates as a proxy for ht, this test can be interpreted as testing for the
presence of a GARCH-in-autocorrelation e⁄ect.
4.5.2 Multiple stock markets: cross-listed securities
Shifting from a single to a multiple market setting adds a number of new dimensions to the role
of the trading volume and the volatility in the stock return dynamics. First, when the same
security is traded at more than one location, the price discovery process is likely to occur at
both markets, and the relative share of each trading location in the former is potentially related
to the informative role of the trading volume on both markets. In other words, if the trading
volume provides additional information to the investors, we might expect the latter to have a
signi￿cant impact on the speed of adjustment of the cross-listed securities to the "equilibrium"
or "intrinsic" value. Next, when the trading locations have overlapping trading hours, the
trading volume can potentially play a signi￿cant role in the comovements between the stock
markets, and, in particular, can have a signi￿cant impact on the common factor sensitivities.
For instance, if investors tend to underreact to the news revealed during the trading period
t, and if the trading volume conveys information in addition to the information implicit in
stock prices, then, following a period with high trading volume, we would expect the risk factor
sensitivities to increase at period t+1. Alternatively, as argued by Gagnon and Karolyi (2003),
if the trading volume is a signal of the high share of liquidity traders, then, following the period
of high trading volume, one would expect to see less comovement between the markets.
Denote by rUS;t, rCAN;t, pUS;t, and pCAN;t the close-to-close log-returns and the log-price
levels of the cross-listed shares on the US and Canadian markets, respectively. Similarly, let
vUS;t and vCAN;t denote the trading volume on each of these trading locations. Also, denote
by ￿t =, pUS;t ￿ pCAN;t the error correction term, and by ￿SPt(￿TSXt) the close-to-close log






















for i;j = US;CAN. The ￿rst two hypotheses are similar to those de￿ned in a single mar-
ket setup. An important di⁄erence, however, is that since the security is traded on multiple
locations, we test the predictive power of the trading volume on each market. Next, we test
whether the lagged trading volume has a signi￿cant impact on the price discovery process. As
de￿ned by Schreiber and Schwartz (1986), the price discovery is the "process by which markets
attempt to ￿nd equilibrium prices." In this context, assuming that prices are set such that ar-
bitrage opportunities are absent, prices on both domestic and foreign markets are cointegrated
with cointegrating vector [1;￿1], ￿t = pUS;t￿ pCAN;t will be the deviation from the long-run
equilibrium, and the dynamics of the price discovery process will be related to the dynamics of
the error-correction process, that is, the dynamics of the speed of adjustment on each market
(see, for instance, Harris et al., 1995)1. Therefore, we study the impact of the lagged trading
volume on the price discovery process by testing whether the latter signi￿cantly a⁄ects the
conditional covariance between the stock return on each market and the error correction term,
i.e., whether the speed of adjustment on each market depends on the lagged trading volume.
Finally, we study the role of the trading volume in the comovement between the stock markets,
which, as we hypothesize here, should result in a signi￿cant e⁄ect of the trading volume on the
conditional stock market betas (hypotheses 9 and 10).
4.6 Empirical Findings
In this section we present our testing and estimation results. We start with studying the role
of trading volume and volatility in the dynamics of the individual stock markets return. First,
1Formal unit root tests, such as the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron indicate that the di⁄erence
between the domestic and foreign log-prices is stationary for all the ￿rms included in our sample. We do not report
the results for the sake of saving the space, but the results are available upon request from the corresponding
author.
118we present and discuss the results of the semi-nonparametric tests applied for the individual
stock markets data in subsection 4.6.1. Next, we compare our results with the results of the
parametric analysis which are presented in the subsection 4.6.2. Next, we turn to the multiple
markets framework. In subsection 4.6.3 we analyse the role of trading volume and volatilty
within the semi-nonparametric framework for the cross-listed securities. Finally, in section 4.6.4
we compare the results from the previous subsection with the results of parametric analysis.
4.6.1 Individual Stock Markets- Semi-nonparametric Analysis
We start with analyzing the semi-nonparametric estimation results by testing the joint signi￿-
cance of the FFF coe¢ cients. As mentioned above, in case of the trading volume we study the
impact of this variable on the conditional mean, variance, and the autocovariance of the stock
market returns, while for the stock market volatility we test whether the volatility a⁄ects the
conditional mean and the autocovariance of the stock market returns.
In the upper panel of Table 5 we present the p-values of the joint Wald test for the trading
volume. Starting with the analysis of the impact of the trading volume on the conditional
mean, which corresponds to H1, we ￿nd a signi￿cant evidence of the trading volume a⁄ecting
the expected stock market returns for the UK and Hong-Kong and also (some marginally)
signi￿cant evidence for Germany. For the rest of the markets no such evidence could be found.
On the contrary, for most of the markets we ￿nd strong empirical evidence of the trading volume
a⁄ecting the variance of the stock market returns, thus, rejecting H2, a ￿nding which provides
some preliminary support for the "information ￿ ow" hypothesis. A particularly interesting
issue, however, is the impact of the trading volume on the conditional autocovariance of the stock
market returns. Surprisingly, only in case of the UK we were able to detect the existence of such
a link, while for the rest the null cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of signi￿cance. We
compare our ￿ndings with the ones based on the alternative measure of the trading volume, the
log-volume demeaned by one-year moving average, as in Campbell et al.(1993).2 No substantial
di⁄erence was found when testing whether the lagged trading volume has a signi￿cant impact on
the conditional mean return. The same holds for the conditional variance, with Italy being the
2Consistent with their ￿ndings the MA demeaned log-volume series does not exhibit any drift, while it exhibits
a substantial degree of persistence.
119only exception, where the e⁄ect of the trading volume turns out to be statistically signi￿cant. As
for the volume-autocovariance link the results, in general, remain unaltered as well. The only
noteworthy di⁄erence is that with the MA-demeaned volume we ￿nd statistically signi￿cant
links for both the US and the UK, while for the rest of the markets the null still cannot be
rejected.
The weak evidence of the volume-autocovariance link comes in sharp contrast with the
numerous studies which report that using the lagged trading volume as an additional ￿lter
improves the performance of the contrarian/momentum based investment strategies (see, for
instance, Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994), among others). Combined with our ￿ndings,
these results suggest that, though the trading volume may have a signi￿cant impact on the
magnitude of the stock return reversal, the link between the former and the latter seems to be
indirect, rather than direct, as suggested by Campbell et al. (1993) and Wang (1994). Such
an indirect link between the trading volume and the stock return can occur via a volatility-
autocorrelation relationship, and, therefore, we turn to the analysis of the stock market volatility
and its role in the stock market return dynamics.
In the lower panel of Table 5 we report the p-values for the joint Wald test for the volatility
related hypotheses. As a basic volatility measure we choose the EGARCH(1,1) model of Nelson
(1991). This model has an important advantage compared to other existing models, since it
does not require any restrictions to be imposed on the variance equation parameters and is
also reported to yield superior out-of-sample forecasts compared to other models (Pagan and
Schwert, 1990). First, we test the null hypothesis that the stock market volatility has no impact
on the expected stock market returns, as stated by H4. Our results strongly suggest that such
a link does exist, a ￿nding that could be attributed to the usual risk-return trade-o⁄. Next, we
turn to the analysis of the autocovariance-volatility dynamics. For the majority of the markets
in our sample we ￿nd that the volatility has a signi￿cant impact on the conditional autocovari-
ance of the stock market returns. In other words, the probability of observing momentum or
reversal appears to be di⁄erent during turbulent and tranquil periods, a ￿nding which appears
to be consistent with the predictions of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) "feedback trading"
model. As with the trading volume we compare our results with those based on the alternative
measure of the stock market volatility. We run the same test for the volatility proxy implied
120by the PARCH(1,1) model. Introduced by Ding et al. (1993), this model nests a number of
linear GARCH-type models by turning the power coe¢ cient of the volatility into an additional
parameter which has to be estimated along with the other parameters. We also try di⁄erent
number of the higher order terms by expanding and reducing the window length of Mn. The
results remain virtually the same, supporting the robustness of our ￿ndings.
While having an advantage of combining both the parametric and nonparametric features,
statistical inference on the FFF coe¢ cients should be conducted with care since their asymp-
totic distribution depends on the approximation order and the way the latter has been chosen
(Gallant and Souza,1991). To bypass this di¢ culty, following Ivaldi et al. (1996), in addition to
p-values based on an asymptotic approximation, we also construct con￿dence intervals for the
estimated Wald statistics by performing a bootstrap. For each conditional moment we generate
2000 samples by randomly drawing with replacement the dependent variable (the raw return
for the conditional mean, the conditionally demeaned squared return for the variance, etc.), and
the conditioning variable (the volume or the volatility measure). For each sample we calculate
the value of the Wald statistic and by that procedure we create the empirical distribution of the
latter under the null that no relation between the trading volume/volatility and the conditional
moments exists. The resulting p-values are presented next to the asymptotic approximation
based ones in the upper panel of Table 5 for the hypotheses H1-H3 and in the lower panel of
Table 5 for the hypotheses H4-H5. Interestingly, an overall impression is that for all the tests
under consideration the critical values implied by the bootstrap procedure are somewhat lower
than the standard ￿2 based ones. However, we do not ￿nd any substantial dispersion based
on either of the two approaches. The only exception are France and Germany, where in case
of using the bootstrap-based critical values the link between the return autocovariance and the
lagged trading volume turns out to be statistically signi￿cant.
To summarize our intermediate ￿ndings, the results of the semi-non parametric analysis
suggest that
a The lagged trading volume signi￿cantly a⁄ects the volatility of the stock market returns, a
￿nding which is consistent with the "information ￿ ow" hypothesis.
b The stock market volatility signi￿cantly a⁄ects the autocovariance of the stock market re-
121turns, supporting the "feedback trading" hypothesis of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992).
c Some limited evidence of the lagged trading volume a⁄ecting the autocovariance of the stock
market returns has been found, consistent with the predictions of the Campbell et al.
(1993) and Wang (1994) models.
Table 5: FFF analysis
Trading volume
H0 US UK Canada Japan Italy
@E(rt+1jvt )
@vt = 0 0.38/0.37 0.03/0.03 0.62/0.61 0.43/0.42 0.17/0.17
@V ar(rt+1jvt )
@vt = 0 0.000/0.000 0.000/0.000 0.48/0.33 0.37/0.27 0.25/0.19
@Cov(rt+1;rtjvt )
@vt = 0 0.35/0.11 0.002/0.02 0.86/0.22 0.85/0.59 0.98/0.93
Netherlands Hong-Kong Germany France Australia
@E(rt+1jvt )
@vt = 0 0.51/0.48 0.008/0.03 0.1/0.09 0.16/0.17 0.85/0.87
@V ar(rt+1jvt )
@vt = 0 0.000/0.01 0.004/0.03 0.000/0.002 0.000/0.005 0.89/0.18
@Cov(rt+1;rtjvt )
@vt = 0 0.36/0.24 0.84/0.63 0.33/0.03 0.89/0.03 0.96/0.83
Volatility
H0 US UK Canada Japan Italy
@E(rt+1jht )
@ht = 0 0.000/0.000 0.18/0.19 0.002/0.01 0.001/0.005 0.001/0.003
@Cov(rt+1;rtjht )
@ht = 0 0.000/0.000 0.04/0.07 0.27/0.05 0.003/0.72 0.000/0.01
Netherlands Hong-Kong Germany France Australia
@E(rt+1jht )
@ht = 0 0.002/0.004 0.000/0.001 0.01/0.02 0.04/0.05 0.09/0.06
@Cov(rt+1;rtjht )
@ht = 0 0.000/0.01 0.000/0.003 0.000/0.003 0.16/0.004 0.03/0.05
Estimated equation:
^
m(x) = an + bnx + cnx2 +
X Mn
2
l=1(’l;n cos(lx) + ￿l;n sin(l;x))
For each market and for each conditional moment we test the null that
@m(x)
@x = 0
The numbers are asymptotic (at the LHS) and bootstrap based (at the RHS) p-values of the Wald
statistic of H0 : b = c = ’l = ￿l = 0 for 1 ￿ l ￿ Mn
2
These ￿ndings suggest that for the purpose of further analysis it seems reasonable to separate
the potential impact of the trading volume on the dynamics of the stock market returns from
the e⁄ects of the stock market volatility on the latter. Thus, we turn now to a parametric
analysis.
1224.6.2 Individual Stock Markets - Parametric Analysis
In this section we study the role of the trading volume and the volatility in the stock returns
dynamics within a parametric framework. For each market we estimate the following model
rt+1 = ￿0 + ￿1
￿
vt + ￿2h0:5
t + ￿trt + h0:5
t zt+1

















In this speci￿cation we allow the lagged trading volume
￿
v (de-trended, as discussed in the
previous sections) to have both direct and indirect e⁄ects on the expected return of the stock
market index. The direct, or "pure" causal e⁄ect, of the trading volume is measured by the
parameter ￿1 and allows for a volume-return causal e⁄ect as reported by Gervais et al. (2001)
and Baker and Stein (2004). The indirect e⁄ect, on the other hand, allows the trading volume
to a⁄ect the expected stock market returns via the autocorrelation coe¢ cient, as predicted by
Campbell et al.(1993) and Wang (1994), and is measured by the parameters ￿1 and ￿2. In
addition, the trading volume is allowed to a⁄ect the volatility of the stock market returns via
the parameters ￿1 and ￿2, to allow for "information ￿ ow" related e⁄ects. Also, we allow for
the impact of the stock market volatility on the autocorrelation as predicted by the "positive
feedback trading" model of Sentana and Wadhwani (1992). We model the volatility as an
EGARCH(1,1) process, having as important advantage that it does not require to impose non-
negativity constraints on ￿1 and ￿2, and, thus, no a priori assumption regarding the sign of the
trading volume-volatility relationship is required. This formulation is ￿ exible enough to nest a
number of important models. In particular, the Campbell et al. (1993) and Wang (1994) models
are obtained by setting ￿1;￿2;￿3;￿1, and ￿2 equal to zero, while by setting (￿1;￿1;￿2;￿1;￿2)
equal to zero this model boils down to a version of the Sentana and Wadhwani (1992) "feedback
trading" model. Numerous studies suggest that even after controlling for GARCH e⁄ects, stock
market returns still exhibit excessive kurtosis and propose to use fat-tailed distributions instead
123of the Gaussian one, such as the Generalized Error (Nelson,1991) or Student-t distributions
(Diebold,1998). In this study zt is assumed to follow a Generalize Error Distribution (GED)
with constant parameter ￿. For ￿ = 2 GED boils down to the Normal distribution, while for
￿ < 2 normalized returns exhibit excessive kurtosis.
Maximum likelihood estimates of the mean and variance dynamics are presented in Tables
6 and 7, respectively. For all the markets the conditional variance of the stock market returns
exhibit a high degree of persistence, consistent with other related studies. Also, for all the
markets the volatility is negatively correlated with the lagged stock returns, a ￿nding, that can
be attributed to the "leverage e⁄ect". For all the markets the estimate of ￿ is signi￿cantly
smaller than 2, indicating that even after controlling for GARCH e⁄ects the returns still re￿ ect
some leptokurtosis.
Turning next to the analysis of the impact of the trading volume and volatility on the stock
return dynamics, a number of interesting ￿ndings can be mentioned. First, consistent with
the results of the semi-nonparametric analysis, the trading volume does seem to provide some
information regarding the direction of the stock market returns, a ￿nding which also supports
the results of Chen, Firth, and Rui (2001) with the coe¢ cient ￿1 being both statistically and
economically signi￿cant for ￿ve out of the ten markets in our sample. However, the impact
of the lagged trading volume on the expected stock market returns does not seem to have
any consistent pattern. While for the US, UK, and the Netherlands an increase in trading
volume seems to lead to a subsequent decline in the stock market value, a ￿nding which is
consistent with predictions of the Baker and Stein (2004) model, for other markets, such as
Italy and Germany, the impact of the trading volume on the expected stock market returns
shows an opposite sign, which is more consistent with the "visibility" hypothesis of Gervais et
al. (2001). As for the GARCH-in-mean coe¢ cients, in general, a positive sign of ￿2 is consistent
with a risk-return trade-o⁄, but only in case of the US market the stock market volatility has
a statistically signi￿cant power to forecast future stock returns, a ￿nding, that comes in sharp
contrast with the results of the FFF based test. Likely, this suggests that after controlling for
a "GARCH-in-autocorrelation" e⁄ect the GARCH-in-mean e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant.
Next, we study the impact of the trading volume and the volatility on the autocorrelation
between the stock market returns (hypotheses H3 and H5). Supporting the results of the FFF
124based analysis, the evidence of the trading volume having any direct e⁄ect on the autocorrelation
of the stock market returns as in the Campbell et al.(1993) and Wang (1994) models is very
weak. Though for some markets, consistent with the above mentioned model (Campbell et
al., 1993) the estimate of ￿1 shows a negative sign, it still lacks statistical signi￿cance, with
France being the only exception. Turning next to the impact of the stock market volatility on
the autocorrelation dynamics, we ￿nd that in contrast to the trading volume the "GARCH-in-
autocorrelation" e⁄ect is both statistically and economically signi￿cant for the majority of the
stock markets in our sample. More speci￿cally, consistent with the predictions of Sentana and
Wadhwani (1992), an increase in the stock market volatility increases the likelihood of observing
reversals in the stock market returns, with the estimate of ￿3 being negative and statistically
signi￿cant. Still, however, the lagged trading volume seems to have an indirect e⁄ect on the
magnitude of the stock market return reversal via the stock market volatility. For the majority
of stock markets, consistent with the results of FFF based tests, we ￿nd that the lagged trading
volume signi￿cantly a⁄ects the stock market volatility. More speci￿cally, an increase in the
trading volume seems to lead to a higher market volatility, consistent with models which relate
the trading volume to the information ￿ ow. Combining these results, our ￿ndings suggest that
in the dynamics of the stock market return reversal mechanism the trading volume plays a
secondary, although important, role, while the leading source of changes in the stock market
return autocorrelation seems to be the stock market volatility.
To provide some visual impression on the dynamics of the stock market return reversal and
volatility, we plot the conditional autocorrelation ￿t and the conditional volatility ht implied by
the parametric model discussed above. We present the results for the three largest developed
markets, namely the US, UK, and Japan, and for the Hong-Kong stock exchange, which is
considered to be the largest among the emerging stock markets in Figures 4.1 and Figures 4.2.
A general impression is that, though in our model speci￿cation the trading volume was allowed
to have both a direct and an indirect (via the volatility) e⁄ect on the autocorrelation dynamics,
its direct e⁄ect appears to be negligible compared to the indirect one via the volatility, a ￿nding
which supports the results of both the FFF based and parametric analysis. The impact of the
volatility on the autocorrelation dynamics is especially pronounced in case of the US and UK
markets, where the former is virtually the mirror image of the latter. A number of interesting
125observations arises from the analysis of the autocorrelation histogram. First, it appears that
the major share of the autocorrelation distribution mass lies in the positive range. This ￿nd-
ing is consistent with numerous studies reporting daily and intradaily returns, exhibiting an
unconditional positive serial correlation. It also appears to be negatively skewed, which can
be due to both a statistically and an economically signi￿cant leverage e⁄ect in the volatility
dynamics. However, taking into account both the direct e⁄ect of the positive feedback trading
strategies and the indirect e⁄ect of trading volume via the volatility, we ￿nd changes, not only
in the magnitude, but also in the sign of the stock market return autocorrelation. For instance,
taking a look at the dynamics of the US and UK stock market serial correlation, it appears
that, starting from the middle of 1997, the latter gradually turns from being moderately posi-
tive to substantially negative with peaks around 1999-2000, a ￿nding which can be attributed
to the collapse of the "dot.com" bubble. There also is an additional peak around 2002, which
is more pronounced for the US market, and which can be attributed to the series of corporate
scandals around that period, followed by sharp declines in the stock market value on the one
hand and high market turbulence on the other hand. For the Hong-Kong stock market the
dynamics of the serial correlation is characterized by a substantially negative serial correlation
and a high volatility around the period of mid-1997-mid 1998, that is, the period of a severe
currency and stock market crisis, known as the "Asian Flue". The conditional autocorrelation
of the Japanese stock market, on the other hand, as well as the variance of the latter, appears
to be highly volatile during the whole time-span of our study. Overall, these ￿ndings suggest
the importance of accounting both for feedback trading and volume-"information ￿ ow" related
e⁄ects in the dynamics of the stock market returns.
For now we studied the role of the trading volume and volatility in a single market setup.
Turning to a multiple market setup adds a number of interesting and important dimensions to
the trading volume-volatility-return relation, as discussed in a previous section. Thus, in the
following subsections we study the relation between the trading volume, volatility and the stock
returns for the cross-listed securities.
126Figure 4-1: Volatility and autocorrelation dynamics: US and UK markets
127Figure 4-2: Volatility and autocorrelation dynamics: Japan and Hong-Kong markets
128Table 6: Trading volume and volatility-mean dynamics




































































































































































￿(￿￿) denotes signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
129Table 7: Trading volume and volatility-volatility dynamics







































































Log-ld 12534.4 14785.52 13031.36 11432.54 11627.99





























































































￿(￿￿) denotes signi￿cance at 10 (5) %
1304.6.3 Cross-listed Securities - a Semi-nonparametric Analysis
In the following subsections we extend the analysis of the role of the trading volume and
volatility in the dynamics of the stock markets to a multiple-market setup. More speci￿cally,
we conduct our analysis based on a comprehensive sample of Canadian ￿rms whose shares are
listed both on the Toronto and the New-York stock exchanges. Since these ￿rms￿shares are
simultaneously traded on both domestic and foreign markets, an interesting issue is not only to
study the relationship between the information ￿ ow mechanism, the trading volume, and the
volatility within each market, but also to compare their relative impacts on the dynamics of
the stock returns between the markets.
We start with the results of the semi-nonparametric analysis. In Table 8 we present the
results of the FFF based tests of the hypotheses H6-H10, as described in Section 4. For each
cross-listed ￿rm included in our sample, we test ￿ve hypotheses listed in the ￿rst column of
Table 8, based both on the asymptotic and the bootstrap-based approximations of the Wald
statistic. We do not present individual results for each ￿rm but, instead, for each hypothesis we
present an overall fraction of ￿rms out of the total sample for which the null has been rejected
at a 10 percent level of signi￿cance. We refer to this fraction as a "rejection ratio." We decide
to reject an "overall" speci￿c null if an overall fraction of ￿rms for which the null is rejected
signi￿cantly exceeds 0.1, that is, the size level of the test for the individual ￿rm. In other words,
we decide to reject a speci￿c null hypothesis if the fraction of ￿rms for which this speci￿c null
has been rejected signi￿cantly exceeds the one that can be attributed to the Type 1 error.
131Table 8: Cross-listed securities-FFF analysis
NYSE/AMEX TSE
H0 vUS vCAN vUS vCAN
@E(ri;t+1jvj;t )
@vj;t = 0 0.15/0.15 0.19￿￿/0.18￿￿ 0.2￿￿/0.19￿￿ 0.21￿￿/0.13
@V ar(ri;t+1jvj;t )
@vj;t = 0 0.44￿￿=0:44￿￿ 0.36￿￿=0:31 0.43￿￿=0:43￿￿ 0.17￿=0:32￿￿
@Cov(ri;t+1;￿tjvj;t )
@vj;t = 0 0.46￿￿=0:35￿￿ 0.25￿￿=0:2￿￿ 0.28￿￿0:22￿￿ 0.21￿￿=0:15
@Cov(ri;t+1;￿SPtjvj;t )
@vj;t = 0 0.25￿￿=0:25￿￿ 0.23￿￿=0:14 0.29￿￿=0:18￿ 0.18￿=0:13
@Cov(ri;t+1;￿TSXtjvj;t )
@vj;t = 0 0.32￿￿=0:28￿￿ 0.18￿=0:14 0.29￿￿=0:28￿￿ 0.17￿=0:12
Estimated equation:
^
m(x) = an + bnx + cnx2 +
X Mn
2
l=1(’l;n cos(lx) + ￿l;n sin(l;x))
For each market and for each conditional moment we test the null that
@m(x)
@x = 0
The numbers are asymptotic (at the LHS) and bootstrap based (at the RHS) rejection rates of Wald
statistic of H0 : b = c = ’l = ￿l = 0 for 1 ￿ l ￿ Mn
2
We start with the null that the trading volume has no impact on the conditional mean of the
stock returns or, in other words, does not help to predict the direction of change of stock prices,
which corresponds to hypothesis H6. As can be seen from our results, for both the Canadian
and the US trading volume a rejection ratio signi￿cantly exceeds 0.1, though the di⁄erence is
not substantial. Also, the impact of the US trading volume on the conditional mean of the
Canadian return lacks statistical signi￿cance. On the other hand, for both the TSE and the
NYSE/AMEX we ￿nd strong evidence of the trading volume a⁄ecting the variance of the stock
returns, thus, rejecting hypothesis H7. The evidence is especially strong for the US volume
where the rejection ratios are 0.44 and 0.43, respectively, i.e., the null is rejected for almost
every second ￿rm. Next, we turn to the impact of the trading volume on the price discovery
process on both markets, namely the question of whether an increase in the trading volume
a⁄ects the mechanism of the error correction dynamics (hypothesis H8). For both markets
we are able to reject the null that the trading volume does not contribute to the dynamics of
the price discovery process, though in case of the Canadian volume a⁄ecting the TSE returns,
the rejection ratio is somewhat low. Finally, we turn to the impact of the lagged trading
volume on the conditional US and Canadian market betas by testing hypotheses H9 and H10.
Interestingly, for both markets we ￿nd that the trading volume seems to have a statistically
132signi￿cant impact on the sensitivities to the market risk. This ￿nding is particularly interesting
since it emphasizes a potential role of the trading volume, not only in the dynamics of a single
asset, but also in the comovement between stock prices at di⁄erent markets. It also suggests
that the lagged trading volume can serve as a useful instrument for modeling and estimating
the dynamics of the conditional sensitivities to the market risk.
4.6.4 Cross-listed Securities - a Parametric Analysis
To gain some further insight into the volume-volatility-return dynamics we turn next to a
parametric analysis. First, we study the role of the trading volume in the mean dynamics of
the stock returns. Next, we turn to the impact of the trading volume on the volatility of the
stock returns.
Mean Dynamics
We start with specifying the equation of the mean dynamics. For each ￿rm in our sample we
estimate the following regression
ri;t+1 = ￿i;0 + ￿i;1vUS;t + ￿i;2vCAN;t + ￿i;t￿t + ￿US
i;t ￿SPt+1 + ￿CAN
i;t ￿TSXt+1 + ￿i;t+1









for i = US;CAN: In this regression equation the parameters ￿1 and ￿2 measure the direct
impact of the trading volume on the expected returns and ￿1 and ￿2 measure the e⁄ect of the
trading volume on the dynamics of the price discovery process via the speed of adjustment
coe¢ cient ￿t. In addition, we allow the market risk sensitivities ￿￿s to be time-varying via a
time variation in trading volume. To keep the speci￿cation parsimonious in terms of modeling
the market risk sensitivities, we restrict the impact of the trading volume on its own market
beta (that is, the US volume on ￿US and the Canadian volume on ￿CAN). The intuition behind
this restriction is that if the lagged trading volume does provide information to the investors,
133it is more likely that it is the trading volume on the US markets that provides additional
information to the one implicit in the US stock prices and vice versa. The innovation ￿i;t+1 is
assumed to be mean independent from the regressors.
The estimation results are presented in Table 9, where we report the average least-squares
estimates of the regression discussed above. Starting with the direct impact of the trading
volume on the expected stock returns, we ￿nd that for the stocks traded on the US markets
the direct e⁄ect of the trading volume is economically and statistically signi￿cant for both the
US and the Canadian volume, with estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 being highly statistically signi￿cant.
The results appear to be similar for the Canadian sample, though for the US trading volume
the estimate of ￿1, being economically signi￿cant, lacks statistical signi￿cance. An interesting
observation, however, is that for both the US and Canadian samples the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2
have opposite signs, while being of the same magnitude (in absolute value). A formal test of the
hypothesis ￿1 = ￿￿2 indicates that the null cannot be rejected at any reasonable signi￿cance
level with p- values equal to 0.48 and 0.62 for the US and Canadian samples, respectively,
suggesting that in the multiple market setting it is the relative rather than the absolute trading
volume that a⁄ects the expected stock returns.
This conjecture is strengthened when we examine the impact of the trading volume on the
price discovery mechanism, namely, the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2. For both the US and Canadian
samples the estimates of ￿1 and ￿2 are positive and negative, respectively, and highly statistically
signi￿cant. As in case with ￿1 and ￿2 formal tests of the hypothesis ￿1 = ￿￿2 suggest that
the null cannot be rejected at any legitimate signi￿cance level. Again, it appears that it is
the relative rather than absolute volume that a⁄ects the error-correction and thus the price
discovery mechanism. More speci￿cally, for the Canadian sample an increase in the relative US
volume, on average, signi￿cantly increases the speed of adjustment, while adversely a⁄ecting
the latter for the sample of the US shares, with ￿1 being positive and statistically signi￿cant.
The results are opposite when we examine the impact of the relative Canadian volume on the
error-correction dynamics, where the estimate of ￿2 appears to be signi￿cantly negative. The
underlying intuition is that when the trade occurs on more that one market, investors tend to
extract the information both from the trading volume on the domestic and foreign markets, and,
therefore, it is the relative rather than the absolute volume that determines at which market
134the lion￿ s share of the price discovery occurs or, modifying the de￿nition of Garbade and Silber
(1979), which market emerges as the conditionally dominant one. Our results suggest that
the relative trading volume serves as a useful indicator for this purpose. Note that when the
trade is symmetrically allocated (that is, when the di⁄erence between the trading volumes on
both markets is zero) the price discovery process almost breaks even between both markets
with the estimates of ￿US;0 and ￿CAN;0 being close one to one another in magnitude.3 As the
US trading volume increases relatively to the Canadian trading volume, that is, as the trade
during the previous trading day becomes more and more concentrated at the US markets, the
speed of adjustment coe¢ cients are increasing for the Canadian market and decreasing for the
US market, implying that the price discovery process becomes more concentrated at the US
market, turning the latter into the informationally dominant one.
3Note that an increase in the speed of adjustment for the US sample means that ￿US;t becomes more negative.
135Table 9: Cross-listed securities: mean dynamics
NYSE/AMEX TSE
Coef. S.Error Coef. S.Error
￿0 0.0032 (0.0038) 0.0097 (0.013)
￿1 -0.0013￿ (0.00076) -0.0016 (0.0013)
￿2 0.0008￿￿ (0.0002) 0.0009￿￿ (0.0002)
￿0 -0.625￿￿ (0.129) 0.332￿￿ (0.114)
￿1 0.072￿￿ (0.022) 0.06￿￿ (0.021)
￿2 -0.041￿￿ (0.017) -0.042￿￿ (0.017)
￿US
0 -0.39￿￿ (0.117) -0.375￿￿ (0.114)
￿US
1 0.073￿￿ (0.019) 0.061￿￿ (0.019)
￿CAN
0 0.264￿ (0.14) 0.26￿ (0.14)
￿CAN


















￿(￿￿) denotes signi￿cance at 10 (5) % signi￿cance
Next, we turn to the role of the trading volume in the stock market comovements, namely
the estimates of the conditional betas. Here, the results are particularly intriguing. Our ￿ndings
suggest that the stock market "betas" exhibit a substantial degree of time-variation, depend-
ing on the trading activity at both markets. More speci￿cally, we ￿nd, for both the US and
Canadian samples, that following days with a high trading activity, both the US and Canadian
market betas are signi￿cantly increasing. This ￿nding, which ￿as discussed before￿ is consis-
tent with the informative role of the trading volume, suggests that following days with a high
trading activity the systemic risk tends to increase, implying that the trading volume may serve
as a useful instrument in the conditional risk modeling.
136Our ￿nding that market risk sensitivities of the individual assets are positively related to the
trading volume also sheds some new light on the results of Gervais et al. (2001) who ￿nd that,
following days with a high trading volume, stocks tend to exhibit positive excess returns. They
attribute this ￿nding to the "visibility" phenomenon and argue that, following days with a high
trading activity, stocks become more "visible" to the investors. An expansion of the investors￿
base along with short-sale restrictions, they argue, leads to subsequent positive returns. Our
￿ndings, however, suggest a di⁄erent interpretation of their results. Since the market risk of
the individual securities appears to be positively related to the lagged trading volume, positive
returns following the days with a high market activity can be a compensation for an increase
in the market risk.
We conduct a number of robustness checks. First, we augment our regressions with ￿rst-
order lags of the Canadian and US returns along with lagged returns on the corresponding stock
market indices. The main results remain virtually unaltered. Interestingly, we ￿nd that both
the Canadian and the US shares seem to exhibit signi￿cant underreaction to the news from
the TSE, with the estimated coe¢ cients of the Canadian stock market lags being positive and
statistically signi￿cant. Next, we estimate the same regression with the log-de-trended, instead
of the raw log-volume, with no substantial change in the results. Finally, in order to take into
account possible auto- and cross-autocorrelations in the trading volume,4 we replace the raw
log-volume by the estimated residuals from a Vector Autoregression with two lags. The only
substantial di⁄erence is that the coe¢ cient of the trading volume-TSX interaction term turns
out to be statistically insigni￿cant though positive. Also, CUSUM stability tests indicate that
the coe¢ cients are reasonably stable over time. Overall, our ￿ndings appear to be fairly robust
to various regression and trading volume speci￿cations.
Volatility Dynamics
Next, we study the relationship between the trading volume and the volatility of the stock
returns. As the volatility is considered to be a proxy for the information ￿ ow (see, for instance,
Chan, Chan, and Karolyi (1991), among others), we start with an analysis of a simple measure
4Numerous articles report the trading volume being signi￿cantly autocorrelated (for example, Gallant and
Tauchen (1992)). Our results support their ￿ndings with the VAR yielding an average adjusted R
2 of 0.32 and
0.16 for the US and Canadian trading volume, respectively.
137of the unconditional relative market informativeness, as proposed by Lieberman, Ben-Zion, and
Hauser (1999). For each pair of cross-listed securities we calculate the ratio of the residual





,which serves as a proxy to the average
information ￿ ow on the US and Toronto stock exchanges, respectively. We hypothesize that
this measure of the relative market informativeness should be positively related to the US share
of trade which we de￿ne here as the average daily US volume divided by the average trading
volume on both markets. In the upper panel of Table 10 we present some descriptive statistics
of this variance ratio measure, both for the whole sample and for the US share of trade-based
portfolios which are grouped in ascending order from the ￿rms with the lowest US share (Q1)
to those with concentration of trading activity on the US market (Q4). Starting with an overall
sample we ￿nd that both the mean and the median are close and in case of the mean also
insigni￿cantly di⁄erent from 1, suggesting that the pricing information revealed on one market
transfers rapidly to the other. Turning to the US share of the trade-based portfolios we observe
that both the mean and median estimates are increasing from the lower to the upper quartiles,
though this increase is not monotonous. Nevertheless, consistent with our prior conjecture, we
￿nd a positive and statistically signi￿cant relationship between the US share of trade and the
variance ratio, with Spearman￿ s rho being positive and statistically signi￿cant (p -value equal
to 0.01).
As a next step we study the volume-volatility relationship in a dynamic context. Multivari-
ate GARCH-type models have been widely used in modeling the mechanism of the information
transfer from one market to another (see, for instance, Lin, Engle, and Ito,1994; Koutmous
and Booth,1995; and Tse,1999 among others). In order to study the dynamics of the trading
volume-volatility relationship following these and other studies, for each ￿rm in our sample we


















ln(h1;t+1) = !1 + ￿1G1;t + ￿1 ln(h1;t) + ￿1G2;t + ￿1;USvUS;t + ￿1;CANvCAN;t
138ln(h2;t+1) = !2 + ￿2G2;t + ￿2 ln(h2;t) + ￿2G1;t + ￿2;USvUS;t + ￿2;CANvCAN;t
Gi;t = fjui;tj ￿ E jui;tj + ￿iui;tg; ui;t = ￿i;t=h0:5
i;t ; i = 1;2
Here, we assume that the conditional covariance matrix of the Canadian and the US stock
returns follows a bivariate EGARCH-type process with a constant correlation ￿, as in Boller-
slev (1992). The parameters ￿1 and ￿2 measure the cross-market volatility spill-overs, which
are also allowed to be sign-dependent via the parameters ￿1 and ￿2: We allow both the US
and the Canadian trading volume to e⁄ect the variance of the stock returns on both markets
via the parameters (￿1;US;￿2;US) and (￿1;CAN;￿2;CAN). The parameters of the model are esti-
mated using a Quasi-Maximum Likelihood framework. Due to the relatively large dimension
of the parameter vector and the large number of companies, we apply a two-step estimation
procedure. First, the estimates of the residuals ￿i;t are obtained from the above-mentioned re-
gression. The elements of the variance-covariance matrix are then simultaneously estimated via
a standard maximization procedure of the bivariate Gaussian log-likelihood function. Though
asymptotically not e¢ cient, under the assumption of a correct mean and variance-covariance
matrix speci￿cation the estimates are still consistent (Bollerslev and Woolridge,1992) and since
we are interested in the average estimates it is consistency that is crucial for our analysis.
The estimation results are presented in the lower panel of Table 10. Instead of presenting the
results for each ￿rm, we present the cross-sectional average of the estimates with corresponding
cross-sectional standard errors for each parameter of the model.5. First, consistent with other
studies (Sentana and Wadhwani,1992; Koutmos,1996), we ￿nd that the stock return volatility
exhibits a substantial degree of persistence, with an average estimate of ￿ close to one, though
statistically still di⁄erent from one. Also, for both markets there is a strong evidence of the
di⁄erent impacts of "bad" and "good" news with the estimate of ￿ being signi￿cantly negative,
a ￿nding which can be attributed to a "leverage" e⁄ect. It is worth emphasizing the economic
signi￿cance of the "leverage" e⁄ect, which, according to our estimation results, leads to a more
than 50% discrepancy between the impact of "good" and "bad" news on the volatility! We also
￿nd strong evidence of cross-market volatility spill-overs between the shares listed on the TSE
5This approach is valid under the assumption that the time-dimension is of higher order than the cross-
sectional dimension. Since in our study the time-span substantially exceeds the number of ￿rms, this assumption
does not seem to be too stringent.
139and their "twins" listed on the US markets. Interestingly, it appears that the spill-over from
the US to the Canadian market is more pronounced than in the opposite direction, though the
di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant.
Turning next to the analysis of the trading-volume volatility relationship, the results are
particularly intriguing. First, controlling for the impact of both the Canadian and the US
trading volume, we ￿nd the latter having both a statistically and an economically signi￿cant
impact on the volatility of stock returns with
^
￿US being highly signi￿cant. On the other hand,
we ￿nd no evidence of the Canadian volume a⁄ecting the volatility dynamics, with
^
￿CAN lacking
statistical signi￿cance for both markets. Curiously, the estimate of ￿US is signi￿cantly negative,
suggesting that, on average, we might expect the stocks to be less volatile following a period of
intensive trading on the US markets. This ￿nding comes in contrast to the "information ￿ ow"
theories which relate both trading volume and volatility to the intensity of the information ￿ ow
and, thus, predict a positive relationship between the former and the latter. However, since the
subject of our analysis are the ￿rms listed and traded simultaneously on both the domestic and
the foreign market it seems reasonable to study the impact of the trading volume separately
for the ￿rms with a low and a high intensity of the information transfer between the markets.
We use the estimate of the cross-market correlation, ￿, as a measure of the intensity of the
cross-market information transfer. Interestingly, for both the US and the Canadian markets
we ￿nd a positive and signi￿cant relationship between the impact of the US trading volume on
the volatility, that is, ￿US and the cross-market correlation ￿. For the US market an estimate
of Spearman￿ s rho between these two parameters is 0.24 (p-value 0.01) and is also marginally
signi￿cant for the Canadian market (rho=0.16 and p-value is 0.1). Further analysis indicates
that, while for the low-correlation ￿rms the impact of the trading volume on the volatility is
signi￿cantly negative, it turns out to be positive for the ￿rms with a high ￿. That is, we ￿nd
supporting evidence for the "information ￿ ow" hypothesis for the ￿rms with an intense cross-
border transfer of pricing information. On the other hand, for the ￿rms with a low cross-market
correlation it seems that the trading volume is a proxy for the liquidity shocks, leading to a
lower variance in the subsequent trading period, rather than to informative trading.
To provide a visual impression on the dynamics of the price-discovery process and the cross-
market information ￿ ows, we plot the average share of the US market in the price discovery
140process and the average conditional variance ratio in the upper and lower panels of Figure
4.3, respectively. Here, following the terminology and extending the methodology of Schreiber
and Schwartz (1986) and Eun and Sabherwal (2003), we de￿ne the conditional US share in
the price discovery for a speci￿c ￿rm j and period t as
￿j;CAN;t
j￿j;US;tj+￿j;CAN;t
, that is, the share of
the adjustment occurring on Canadian market out of the total adjustment occurring on both
the US and Canadian markets at period t6. This ratio is a natural re￿nement of the original
measure used by Eun and Sabherwal (2003), who assume that the speed of adjustment is
constant for both markets, an assumption which is strongly rejected in our study. Therefore,
it would be interesting to study the evolution of the price-discovery process over time. As for
the conditional variance ratio, we de￿ne the latter as
hj;US;t
hj;CAN;t for a speci￿c ￿rm i and period
t. This measure, which is also a natural re￿nement of the unconditional variance ratio used
by Lieberman, Ben-Zion and Hauser (1999), will allow us to study the relative intensity of the
information ￿ ows on both domestic and foreign markets and its evolution over time. Since we
use di⁄erent time-periods for di⁄erent ￿rms, we picked only those with continuous data during
the period January 2000-December 2005, and for each period t we calculate a cross-sectional
average of the US price discovery shares and the variance ratios of the individual ￿rms. That
is, for each period t, we present the average US price discovery share and the average variance











hj;CAN;t with N, the number
of ￿rms corresponding to our criterion, being equal to 27.
Starting with the US price discovery share, an inspection of its histogram indicates that
during the time-span of our study the US market behaved as a satellite one, with a lion￿ s share
of the US share lying below 0.5, a ￿nding which is consistent with other studies which report
that the domestic market emerges as the dominant one. However, it also exhibits a substantial
degree of time-variation with a minimum share of 0.3 and a maximum around 0.6, suggesting
that taking into account the conditional variation in the speed of adjustment during the periods
when the trade is concentrated on the US stock exchange, the latter becomes the dominant
market. Interestingly, the average US price discovery share exhibits an upward trend, starting
from 0.35 and reaching the average level of 0.5. A similar picture unfolds from inspecting the
time evolution of the average relative volume, which we de￿ne as the cross-sectional average
6Note that since ￿US;t is non-positive applying an absolute value operator to ￿US;t is necessary.
141of the di⁄erences between the US and Canadian trading log-volumes and which is depicted in
Figure 4.4. While at the beginning of our sample, trading was heavily concentrated on the
Canadian market, over time one can clearly observe the former gradually reallocating from the
TSE to the US markets and by the end of 2005 almost breaking even between both the domestic
and the foreign market, which corresponds to the price discovery process breaking even between
the TSE and the US markets. Turning to the analysis of the average conditional variance ratio,
we ￿nd it ￿ uctuating around the level one, suggesting that both markets are highly integrated,
with highly intensive cross-border information ￿ ows in both directions. Interestingly, there is
a single peak around the period of March 2000, when the US market plummeted down due to
the collapse of the "Internet" bubble and when this market was characterized by an unusually
high volatility which also seems to cause the distribution of the variance ratio to be slightly
positively skewed.
4.7 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we study the role of the trading volume and the volatility in the dynamics of the
stock markets. In particular, we study the role and the predictive power of the trading volume
and the volatility both for the individual national stock markets and for the securities listed on
multiple markets. Our analysis is based on both parametric and semi-nonparametric (Flexible
Fourier Form) estimation methodologies, which makes our ￿ndings robust to potential model
speci￿cation errors.
For the individual national stock markets our key ￿ndings are as follows. First, we ￿nd
strong evidence of the lagged trading volume a⁄ecting the variance of the stock market returns.
More speci￿cally, an increase in the trading volume leads to an increase in the stock market vari-
ance during the subsequent trading period, a ￿nding which is consistent with the "information
￿ ow" hypothesis. Secondly, we ￿nd that the stock market return autocorrelation is inversely
related to the volatility, a ￿nding which supports the "feedback trading" theory of Sentana
and Wadhwani (1992). Third, no negative relation between the lagged trading volume and the
autocorrelation, as suggested by Campbell et al. (1993) model, has been found. Combining
these three ￿ndings together, our results suggest that the pro￿tability of volume-￿lter based
142contrarian strategies, as reported by Conrad, Hameed, and Niden (1994), can be explained by
the combination of the "information ￿ ow" and "feedback trading" models, but might not be
explained by the trading volume-autocorrelation class of models, such as the Campbell et al.
(1993) and Wang (1994) models.
We also study the role of the trading volume in a multiple markets context. Based on a
comprehensive dataset of Canadian ￿rms listed on both the domestic and the US stock markets
we study the role of the trading volume in the price discovery process and in the comovements
between the stock markets. We ￿nd strong evidence in favor of the lagged trading volume
a⁄ecting the price discovery process via the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients of the securities.
Interestingly, our ￿ndings suggest that it is the relative rather than the absolute volume that
a⁄ects the dynamics of the price discovery process. More speci￿cally, we ￿nd that an increase in
the relative US trading volume leads to a subsequent increase in the share of the price discovery
that occurs on the US market and vice-versa, or, borrowing the terms of Garbade and Silber
(1979), turns the US market to the dominant one. This ￿nding is consistent with the results
of Stickel and Verrecchia (1994) when extended to a multiple market setup, who suggest that
investors interpret a high volume as an indication of the informative demand. We also ￿nd
signi￿cant evidence in favor of the trading volume a⁄ecting the comovement of the securities￿
prices between the market via risk factor sensitivities. In particular, we ￿nd that following days
with a high trading volume the CAPM-betas of the individual securities signi￿cantly increase
as well. This ￿nding, which we interpret as additional evidence of the informative role of the
trading volume, suggests that the "high volume premium" reported by Gervais, Kaniel, and
Mingelgrin (2001) can be viewed as a compensation for additional risk.
Our results suggest a number of interesting directions for further research. First, our results
seem to indicate that the dominant factor that governs the stock return reversal dynamics is
the stock market volatility and not the trading volume. Thus, it seems reasonable to compare
the pro￿tability of the contrarian strategies based on the volatility-￿lters with those based on
the trading volume ￿lters. One way to proceed will be to use a volatility/volume weighted
version of the zero-investment strategy, proposed by Lo and MacKinlay (1990). Second, it
would be interesting to make a distinction between the informative and the non-informative
trading periods by looking at the share of the medium-size trades during a particular trading
143period, following Barclay and Warner (1993), who report that informed traders are concentrated
in the medium-size category. If informed trades are indeed characterized by the medium size,
the volume-price relationship during days with a high share of the medium-size trades may
di⁄er from ones when this share is low. Finally, it would be interesting to study the intraday
dynamics of the price discovery process. Numerous studies report the trading volume to follow a
"U-shape", which in the context of our study would suggest that the price adjustment process
is likely to be rapid at the beginning/end of the trading day and relatively slow during the
middle of the day.
144Table 10: Cross-listed securities: volatility dynamics
Table 10.A: Unconditional variance ratio
Mean Median Min Max
All 1.003 0.98 0.74 1.83
Quartile 1 0.96 0.94 0.86 1.17
Quartile 2 1.03 0.99 0.75 1.83
Quartile 3 1.01 1.002 0.74 1.45
Quartile 4 1.02 0.99 0.88 1.33
Spearman ro (US share, V. ratio) 0.25￿￿
Table 10.B: Conditional volatility dynamics
NYSE/AMEX TSE
Coef. S.Error Coef. S.Error
! -0.258￿￿ 0.024 -0.252￿￿ 0.021
￿ 0.064￿￿ 0.008 0.058￿￿ 0.007
￿ 0.961￿￿ 0.003 0.961￿￿ 0.003
￿ -0.134￿￿ 0.018 -0.113￿￿ 0.014
￿ 0.044￿￿ 0.006 0.052￿￿ 0.007
￿US -0.0053￿￿ 0.002 -0.0058￿￿ 0.002
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145Figure 4-3: Price discovery and information ￿ ow dynamics
146Figure 4-4: Average relative trading volume on the New-York and Toronto stock exchanges
over the period of January 2000-December 2005
147Chapter 5
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002:
Implications for Market E¢ ciency
and Analysts￿Performance
5.1 Introduction
Transparent corporate disclosure of information is undoubtfully one of the corner stones needed
for an e¢ cient functioning of stock markets. Financial statements, reports, and announcements
serve as a useful valuation tool both for analysts, who submit their forecasts and investment
recommendations based on this data, and for the investors who use this information to price
￿nancial instruments and to choose optimal portfolio strategies. In this context the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (hereafter SOX act) is unanimously described as one of the most far-reaching and
signi￿cant changes in the disclosure obligations of publicly traded companies (Smith, 2002, Rib-
stein, 2003). The purpose of this paper is to study the reaction of the stock market participants,
the investors and the analysts, to this reform.
148Figure 5-1: Standard and Poor￿ s 500 composite over the period of 2001-2003
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, signed into law on 30 July 2002, was enacted as a response to
a series of severe corporate scandals that have shaken the con￿dence of the public in the
stock markets in particular and in the ￿nancial institutions in general. On 16 October 2001
Enron Corporation announced a 35 million decrease in stated earnings and a 1.2$ billion loss
of shareholder equity due to accountancy misreporting, a statement followed by the November
announcement that an additional 500$ millions in earnings were overstated. On 2 December
2001 Enron declared itself bankrupt, making history as the largest bankruptcy in the corporate
history of the United States. However, this was just the beginning. The bankruptcy of Global
Crossing in January 2002 and Adelphia Communications in March 2002 due to in￿ ated earnings,
Xerox, admitting more than 6$ billion in overstated earnings on June 2002, and Worldcome,
￿ling for bankruptcy on July 2002 - these are just a few landmarks that uncovered severe
institutional and regulatory problems in the ￿nancial reporting of ￿rms. The costs of these
misreportings led scandals were severe: Standard and Poor￿ s 500 index lost about 20 percent
of its value during the year 2002 (see Figure 5.1). This decline has been accompanied by an
upward shift in the Implied Volatility Index (VIX), indicating a sharp increase in overall market
uncertainty (see Figure 5.2 ) and a downward shift in the consumer con￿dence index (Hevesi,
2003).
As a response to these multiple cases of corporate fraud the SOX act concerns the following
key aspects (for the comprehensive reviews see Smith, 2002 and Ribstein, 2003 among others)
149Figure 5-2: Implied Volatility Index (VIX) over the period of 2001-2003
1 New disclosure requirements. The companies are required to provide an internal control
report as part of their annual report. Also, the quarterly and annual reports must disclose
all o⁄-balance sheet transactions and other material changes in their ￿nancial conditions
on a "rapid and current basis". Insider trading reporting rules are substantially tightened
as well.
2 Securities analysts regulation. A new regulation ensures the analysts￿independence
from their ￿rms￿investment banking activities.
3 Internal monitoring and gatekeeper regulation. More responsibility for the indepen-
dent board audit committee for hiring and overseeing auditors; prohibits fraudulently
in￿ uencing and/or misleading auditors; reducing ties between auditors and audited com-
panies.
As the SOX act is aimed to increase the transparency of the information disclosure by the
￿rms and, in this way, to restore the con￿dence of the public in the stock markets, an important
question is whether this goal has been achieved. In particular, if the information disclosure did
become more transparent and news is revealed on a more frequent and reliable basis, one would
expect the stock prices to respond more rapidly to news regarding the ￿nancial and economic
conditions of the companies. However, although the SOX act￿ s primary goal was to increase
150the information disclosure, to the best of our knowledge, no study examines whether and, if so,
to what extent the speed of adjustment to the new information of stock markets has changed
after the Act has been signed into law. The ￿rst purpose of this paper is, therefore, to ￿ll
this gap by studying whether the informational e¢ ciency of the US stock markets has changed
following the SOX act.
Also, since corporate news is an important source of information for analysts, an increase in
the information disclosure should increase the accuracy of the analysts￿forecasts. However, if
the Act has not succeeded in restoring public con￿dence, shaken by the corporate scandals, the
picture might be reverse. In particular, we may expect both investors and analysts becoming
more cautious in interpreting the news, which would result in stock prices re￿ ecting more slowly
the information on the one hand and the analysts￿forecasts becoming overpessimistic on the
other hand. The second purpose of this paper is, therefore, to study the implications of the
SOX for the accuracy of the analysts forecasts.
In terms of methodology we estimate the partial adjustment model with noise of Amihud
and Mendelson (1987), which we apply to all the stocks listed on NYSE/AMEX during the last
decade. Within this framework we test for the presence of structural breaks in the speed of
adjustment coe¢ cients after the Act has been signed into law. Next, we apply nonparametric
tests to the analysts forecasts and actual earnings data of the abovementioned ￿rms to study
whether the corporate scandals and the SOX act have in￿ uenced the performance of the analysts
and, if so, in which direction.
We ￿nd strong support in favor of markets becoming more informationally e¢ cient in the
post SOX period, with average speed of adjustment exhibiting a substantial increase. On the
other hand, we also ￿nd strong evidence of the analysts￿ forecasts becoming less accurate,
and, in particular, more "overpessimistic" in the post SOX era. Though we also ￿nd some
weak evidence in favor of the SOX act e⁄ecting the analysts￿performance in the recent two
years, overall the positive impact of the legislation appears to be overwhelmed by the impact of
the corporate scandals which have distorted the con￿dence of the analysts in the information
provided by the ￿rms.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 5.2 we brie￿ y overview
some relevant literature on the stock market informational e¢ ciency and the performance of
151the ￿rms￿analysts. Section 5.3 describes the data. In Section 5.4 we formulate our research
questions and discuss the methodology applied in this paper. In Section 5.5 we present and
discuss our estimation results. Finally, in Section 5.6 we present our concluding remarks and
propose some directions for further research.
5.2 Literature Review
The concept of the "e¢ cient market hypothesis" has been formalized by Fama (1970) and is
related to the question of whether the pricing information is fully incorporated in stock prices.
The question of market e¢ ciency has been examined by an extant body of empirical studies.
While providing a comprehensive review of the market e¢ ciency literature is clearly out of
the scope of this paper, we shall brie￿ y review a number of widely cited studies in this ￿eld,
related to the issue examined in this paper.1 Amihud and Mendelson (1987) report signi￿cant
violations from the null of a random walk in favor of ARMA(1,1) model for the sample of
Dow Jones components, suggesting that stock prices do not fully adjust to a new information.
Lo and Mackinlay (1988) reject the null that stock prices follow a random walk based on the
variance-ratio test. Damodaran (1993) estimates the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients for the
NYSE/AMEX sample of stocks and ￿nds that in general the stocks are characterized only by
the partial adjustment to the partial adjustment or "underreact". In a more recent work Lo
and MacKinlay (1999) ￿nd that short-run serial correlations are not zero and the existence
of "too many" successive moves in the same direction suggests the existence of "momentum"
in short-run stock prices, a ￿nding supported by Theobald and Yallup (2004) who report an
overall tendency of NYSE/AMEX listed stocks to underreact in the short run. Lo, Mamaysky,
and Wang (2000) by using nonparametric techniques report that some technical analysis based
rules do have some predictive power. Overall, these papers suggest that in a short-run the
adjustment of stock prices to a new information is less than full, possibly due to investors￿
underreaction.
A number of studies examine the relationship between the market e¢ ciency and information
disclosure. Collins et al. (1987) and Freeman (1987) show that di⁄erences in information
1For a survey of the market e¢ ciency literature a reader is refered to Schwert (2003)
152environment a⁄ect the extent to which price changes anticipate earnings changes, a ￿nding
supported by Collins and Kothari (1989). Imho⁄and Lobo (1992) ￿nd that earnings news have
a greater impact on unexpected stock price change as the amount of pre-earnings-announcement
uncertainty decreases. In a more recent study Douthett et al. (2003) ￿nd that earnings surprises
tend to have a larger impact on the stocks of the ￿rms which are required to report ￿nancial
information under more stringent disclosure rules. Ng et al. (2006) provide evidence that the
stocks of ￿rms with higher quality disclosure are associated with a smaller underreaction. The
overall conclusion of these studies is that the speed of adjustment of security prices to a new
information is related to the quality of the information disclosure. In context of this study, an
important question is whether the extent of underreaction has changed after the introduction
of the SOX.
The second issue of interest is whether the enactment of the SOX act has in￿ uenced the
performance of analysts, and, in particular, whether the analysts￿forecasts of the companies￿
earnings became less biased2. Numerous studies indicate the presence of a bias in the analysts￿
earnings forecasts (see Brown (1993) for a review of the related literature). Fried and Givoly
(1982) and O￿ Brien (1988) show that the analysts￿earnings forecasts generally are overopti-
mistic. Similar results are reported by Stickel (1990) and Abarbanel (1991), who ￿nd that the
mean estimate of the analysts￿forecast errors is signi￿cantly negative. Lim (2001) proposes a
model where analysts trade o⁄ bias to improve management access leading to optimal forecasts
being overoptimistic. More recent studies, however, ￿nd that the sign of the bias is unstable
over time. Brown (1997) documents signi￿cant rightward temporal shifts in mean earnings
surprises between 1984 and 1996. Similar ￿ndings are reported by Brown (2001), which are
consistent with ￿rms￿management desire to meet or beat analysts forecasts as reported by
Degeorge et al. (1999).
Several studies examine the relationship between the forecast accuracy and the level of in-
formation disclosure. Waymire (1986) ￿nds that the accuracy of the analysts earnings forecasts
improves after the management earnings forecast is released. For the US ￿rms Lang and Lund-
holm (1996) ￿nd that ￿rms with more informative disclosure policies are followed by a larger
2A term "analysts￿forecasts bias", as it is somewhat loosely used in academic literature, refers to a situation
when the expected value of the analysts￿forecast error (actual earnings minus concensus forecast) is di⁄erent
from zero.
153number of the analysts and have more accurate analyst earnings forecasts. Basu, Hwang, and
Jang (1998) ￿nd that country-average levels of disclosure are positively associated with analysts￿
levels of accuracy for the sample of seven countries. Similar results are reported by Khanna,
Palepu, and Chang (2000) for a sample of 37 countries and by Hope (2002) for a sample of 22
countries. The overall conclusion from these and other studies is that higher disclosure enhances
the analysts￿forecast accuracy. Therefore, studying the question of whether the SOX act led to
improvement in the analysts￿performance is of major importance both for policy makers and
for the practitioners who incorporate the analysts￿earnings forecasts in their ￿rm valuations.
5.3 Data Description
5.3.1 Sample Selection
Our database consists of daily observations on all NYSE/AMEX stocks with continuous data
from January 1998 to December 2005. This data includes closing prices adjusted for splits, daily
trading volume and the number of shares outstanding for each security included in our sample.
The data has been obtained from the CRSP tapes. Similar data, though over a di⁄erent time
span, has been used in related studies by Damodaran (1993) and Theobald and Yallup (2004),
though for di⁄erent purpose. Following the standard convention we exclude from our analysis
NASDAQ stocks. This screening rule leaves us with a total number of 1513 ￿rms.
To study potential implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley act for the analysts￿ s performance for
all the ￿rms included in our sample we collect data on their actual and predicted earnings over
the period January 1998-June 2006 on a quarterly basis. More speci￿cally, each ￿rm-quarter
observation includes actual earning, mean analysts￿forecast, highest/lowest forecast estimates,
and the announcement date. All data has been obtained from the Institutional Brokerage
Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Following related studies ( Datta and Dhillon,1993, Shane and
Brous,2001) we de￿ne the consensus forecast as the mean forecast from the last month before
the announcement date for each ￿rm-quarter observation. To be included in our sample a ￿rm
must have at least two years (eight quarterly observations) both before and after July 2002
when the SOX has been signed into law. Also, to be included in our sample we require each
observation to have at least two di⁄erent analysts￿estimates. To take care of possible outliers
154caused either by special items or by data input errors we ￿lter our data with the Grubbs
algorithm (Barnett and Lewis (1994)). After applying these ￿ltering rules our ￿nal dataset
consists of 24380 ￿rm-quarter observations.
5.3.2 Exploratory Analysis
In this subsection we conduct an exploratory analysis of our data. First, we present the descrip-
tive statistics and discuss the properties of stock returns of the ￿rms included in our sample.
Next, we conduct a preliminary analysis of the earnings and the analysts forecasts data.
Stock returns data
A number of studies report the speed of adjustment of the large capitalization stocks being
di⁄erent from those of the small size ￿rms (Damodaran,1993; Theobald and Yallup, 2004).
Therefore, for the purpose of further analysis we sort all the ￿rms in our sample into ten deciles
based on their average CRSP capitalization decile assignment during the time span of our study.
In Table 1.A we present some descriptive statistics of the daily close-to-close log returns
ranked by their market capitalization as described above. For each statistic (mean, standard
deviation etc) we report a cross-section average of the latter across all the securities accord-
ing to their capitalization decile assignment. Most of the stocks exhibit positive drift which,
starting from the ￿fth decile, becomes statistically signi￿cant. Also, for the stocks included in
our sample the null hypothesis of normally distributed returns on average is strongly rejected
based on a highly signi￿cant excess kurtosis. This excess kurtosis, however, can be partially
attributed to GARCH-type e⁄ects, based on highly signi￿cant estimates of the autocorrelation
coe¢ cient between the squared returns. Raw returns on average also appear to be signi￿cantly
autocorrelated, though both the sign and the magnitude of the estimates seem to change from
signi￿cantly negative for the low decile portfolios to positive (though statistically insigni￿cant)
for the high-cap stocks. Interestingly, average estimates of both standard deviation and mean
turnover almost monotonously increase from low to high-cap portfolios. Since both trading
volume/turnover and volatility are usually considered to be a proxy for the information ￿ ow3,
3See, for instance, Andersen (1996).
155these ￿ndings suggest that trading in high-cap stocks is likely to be more informationally inten-
sive. Finally, for all the stocks daily returns appear to be negatively skewed and the magnitude
of skewness coe¢ cient estimate tends to decline (though not monotonously) from the low to the
high capitalization deciles. In conjunction with monotonously increasing turnover this ￿nding
can be attributed to Hong and Stein (2003) "dispersion of beliefs" model.
Table 1.A: Descriptive statistics-daily returns
Decile 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.0045 -0.0049 -0.0049 0.012 0.02￿￿
St. Deviation 1.87 1.94 1.98 2.24 2.23
Skewness -0.114￿ -0.141￿￿ -0.113￿￿ -0.064￿￿ -0.101￿￿
Kurtosis 10.27￿￿ 10.08￿￿ 8.84￿￿ 8.79￿￿ 8.99￿￿
Corr(rt;rt￿1) -0.046￿￿ -0.019￿￿ -0.016￿￿ 0.004 -0.004
Corr(r2
t;r2
t￿1) 0.163￿￿ 0.162￿￿ 0.164￿￿ 0.155￿￿ 0.148￿￿
Daily Turnover 0.2 0.25 0.28 0.35 0.41
Decile 6 7 8 9 10
Mean 0.031￿￿ 0.024￿￿ 0.025￿￿ 0.028￿￿ 0.022￿￿
St. Deviation 2.34 2.16 2.23 2.26 2.22
Skewness -0.023 -0.064￿ -0.033 -0.063￿￿ -0.058￿￿
Kurtosis 9.51￿￿ 9.11￿￿ 9.51￿￿ 8.95￿￿ 8.51￿￿
Corr(rt;rt￿1) -0.012￿￿ -0.011￿￿ -0.005 0.005 0.004
Corr(r2
t;r2
t￿1) 0.147￿￿ 0.145￿￿ 0.146￿￿ 0.142￿￿ 0.16￿￿
Daily Turnover 0.47 0.5 0.58 0.6 0.45
The estimates of the mean, standard deviation, and mean turnover
are presented in percentage points. ￿(￿￿) denoted signi￿cance at 10
(5)%. Corr(rt;rt￿1) and Corr(r2
t;r2
t￿1) denote serial correlation
of raw and squared returns, respectively. Daily turnover is measured
as the daily trading volume scaled by the total number of shares
outstanding.
156Earnings data
Next, we conduct a preliminary analysis of the "earning surprise" series which we de￿ne as
actual earning minus consensus forecasts. For the purpose of further analysis we group all ￿rms
in our sample into ￿ve portfolios based on the extent to which actual earnings can be predicted









￿;i the estimated variance of the forecast errors for that company. We group
all the ￿rms included in our sample into ￿ve portfolios based on the variance-ratio criterion,









ratio. This measure, calculated for each ￿rm, provides us
the information on how well the analysts￿forecasts explain the variation of the actual earnings.
The ￿rst portfolio includes the stocks with the lowest (￿rst quintile) variance ratio while the
￿fth portfolio includes the ￿rms with the highest (￿fth quintile) variance ratio estimates.
Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 1.B. A number of interesting observations can
be mentioned. First, the earning surprise series appears to be highly leptocurtic with estimates
of kurtosis signi￿cantly exceeding the one corresponding to the normal distribution. Also, the
earning surprises on average exhibit higher dispersion as we move from the lower to the upper
quintiles, based both on the estimates of the standard deviation and average spread (highest
forecast minus lowest forecast). The estimates of mean and skewness are particularly interesting.
First, we ￿nd the mean of the earning surprise to be signi￿cantly negative for all the portfolios
included in our sample, a ￿nding which suggests that on average analysts tend to submit
overpessimistic forecasts. This ￿nding is consistent with the results of Degeorge et al. (1999)
and Burgstahler and Eams (1998) who report that companies￿management tends to report
earnings that meet or beat analysts forecasts. Interestingly, both mean and skewness estimates
tend to decline from lower to upper quintile portfolios, with skewness switching from positive
and signi￿cant to slightly negative, suggesting that the degree of the analysts overpessimism
tends to decline with an increase in ex-post uncertainty. These ￿ndings can be attributed to
the bias-variance trade-o⁄ as suggested by Lim (2001). To test this conjecture in a last row of
Table 1.B we report sample correlations between the earning surprise and spread, which can
be interpreted as an ex ante measure of the uncertainty, that is, a measure of the analysts￿
dispersion of beliefs. While being statistically insigni￿cant for the portfolios 3-5, for the lower
157quintile portfolios the estimates are positive and statistically signi￿cant, suggesting that during
periods of high uncertainty analysts are likely to become more dependent on the information
they receive from the company management.
Table 1.B: Descriptive statistics-earning surprises
Quintile 1 2 3 4 5
Mean 0.015￿￿ 0.016￿￿ 0.012￿￿ 0.011￿￿ 0.007￿￿
St. Deviation 0.034 0.056 0.065 0.077 0.101
Skewness 0.841￿￿ 0.459￿￿ 0.093 -0.146 -0.17
Kurtosis 7.82￿￿ 7.71￿￿ 8.16￿￿ 7.78￿￿ 8.1￿￿
Mean spread 0.057 0.086 0.088 0.097 0.084
Corr(spr,surp) 0.17￿￿ 0.11￿￿ -0.001 0.004 0.018
earnings surprise is measured as the actual earning - mean forecast
forecast spread is measured as the highest - lowest analysts￿forecast
Corr(spr,surp) denotes sample correlation between the earnings surprise
and forecast spread. ￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at 5%
5.4 Research Questions and Methodology
5.4.1 Market E¢ ciency
Following a de￿nition proposed by Schreiber and Schwartz (1986), a price discovery process is
a process during which the stock price converges to its equilibrium or "intrinsic" value. When
the markets are fully e¢ cient any change in intrinsic value of the ￿rm should be immediately
re￿ ected in its stock price. Following this concept, the question of whether the market has
become more (less) informationally e¢ cient due to some market-wide event can be analyzed by
comparing the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients before and after the event has occurred.
As noted by Fama (1992), testing the hypothesis of stock markets being informationally
e¢ cient is in fact a test of a joint hypothesis of market e¢ ciency and correct speci￿cation of the
model. Following Damodaran (1993), Theobald and Yallup (2004) and other related papers,
our study of the market e¢ ciency is based on a partial adjustment with noise model of Amihud
and Mendelson (1987) (denoted as A&M model). This model explicitly speci￿es stochastic
158processes for the observed log-price series and the underlying latent intrinsic value series. The
log of the intrinsic value is assumed to follow a random walk with drift, thus, assuming that the
equilibrium unobserved price is fully e¢ cient in a sense that it immediately incorporates any
information shock. The observed price and the intrinsic value of ￿rm i at period t are speci￿ed
as
￿Pi;t = ￿i;t(Vi;t ￿ Pi;t￿1) + ui;t i = 1;::::n; t = 1;::::T
￿Vi;t = ￿i + ei;t
where ￿Pi;t = Pi;t ￿ Pi;t￿1 denotes the change in the observed price, Vi;t is the unobserved
intrinsic value (both expressed in natural logarithms), ￿i;t is the speed of adjustment coe¢ cient
which lies in interval (0;2) to keep the observed return process stationary, ￿i and ei;t are the
drift term and the information shock to the intrinsic value, respectively, and ui;t is a bid-ask
spread related noise. Both ui;t and ei;t are assumed to have zero mean and to be serially and
cross sectionally-uncorrelated at all leads and lags. In this setting, a fully e¢ cient market
corresponds to the case of ￿i;t being equal to 1 for all the ￿rms: When ￿i;t lies between 0 and 1
investors systematically underreact to the news, while for ￿i;t lying in interval (1;2) overreaction
occurs.4
Theobald and Yallup (2004) show that the observed price process can be easily reformulated
as
￿Pi;t = ￿i;t￿i + (1 ￿ ￿i;t)￿Pi;t￿1 + ￿i;tei;t + ui;t ￿ ui;t￿1
A General Method of Moments (GMM) estimator of ￿i;t based on instrument variables can
be easily constructed and estimated (the choice of the instruments will be discussed in the
following section).5.
The A&M model provides a simple and intuitive way of analyzing the process of markets
incorporating new information with the speed of adjustment ￿ being the key parameter of
interest. Within this framework we are interested in studying the following research questions
4In the original model of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) ￿i;t is assumed to be constant for each ￿rms. In this
paper we allow it to be time varying which is important for our hypothesis development.
5Alternatively, one can simply estimate 2) as ARMA(1,1) model, as proposed by Theobald and Yallup. Also
see Damodaran (1993)
159Q1: Was the speed of adjustment stable over the last decade? If not, when did this change
occur?
In the original A&M model the speed of adjustment ￿ is assumed to be time-invariant,
that is, ￿i;t = ￿i: We examine this issue by testing the following null hypothesis for each ￿rm
included in our sample
H0 : ￿i;t = ￿i 8 t = f1;2::::::Tg
against the alternative that there has been a structural shift at some t￿ lying between 1 and T;
the time span of our study. That is, under the alternative for each ￿rm the speed of adjustment
is piecewise constant and equals to ￿i;S1 before the structural break has occurred and ￿i;S2 in
the post-break period, with the indices b and a denoting before and after the structural shift,
respectively. We apply two di⁄erent tests: the supremum Wald test of Andrews (1993) and
the exponential Wald test developed by Andrews and Ploberger (1994). While, as shown by
Andrews and Ploberger (1994), the latter test enjoys certain optimality properties (which is not
the case for the former), the supremum Wald test also allows us to determine when a structural
break has occurred, given that the null of parameter stability has been rejected.
Consider the sample of length T, which is partitioned into two subsamples with sample
lengths ￿T 2 N and (1￿ ￿)T 2 N respectively for some ￿ lying in a given interval [￿l;￿u] with
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The limiting distributions of these two statistics under the null were derived by Andrews (1993)
and Andrews and Ploberger (1994), respectively, who also provide the tables of the correspond-
ing critical values for di⁄erent levels of signi￿cance. More speci￿cally, this procedure involves
estimation of a series of usual Wald statistics over a ￿nite grid of K partitioning points of the
whole time span of the study. Following Andrews we choose the interval of ￿ equal to [0:15;0:85]
with a grid of 22 trading days ( approximately one trading month). This procedure leaves us
with 65 potential change points per stock during the time span of our study.
We are interested not only in whether but also how the speed of adjustment changed after
the introduction of the SOX and whether this change (if it occurred) has led to an increase in
the informational e¢ ciency of stock market. This leads to the following two research questions.
Q2: Has the average speed of adjustment for the ￿rms included in our sample increased or
decreased following the enactment of SOX reform?








with ￿i;S1 (￿i;S2) denoting the speed of adjustment of ￿rm i before (after) the SOX act has
been signed into law and N is the number of ￿rms in the population. For each cap decile we









￿i;S2 with n denoting the number of ￿rms included in each decile: A
signi￿cant increase of the cross-sectional average of the speed of adjustment estimates in the
post SOX period will indicate that following the reform US markets incorporate more rapidly
new information.6
6In this study we focus on the mean spead of adjustment as the measure of location of the distribution of the
speed of adjustment coe¢ cients. While it is out of scope of this paper, one could also test for the breakpoints
in the higher moments of the speed of adjusment distribution, e.g. variance, skewness etc, though the results of
these tests would be harder to interpret.
161Q3: Have the US markets become more e¢ cient following the enactment of the SOX reform?
Since in the A&M model full market e¢ ciency is de￿ned as a case when the speed of
adjustment ￿ is equal to unity for each stock traded on the market, a natural way of testing
for change in market e¢ ciency is by measuring the average distance between the vector of the
speed of adjustment parameters and the unity vector. In this study we base our analysis on two
di⁄erent distance measures, the average L1 distance (here Abs.Dist) and average squared L2
distance (here Sq.Dist) which we de￿ne as N￿1
N X
i=1





for each cap-portfolio. We test for a change in market e¢ ciency by testing the following null
hypotheses via a pairwise t-test
Abs:DistS1 = Abs:DistS2
Sq:DistS1 = Sq:DistS2
































, respectively. An increase in market e¢ ciency should result in a signi￿-
cant decline in the distance measures following the reform.
5.4.2 Analysts￿Performance
A second issue we consider in this paper is the impact of corporate scandals and the SOX
reform on the accuracy of the analysts forecasts, in particular, on their bias. The analysis
is performed separately for each one of the ￿ve variance ratio ranked portfolios, formed as
described in subsection 5.3.2. To set forth notations, we denote by n￿ the sample size for
each portfolio which is equal to the total number of ￿rms included in each portfolio, that is,
n from the previous subsection multiplied by the average number of observation over the time
dimension per company. We examine the following research questions
Q4: Were the analysts￿consensus forecasts the "best" earnings forecasts both before and
after the enactment of the reform?
Denote the actual quarterly earning by ei;t and the consensus forecast by ci;t , where i =
1621;:::n denotes the index of the company and t denotes the forecast period. We test whether the
analysts￿consensus forecasts were the "best￿earnings forecasts both in the pre-and post SOX
periods, which corresponds to testing the following null hypothesis
H0 : E(ei;t jci;t = c) = c 8c 2 C
where E(ei;t jci;t = c) denotes expected actual earning conditional on a latest consensus forecast
c and C denotes the support of ci;t. In particular, under the null, analysts￿consensus forecasts
are neither "overpessimistic" nor "overoptimistic". We test this hypothesis by using two alter-
native tests. The ￿rst one is the test proposed by Gozalo (1993). In our context, he suggests







E(ei;t jci;t = c) ￿ c
￿
Here c is the value of a randomly selected consensus forecast and
^
E(ei;t jci;t = c) is a non-
parametric Nadaraya-Watson estimate of the expected earning conditional on that value of the








K( )2d  with
^
f(￿) being a nonparametric estimate of




￿is the estimate of the
variance of the forecast error ￿i;t = ei;t ￿ E(ei;t jci;t = c) . The choice of the bandwidth h is
based on a cross-validation criterion. Under the null of a correct parametric speci￿cation the
limit distribution of the test statistic is standard normal. Gozalo (1993) proposes to look at the
supremum of T evaluated at d randomly chosen points. Since this test is potentially oversized,
instead, we calculate the statistic T(G) =
Pd
j=1 T2
j which is asymptotically ￿2(d) distributed
under the null (see Pagan and Ullah, 1994 for a comprehensive discussion of estimation and
testing in a nonparametric framework ).
A second test has been proposed by Stute (1997). He proposes considering the empirical





￿i;tI(ci;t ￿ c0) where ￿i;t = ei;t￿ci;t, that is, the earning surprise
under the null of the consensus forecast being the "best" forecast; and using a functional of this














whose asymptotic distribution can be approximated by the "wild bootstrap" procedure (Stute,1997).7
Our interest is not only in whether the analysts￿forecasts were the optimal forecasts before
and (or) after the reform, but also whether the former became more or less accurate, following
the introduction of the SOX act. Therefore, we examine the following question.
Q5: Has there been a structural shift in the conditional dynamics of the analysts￿forecasts
errors following the introduction of SOX, and if so, in which direction?
Testing the intertemporal stability of the conditional dynamics of the analysts￿forecasts
errors corresponds to testing the following null hypothesis
ES1(￿i;t jxi;t = x) = ES2(￿i;t jxi;t = x) 8x 2 X
where ￿i;t is the forecast error de￿ned as ei;t ￿ ci;t , xi;t is a conditioning variable with support
X and ES1(￿i;t jxi;t = x) and ES2(￿i;t jxi;t = x) are the conditional expectations of the analysts￿
forecast error given xi;t in pre-and post-SOX periods respectively. The choice of the conditioning
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ES1(￿i;t jxi;t = x) and
^
ES2(￿i;t jxi;t = x) are the nonparametric estimates of the expected
forecast error for a given value of the conditioning variable xi;t before and after the SOX has been





vS2;i;t) are the estimates of its variance v before (after) the SOX act with
the same formula as in standard Gozalo test. As in case of the standard Gozalo test we base our




which is asymptotically ￿2(d) distributed under the null. The underlying intuition behind
7Miles and Mora (2003) also provide a brief description of this procedure.




ES2(￿i;t jxi;t) should asymptotically converge to the true
conditional expectation which should be the same under the null that no structural shift has
occurred . Finally, to test the direction of the structural shift, that is, whether the conditional
bias has increased or declined, we test the equality of Spearman rho￿ s in both periods
H0 : ￿S1(￿i;t;xi;t) = ￿S2(￿i;t;xi;t)
via standard pairwise t￿tests.
5.5 Empirical Results
In this section we present and discuss our empirical results. First, we study the implications
of the SOX for the informational e¢ ciency of the US stock markets within the A&M model
framework, as described in a previous section. The results are presented in the subsection
5.5.1. Next, we turn to the evaluation of the reform￿ s impact on the analysts￿performance. We
present and discuss our ￿ndings in subsection 5.5.2.
5.5.1 SOX and Market E¢ ciency
Q 1. Was the speed of adjustment stable over the last decade? If not, when has a structural
break occurred?
We start with the estimation results of the A&M model. More speci￿cally, we test for a
structural shift of the speed of adjustment coe¢ cient ￿ after the reform has been signed on
30 July 2002. While testing for a structural break when the date of a break is assumed to be
known is a straightforward procedure, we ￿nd it more sensible to start our analysis with testing
for parameter stability without determining a change point a priori. The reason for applying
this approach is that if the structural shift is detected, it still can be potentially attributed to
some other event, such as the collapse of the internet "bubble" or the September 11 events, both
of which happened during the time span used in our study. Thus, by allowing the structural
breakpoint to be endogenously determined we do not only test for a structural shift but also
determine the event which has potentially triggered the latter. To test the stability of the speed
of adjustment we apply Andrews supremum Wald (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994)
165exponential Wald tests as described in a previous section.
Testing results are presented in Table 2. Since it is unrealistic to present the results for each
security separately, instead, we present the rejection rates which we de￿ne here as a number of
securities for which the null of the speed of adjustment stability has been rejected divided by
the total number of stocks. Since we partition our sample on monthly basis by using 22 days
grid and not on a daily basis (which would be a highly computationally intensive procedure),
the test is likely to be conservative. Therefore, for both supremum Wald and the exponential
Wald tests we take the signi￿cance level of 10 percent The rejection rates are calculated for
each cap-based portfolio.
Table 2: Results of the sup(W) and exp(W) tests
Decile 1 2 3 4 5
SW rejection rate 0.19￿￿ 0.14 0.29￿￿ 0.39￿￿ 0.42￿￿
ExpW rejection rate 0.16￿ 0.17￿￿ 0.32￿￿ 0.45￿￿ 0.47￿￿
Decile 6 7 8 9 10
SW rejection rate 0.52￿￿ 0.46￿￿ 0.49￿￿ 0.35￿￿ 0.37￿￿
ExpW rejection rate 0.52￿￿ 0.48￿￿ 0.49￿￿ 0.36￿￿ 0.35￿￿
Notes: Rejection rate is de￿ned as the number of ￿rms for
which a sup Wald statistic is signi￿cant at 10% level divided
by a total number of ￿rms included in each decile. Critical values
for sup(W) and exp(W) tests can be found in Andrews (2003)
and Andrews and Ploberger (1994). ￿(￿￿) denotes that the rejection rate
is signi￿cantly di⁄erent than 0.1 at 10(5)% signi￿cance level
The results of the supremum Wald test indicate that for the low-cap stocks, in particular
those assigned to the ￿rst and second deciles, the null of a stable speed of adjustment is rejected
only for a small number of ￿rms. For the second decile the rejection rate statistically does not
exceed ten percent, that is, the signi￿cance level of the test. On the other hand, the results are
strikingly di⁄erent as we move to higher deciles. Starting from decile 4 we ￿nd both statisti-
cally and economically signi￿cant evidence of a structural shift in the information adjustment
166mechanism. Rejection rates for deciles six, seven, and eight are especially striking, where a
structural break in the speed of adjustment is detected for approximately every second security.
The overall conclusion might be that, if the structural break is due to the reform, its impact is
substantially more pronounced for the high-cap stocks. This ￿nding can be related to the fact
that high-cap stocks, being well known by (or "visible" to) the investors, are more intensively
traded than the stocks of the ￿rms with low market value, and, therefore, we would expect the
former to respond more rapidly to the reform than the latter. These ￿ndings are corroborated
by the results of the exponential Wald test where the evidence of a structural shift in a speed
of adjustment mechanism is even more pronounced, possibly due to the optimality properties
of this test. Overall, based on both tests, we ￿nd substantial evidence of the intertemporal
instability of the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients.
An interesting question is not only whether, but also when a structural shift has occurred,
i.e., whether the structural shift in the speed of adjustment is indeed related to the Sarbanes-
Oxley reform and not to some other event. To shed some light on this issue, we plot in Figure
5.3 the relative frequency of rejections over the time span used in our study. More speci￿cally,
for each trading month between March 1999 (which corresponds approximately to ￿ = 0:15)
and October 2004 (which corresponds to ￿ = 0:85); we de￿ne the relative share of rejections
which occurred during that particular month out of the total number of rejections. The results
clearly show a substantial cluster of the structural breaks occurring in 2002, the year of the
reform, with two spikes around June-July 2002 and August-September 2002. Interestingly, we
also ￿nd a cluster (though of less substantial magnitude) of the structural breaks around March
1999-April 2000, a ￿nding that can be related to the collapse of the "dot.com" bubble. Also,
we ￿nd a single spike of structural breaks the week following September 11, 2001. Overall, the
￿ndings of the Andrews (1993) stability test clearly indicate both instability of the speed of
adjustment mechanism and the reform of 2002 being a potential source of the former.
Q2 and Q3. Has the average speed of adjustment for the ￿rms included in our sample
increased or decreased following the enactment of SOX reform? Have the US markets become
more e¢ cient following the enactment of the SOX reform?
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Figure 5-3: Relative frequency of the structural shifts in the speed of adjustment coe¢ cents for
the NYSE/AMEX stocks
adjustment of the US stock market to a new information. Based on the ￿ndings of Andrew￿ s
(1993) stability test, the most substantial cluster of structural shifts has occurred in 2002.
Therefore, in the following analysis we split our sample into two subsamples: January 1998-
December 2001 and January 2002-December 2005 which we denote as S1 and S2 respectively.
For each security included in our sample, we estimate the speed of adjustment coe¢ cient ￿
during the ￿rst and second sub-period and report its cross-sectional average for each of ten
cap-sorted portfolios. We apply the GMM theory of Hansen (1982) where as instruments we
choose Fama-French factors. The following set of moments is used to estimate the speed of
adjustment for each security
E
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where MKTt denotes the return on market portfolio, SMBt denotes the return on a portfolio
of small size stocks minus high capitalization stocks portfolio, and HMLt denotes the return
on "value" stocks portfolio;io minus "growth" stocks portfolio. Daily data on these factors has
168been obtained from CRSP. Our preliminary analysis suggests that for our sample these factors
on average capture above 20 percent of the total variation of stock returns while on the other
hand we would expect these factors to be uncorrelated with bid-ask spread related noise of the
individual stock, properties that make these factors suitable instruments.
The results are presented in Table 3. A number of interesting ￿ndings can be noted. First,
consistent with ￿ndings of Theobald and Yallup (2004) we ￿nd that on a daily basis investors
tend to underreact to the news with most of the average estimates of ￿ being signi￿cantly lower
than unity. Also, we ￿nd that on average the extent to which investors underreact tends to
decline from low to high-cap portfolios, suggesting that high-cap stocks tend to re￿ ect more
rapidly new information, compared to the ones with low market capitalization. This ￿nding is
consistent with a "lead-lag" e⁄ect (e.g. Chordia and Swaminathan, 2001). Also, for the low-
cap portfolios the estimates of the speed of adjustment tend to exhibit a higher cross-sectional
dispersion.
Next, we turn to the main issue, namely, the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley reform on the
speed of adjustment and market e¢ ciency. Starting with low cap portfolios, in particular, the
￿rst decile, we ￿nd that, though on average the speed of adjustment to the information shocks
has increased, it lacks statistical signi￿cance. The picture is similar for the distance measures,
both of which have declined after the reform, but the di⁄erence between the distance measures
in the pre- and post-SOX periods lacks statistical signi￿cance.. However, starting from decile 2
the results change dramatically. Starting with the analysis of the adjustment coe¢ cients, we
￿nd a dramatic increase in the former, an increase which is both economically and statistically
signi￿cant. An increase in the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients is becoming more pronounced
as we move from the low to high cap stocks. Our results indicate that, following the reform
on July 2002, the speed of adjustment to the information shocks increased on average by more
than 15%, suggesting that after the reform, the US stock market responds more rapidly to the
new information. The analysis of the two distance measures supports these ￿ndings. Similarly
to the speed of adjustment estimates, starting from cap-decile 2, we ￿nd both an economically
and statistically signi￿cant decrease in both the absolute and squared distance measures. Our
￿ndings suggest that on average the Sarbanes-Oxley reform resulted in a decrease of more than
16936% of the mean absolute distance, while a mean squared distance declined almost twice!8
Overall, these ￿ndings suggest that based on the A&M model of partial adjustment, the reform
of 2002 indeed led to an increase in market e¢ ciency.
Table 3: Speed of adjustment estimates-A&M model
Decile 1 2 3 4 5
Sample S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Speed of Adj. 0.518￿￿ 0.589￿￿ 0.449￿￿ 0.474￿￿ 0.648￿￿ 0.755￿￿ 0.706￿￿ 0.853￿￿ 0.776￿￿ 0.939￿￿
p-value 0.4 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.00
Abs.Dist 0.519 0.476 0.595 0.527 0.426 0.286 0.331 0.23 0.245 0.168
p-value 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sq.Dist 0.619 0.328 0.429 0.297 0.285 0.179 0.151 0.107 0.092 0.055
p-value 0.36 0.00 0.09 0.02 0.03
Decile 6 7 8 9 10
Sample S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2 S1 S2
Speed of Adj. 0.858￿￿ 0.977 0.879￿￿ 0.963￿￿ 0.845￿￿ 0.959￿￿ 0.856￿￿ 0.975 0.916￿￿ 1.019￿￿
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Abs.Dist 0.205 0.137 0.178 0.117 0.174 0.095 0.154 0.083 0.128 0.083
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sq.Dist 0.068 0.041 0.05 0.027 0.044 0.015 0.036 0.013 0.025 0.013
p-value 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes: Speed of Adj. denotes sample mean estimate of ￿; Sq.Dist and Abs.Dist denote average squared and
average absolute distance of ￿ from the unity vector. We test the null: Speed of Adj.(S1) =Speed of Adj.(S2)
Abs.Dist.(S1) =Abs.Dist.(S2) and Sq.Dist.(S1) =Sq.Dist.(S2): Corresponding p-values are reported
in the row below.
We conduct a number of robustness checks. The results of Andrews (1993) stability test
8Since in our study the time dimension T is substantially larger than the dimension of the cross-section N




170suggest that a substantial number of structural breaks can be potentially attributed to the
collapse of the "dot.com" bubble and not to the SOX reform. Therefore, as a ￿rst robustness
test we reestimate the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients for the ￿rst subsample from which we
exclude the period between March 1999 and March 2000. Overall, the results remain unaltered
with cap-decile 7 being the only exception where an increase in the speed of adjustment turned
out to be statistically insigni￿cant. Next, we test whether our results could be due to the fact
that we used only the stocks with continuous data over the whole sample period. If investors
learn over time, one would expect to observe a gradual increase in the spead of adjustment,
which could be mistakenly attributed to the impact of the reform. While indeed for a number
of portfolios the speed of adjustment coe¢ cients exhibit a signi￿cant time trend, the latter
is signi￿cantly negative, a ￿nding that suggests that our results are not driven by a selection
bias problem. The investors￿hypothetical learning curve also fails to explain a large cluster
of structural breaks around the reform date. Finally, we reestimate the speed of adjustment
coe¢ cients for the second subsample from which we excluded the period between January and
December 2002, the "breakpoint year" when the reform has been signed. An increase in the
speed of adjustment coe¢ cients becomes even more pronounced and also becomes statistically
signi￿cant for the second decile. An overall impression is that our ￿ndings are fairly robust.
5.5.2 SOX and the Analysts￿Performance
Next, we turn to the analysis of the analysts￿ s performance in the pre- and-post Sarbanes-
Oxley periods. All ￿rms are grouped into ￿ve portfolios based on a variance ratio criterion,
as described in subsection 5.3.2. The bias-variance trade-o⁄ models of Das et al. (1998) and
Lim (2001) suggest that the analysts issue intentionally biased forecasts in order to improve
access to managers￿private information. Consequently, an improved access to managers￿private
information would result in a lower variance ratio. Also, based on the underlying logic of the
bias-variance trade-o⁄ models, the analysts￿forecasts of the companies with low variance ratio
are more likely to be biased, i.e. overoptimistic if the managers prefer overoptimistic forecasts,
or overpessimistic if the ￿rms￿management follows "meat or beat" analysts￿forecast tendency.
Therefore, if the analysts covering the low variance ratio companies are more dependent on
access to managers￿private information, we would expect the accuracy of their forecasts to
171be more a⁄ected by the new disclosure rules on the one hand, and the corporate scandals on
the other hand. In other words, if the structural shift in the analysts￿forecasts accuracy is
detected in the post-SOX act period, we would expect it to be more pronounced for the low
variance-ratio ￿rms.
Q.4. Were the analysts￿consensus forecasts the "best" earnings forecasts both before and
after the enactment of the reform?
We begin with the analysis of the expected forecast error, conditional on the consensus
forecast, which we de￿ne as the di⁄erence between the conditional expected earning given the
consensus forecast for a particular quarter and the consensus forecast. Consider the following
decomposition of the "best" earnings forecast
E(ei;t jci;t = c ) = c+
￿
E(ei;t jci;t = c ) ￿ c
￿
The last term at the right hand side of the equation can be considered as the correction factor,
one can use to improve the performance of the consensus forecast For each sub-period we test
the null hypothesis that the correction factor is equal to zero or, in other words, that the
consensus forecast is the "best" forecast. As discussed in the previous section, we base our
analysis on both non-parametric (Gozalo, 1993) and conditional moments type (Stute, 1997)
tests. Since nonparametric tests typically are substantially sensitive to the choice of bandwidth,
using the "nonsmoothing" type of tests such as the one proposed by Stute (1997) is a useful
check of the robustness of our results.
172Table 4: Expected forecast error tests
Pre-SOX Post-SOX
Quintile T(G) T(S) No.obs T(G) T(S) No.obs
1 0.000 0.000 2526 0.000 0.000 2426
2 0.001 0.003 2616 0.000 0.000 2498
3 0.001 0.002 2447 0.002 0.000 2398
4 0.002 0.000 2294 0.01 0.006 2498
5 0.67 0.078 2294 0.007 0.000 2202
The null: E(ei;t jci;t = c ) = c 8c2 C
The numbers are the p-values of Gozalo (T(G)) and Stute (T(S))
statistics. For T(G) the choice of bandwidth is based on cross-validation
The signi￿cance of T(S) is tested by using "wild bootstrap" with 500
replications. Each test is conducted for both pre- and-post SOX period
for each portfolio
The results are presented in Table 4. For each variance ratio-based portfolio we present
the resulting p-value for each of the abovementioned tests for each sub-period. As it can be
seen from the table, for all portfolios the null is strongly rejected, both before and after the
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, suggesting that in the post-legislation period the consensus forecasts
still do not yield the "best" estimates of actual earnings. These ￿ndings also suggest that the
analysts￿forecasts can be signi￿cantly improved by adding to the latter the correction factor
E(ei;t jci;t) ￿ ci;t: Moreover, the analysis of the behavior of this correction factor will provide
us the clues on whether the performance of the analysts has changed in the post-SOX period.
In particular, if the analysts￿performance has improved following the legislation of the SOX
we would expect to observe a decline in the magnitude of the correction factor. Thus, we turn
now to the analysis of whether the analysts￿performance has changed following the enactment
of the SOX.
Q.5. Has there been a structural shift in the conditional dynamics of the analysts￿forecasts
errors following the introduction of SOX, and if so, in which direction?
Analysts￿performance- a visual inspection
To gain some preliminary insight into the dynamics of the analysts￿forecast errors before and
173after the enactment of the SOX reform we plot the estimated correction factor,
^
E(ei;t jci;t = c)￿
c;versus the consensus forecast c for each value of c lying in the range of (qc;0:05,qc;0:95) in
Figures 4 to 6, with qc;0:05 (qc;0:95) denoting the 5% (95%) sample quantile of the consensus
forecasts distribution. The estimated correction factor is presented for the groups of variance
ratio-ranked portfolios, where for each group we present the estimated correction factor before
and after the SOX has been signed into law separately along with the corresponding uniform
con￿dence bands. Starting with the analysis of the correction factor for the low variance-ratio
￿rms, which is presented in Figure 5.4, it appears that there has been a structural shift in
the forecast error-consensus forecast relationship. Surprisingly, however, it appears that the
magnitude of the correction factor has increased, suggesting that in the post-SOX act period
the analysts￿forecasts on average became less accurate. In addition, two interesting ￿ndings
should be mentioned. First, the correction factor became more positive, suggesting that the
analysts became more overpessimistic, or cautious. Secondly, it appears that in the post-SOX
period the correction factor is substantially more pronounced for the positive forecasts, i.e., we
would expect the analysts￿forecasts errors to be more positive when the ￿rm￿ s management is
reporting "good" news. An inspection of the behavior of the expected forecast error for the high
variance ratio ￿rms, presented in Figure 5.6, leads to similar conclusions. The third quintile
portfolio appears to be the only exception, where it seems to be hard to reach any speci￿c
conclusions regarding the change in direction of the bias (see Figure 5.5). However, the shift in
the correction factor is substantially more pronounced for the low variance-ratio stocks, that is,
for the ￿rms with more pronounced bias-variance trade-o⁄ by the analysts, suggesting that the
analysts following these ￿rms became substantially more cautious when the ￿rms￿management
discloses "optimistic" information.
To study further the nature of the bias we are also interested in studying the relationship
between the expected forecast error and the forecast uncertainty, and, in particular, whether
this relationship has undergone any kind of structural shift, following the series of corporate
scandals and the SOX legislation. Based on the underlying logic of bias-precision trade-o⁄
models we would expect the magnitude of the forecast errors to increase during the periods of
higher uncertainty regarding the future earnings since the analysts are more likely to request
additional information from the ￿rm￿ s management when the earnings exhibit a high degree
174of variation. Moreover, if the source of the structural shift is the SOX act, which made the
information regarding the ￿nancial and economic conditions of the ￿rm more accessible, we
would expect to see a link between the forecast errors and the forecast uncertainty becoming
weaker, since due to an increase in the information transparency we would expect the analysts
forecasts￿to become less dependent on the information provided by the management. On the
other hand, it is also possible that a structural shift (if detected) is due to the corporate scandals
which were related to the misreportings and the earning manipulations of the management, such
as the Enron and Worldcome inquiries. In this case we would expect the analysts to become
more cautious in their forecasts, which could lead to an increase in the forecast errors. Also, the
link between the forecast errors and the forecast uncertainty is expected to become stronger,
since, following the scandals, we would expect the analysts to become more cautious during the
turbulent periods compared to the pre-SOX period.
Figures 5.7 to 5.9 provide some visual impression on the relationship between the analysts￿
forecast errors and the earnings forecast uncertainty, where, as a proxy of uncertainty, we take
the analysts￿forecast spread si;t, which we de￿ne as the highest forecast minus the lowest fore-
cast for the last month before the actual earning is announced for each ￿rm-quarter observation.
As before, we plot a non-parametric estimate of the expected forecast error,
^
E(￿i;t jsi;t = s);
for each value of s lying in the range of (qs;0:05,qs;0:95) for the variance-ratio ranked portfolios.
A number of interesting ￿ndings should be mentioned. First, by observing the overall level of
the analysts￿forecasts errors it seems that the latter was positive, that is, in both periods, on
average, analysts tended to submit overpessimistic forecasts. This ￿nding is consistent with the
results obtained from the inspection of Figures 4-6. Interestingly, the magnitude of the forecast
errors appears to be related to the level of the uncertainty regarding the future earnings, mea-
sured by the forecasts spread, a ￿nding which is consistent with the results reported by Imho⁄
and Lobo (1990). Moreover, we ￿nd that the forecast error is likely to increase during the
turbulent periods, a ￿nding, which cannot be attributed to the bias-variance trade-o⁄ model
of Lim (2001), who assumes that ￿rms￿managers prefer overoptimistic forecasts which would
lead to the forecast errors being negative during the periods of high earnings uncertainty. On
the other hand this ￿nding is consistent with the bias-precision trade-o⁄ model if the ￿rm￿ s
management desire is to meet or beat analysts forecasts, as reported by Degeorge et al. (1999).
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consistent with the predictions of the bias-variance trade-o⁄models with ￿ meat or beat analysts
forecasts￿management strategy.
However, the most intriguing results come from the comparison of the forecast error-forecast
spread link in both periods. First, there is a clear visual evidence of a structural shift in the
overall level of the forecast error. More speci￿cally, we ￿nd that the overall level of the analysts￿
forecast errors has experienced an upward shift, a ￿nding, which holds both for the low and
high variance-ratio ￿rms. The magnitude of the observed shift is indeed striking, ranging from
50 percent for the lower quintile to more than 100 percent for the upper quintile portfolios.
Moreover, it seems that there has also been a structural change in the bias-spread relationship.
Comparing the forecast error-forecast spread plots for the pre-and post-SOX periods we ￿nd
that the analysts￿forecast errors became substantially more positively related to the earnings
uncertainty. This shift is also substantially more pronounced for the low-quintile portfolios, for
which the estimated forecast error-forecast spread curve turns from being moderately increasing
or almost ￿ at to substantially increasing. The shift in forecast error-forecast uncertainty link,
however, is also detected for the high variance ratio portfolios, where the estimated forecast
error-forecast spread curve, which in the pre-SOX period exhibited an inverted "U" shape,
turned to be substantially increasing in spread.
Analysts￿performance- formal tests
We start with a Gozalo-type nonparametric test described in Section 4. We test for the
presence of structural shifts by using two di⁄erent conditioning variables: the consensus forecast
c and the forecast spread s: As for the standard Gozalo test, we calculate the value of the statistic
for ten randomly chosen values of c over the range of (qc;0:05,qc;0:95) and for ten randomly chosen
values of s over the range of (qs;0:05,qs;0:95).
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H0 : ES1(￿i;t jci;t) = ES2(￿i;t jci;t)
Quintile T(G) p-value min=max rhob rhoa t.stat p-value
1 34.44 0.0002 [0.02,13.47] 0.07￿￿ 0.194￿￿ 3.98 0.0000
2 19.76 0.031 [0.08,5.63] 0.134￿￿ 0.184￿￿ 1.59 0.11
3 17.39 0.06 [0.009,5.82] 0.087￿￿ 0.191￿￿ 3.26 0.001
4 19.35 0.036 [0.002,10.62] 0.056￿￿ 0.179￿￿ 4.14 0.0000
5 42.51 0.0000 [0.095,13.95] 0.074￿￿ 0.189￿￿ 3.72 0.0000
H0 : ES1(￿i;t jsi;t) = ES2(￿i;t jsi;t)
1 515.98 0.0000 [30.54,61.87] 0.107￿￿ 0.248￿￿ 4.68 0.0000
2 102.5 0.0000 [0.77,23.64] 0.046￿￿ 0.108￿￿ 1.94 0.05
3 95.57 0.0000 [4.92,13.11] 0.007 0.062￿￿ 1.74 0.08
4 67.54 0.0000 [0.54,23.31] 0.03 0.06￿￿ 0.98 0.32
5 103.86 0.0000 [0.02,22.21] 0.005 0.07￿￿ 1.95 0.05
min/max denote minimum/maximum value of ten randomly selected Gozalo-type
statistics; rhoS1 and rhoS2 denote Spearman￿ s rho estimates for pre-and post-SOX periods
Spearman￿ s rho variance estimates are based on 1000 Monte-Carlo replications
￿￿ denotes signi￿cance at 5% level
The results are presented in Table 5. For each variance ratio ranked portfolio we test two sep-
arate null hypotheses: H0 : ES1(￿i;t jci;t = c) = ES2(￿i;t jci;t = c) and H0 : ES1(￿i;t jsi;t = s) =
ES2(￿i;t jsi;t = s): By testing the ￿rst hypothesis, we test for the presence of a structural break
in the forecast error-consensus forecast relationship, while by testing the second one we test
for the stability of the forecast error-forecast uncertainty link. We start with the analysis
of the forecast error-consensus forecast relationship, with the results presented in the upper
panel of Table 5. Our results strongly suggest the presence of a structural shift in the forecast
error-consensus forecast linking function after the SOX has been signed into law. The null of
intertemporal stability is strongly rejected for the ￿rst two quintile portfolios, with somewhat
weaker, though still signi￿cant, evidence of a structural break for the upper quintile. Over-
all, our ￿ndings suggest that a structural shift has occurred and that the latter appears to
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bias-variance trade-o⁄ by the analysts. To provide an additional insight into the nature of this
shift, for each quintile we calculate the estimates of Spearman￿ s rho between the forecast error
and the corresponding consensus forecast, for both the pre- and-post SOX act sub samples. The
estimates are presented in the sixth and seventh columns of the upper panel of Table 5. Start-
ing with the pre-SOX period the results suggest that there exists a statistically signi￿cant and
positive dependence between the forecast error and the consensus forecasts, suggesting that, on
average, it is more likely to observe a positive earning surprise when the analysts submit high
earnings estimates. In other words, the forecasts are relatively more "overpessimistic" when the
￿rm management issues positive reports regarding the economic and ￿nancial fundamentals of
the ￿rm. This can be attributed either to the earnings management or to the analysts being
more cautious when they receive too optimistic reports. However, the low magnitude of the
estimates suggests that the economic signi￿cance of this dependence is somewhat limited, with
the second quintile being the only exception. The results dramatically change in the post-SOX
period, where for all portfolios Spearman￿ s rho experienced a sharp increase in its value. The
magnitude of increase is indeed dramatic, ranging between 40 percent for the second quintile
and more than 200 percent for the 4-th quintile.
Next, we study the results of the structural shift test for the forecast error-forecast un-
certainty link. The results of the test using the critical values of the ￿2
10 distribution suggest
that the null of the intertemporal stability is strongly rejected for any reasonable signi￿cance
level. The results are similar when we use the critical values implied by the Bonferonni upper
bound. This con￿rms the visually based ￿ndings, which indicated an upward shift both in the
overall level of the forecast errors and in the forecast errors-forecast spread link. These ￿ndings
gain an additional support from the analysis of Spearman rho estimates between the earnings
surprise and the forecast spread. For the pre-SOX period only for the ￿rst two quintiles we ￿nd
a signi￿cant and positive dependence between the bias and the uncertainty, while for the rest
of the ￿rms the estimates are neither statistically nor economically signi￿cant. However, our
￿ndings dramatically change as we move to the post-SOX period, where for all the quintiles we
￿nd a statistically signi￿cant and positive relationship between the earnings surprise and the
spread. As with the bias-consensus link, the changes in Spearman￿ s rho are indeed striking and
178are especially pronounced for the lower quintile portfolios.
We formally test the null rhoS1 =rhoS2 via standard pairwise t-test. This test requires
an estimate of the asymptotic variance of the estimators of both rhoS1 and rhoS2: Though a
closed and compact formula for the asymptotic variance exists, it is hardly suitable for practical
applications, since it requires estimation of high-dimensional integrals (see, for instance, Schmid
and Schmidt (2006)). Instead, these authors propose to use bootstrap based estimates, an
approach we shall adopt in this study as well. In the last two columns of Table 5 we report the
test statistics and the corresponding p-values for each quintile. Overall, our ￿ndings indicate
that the forecast error-consensus forecast and forecast error-forecast uncertainty links became
both statistically and economically signi￿cant in the post-SOX period. These ￿ndings suggest
that, following a series of corporate scandals, analysts became substantially more cautious in
forming their forecasts.
SOX or Regulation FD - a Robustness Check
While we ￿nd a substantial evidence of structural shifts in the analysts￿forecasts bias in the
post-SOX period, the remaining question is whether this shift is due to the corporate scandals
or, perhaps, it can be attributed to some other event which occured during our sample period. A
natural candidacy for such event is the Regulation Fair Disclosure act (FD) enacted on October
23, 2000. Regulation FD prohibits corporations from privately disclosing material information
to a subset of investors or securities markets professionals, e.g. analysts, without simultaneously
disclosing the same information to the public. Since the implementation of FD is likely to be
associated with changes in the earnings-related information environment, this legislation could
also lead to structural shifts in forecasting performance of the analysts. Thus, to examine the
robustness of our results we conduct the same tests with the alternative partitioning of our sam-
ple period. More speci￿cally, we partition the whole sample into three sub-samples: January
1998-October 2000 (encoded Pre-FD), November 2000-July 2002 (encoded Post-FD/Pre-SOX),
August 2002-June 2006(encoded Post-SOX). By partitioning the pre-SOX period into pre-FD
and Post-FD/Pre-SOX periods we seek to disentangle the impact of Regulation Fair Disclosure
act from the potential e⁄ect of the SOX act and the preceeding corporate scandals. For each
sample period we conduct the same structural shift tests we conducted for the two sub-sample
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ence of the structural shift between the pre-FD and post-FD/pre-SOX periods, and between
post-FD/pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. A structural break in the analysts￿forecast bias be-
tween pre-FD and Post-FD/Pre-SOX periods can be attributed to the impact of FD regulation,
while a shift in the forecast bias between the post-FD/pre-SOX and post-SOX periods is likely
to be attributed to the impact of the SOX.
We start with a visual inspection of the forecast error-consensus forecast and the forecast
error-forecast spread plots depicted in Figures 5.10-5.15. Each ￿gure depicts a nonparametric
estimate of the forecast error-consensus forecast or the forecast error-forecast spread link for
the pre-FD, post-FD/pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. A number of interesting ￿ndings should
be mentioned. First, there is an upward shift in the overall level of the analysts￿forecast bias, a
￿nding which suggests that over time analysts became more "overpessimistic" regarding future
￿rms￿earnings. The shift in the overall level of bias, that is, the shift of the "intercepts" of the
estimated curves, is pronounced both for the forecast error-consensus forecast and the forecast
error-forecast spread links. This is consistent with ￿ndings of Brown (2001), who reports a
similar trend in the earnings surprise, though for the earlier period. Second, no visual shift in
the forecast error-consensus forecast link can be detected between pre-FD and post-FD/pre-
SOX periods. The ￿ndings are similar for the forecast error-forecast spread link. On the other
hand, we do ￿nd some evidence of a structural shift in both forecast error-consensus forecast and
forecast error-forecast spread relations between the post-FD/pre-SOX and post-SOX periods.
For the forecast error-forecast spread link a shift is more pronounced for the ￿rms with low
variance ratio, which emphasizes, though informally, the need to control for the bias-variance
trade-o⁄. Overall, visual inspection informally suggests that the structural shifts detected in
the analysts￿bias seem to occur in the post-SOX period and are unlikely to be attributed to
the Regulation FD.
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Table 6.1: Forecast error-consensus forecast tests
pre-FD vs post FD/pre-SOX post FD/pre-SOX vs post-SOX
Quintile T(G) p-value min=max T(G) p-value min=max
1 16.31 0.09 [0.44,8.59] 40.39 0.0001 [0.073,15.84]
2 4.65 0.91 [0.02,1.48] 15.65 0.11 [0.14,4.66]
3 20.46 0.025 [0.006,8.45] 32.67 0.0003 [0.89,6.83]
4 21.34 0.02 [0.009,3.82] 43.51 0.0000 [0.002,16,39]
5 6.31 0.79 [0.02,2.57] 53.15 0.0000 [0.18,11.79]
Table 6.2: Forecast error-forecast spread tests
1 104.83 0.0000 [1.38,18.31] 116.49 0.0000 [10.39,13.56]
2 2.62 0.98 [0.09,1.23] 139.48 0.0000 [3.84,15.62]
3 17.52 0.063 [0.68,3.11] 113.67 0.0000 [3.48,19.59]
4 37.66 0.0001 [1.78,5.74] 119.41 0.0000 [8.16,14.94]
5 16.87 0.08 [0.06,3.56] 178.01 0.0000 [11.62,21.8]
In this table we present the results of the Gozalo-type structural shift tests for the
3-period sample partition. We test for structural shifts in the post-FD/pre-SOX and
the post-SOX periods. min/max denote minimum/maximum value of ten randomly selected
Gozalo-type statistics. T(G) denotes the value of statistic.
Next, we turn to the formal structural shift tests. The results of the nonparametric Gozalo-
type test are presented in Table 6. The upper panel of Table 6, Table 6.1, presents the results
of the structural shift test applied to the forecast error-consensus forecast relation. The results
of the structural shift tests for the pre-FD versus post FD/pre-SOX periods suggest that there
was a structural shift in the forecast error-consensus forecast relation for the third and forth
quintiles. There is also strong evidence of a structural shift following the enactment of the
SOX for all but second quintile, where the results are marginally signi￿cant. The results of the
structural shift tests applied to the forecast error-forecast spread relation, reported in Table
6.2, depict a similar picture. There is a signi￿cant evidence of a structural shift in both post-
FD/pre-SOX and post-SOX periods. However, these shifts can also be attributed to the overall
181shift in the analysts￿forecast bias. Thus, to study further the nature of these structural shifts
we study the estimates of Spearman￿ s rhos.
Table 7: Structural shift test - 3-period partition
Table 7.1: Forecast error-consensus forecast tests
Quintile rho1 rho2 rho3 trho1=rho2 p-value trho2=rho3 p-value
1 0.048￿ 0.108￿￿ 0.18￿￿ 1.46 0.14 1.9 0.057
2 0.165￿￿ 0.089￿￿ 0.175￿￿ -1.89 0.06 2.21 0.027
3 0.069￿￿ 0.083￿￿ 0.186￿￿ 0.334 0.738 2.64 0.008
4 0.051￿￿ 0.046 0.179￿￿ -0.09 0.096 3.46 0.0005
5 0.124￿￿ 0.005 0.188￿￿ -2.74 0.007 4.54 0.0000
Table 7.2: Forecast error-forecast spread tests
1 0.072￿￿ 0.168￿￿ 0.248￿￿ 2.34 0.019 1.98 0.047
2 0.065￿￿ 0.049￿ 0.108￿￿ -0.36 0.76 1.59 0.09
3 0.005 0.02 0.062￿￿ 0.47 0.64 0.72 0.47
4 0.03 0.019 0.06￿￿ -0.31 0.82 1.06 0.28
5 0.0002 0.013 0.07￿￿ 0.28 0.78 1.35 0.17
In this table we present the results of the structural shift test for the forecast error-consensus
forecast relation and forecast-error forecast spread relation for the 3-period sample partition.
rho1; rho2, and rho3 are the Spearman rho estimates for the pre-FD, post-FD/pre-SOX, and
post-SOX periods. The following null hypotheses are tested: H0 :rho1 =rho2, H0 :rho2 =rho3
where trho1=rho2 and trho2=rho3 are the corresponding t-statistics, respectively.
The estimates of Spearman￿ s rhos as well as the t-statistics of the structural shift tests
and the corresponding p-values are reported in Table 7. Here rho1; rho2; and rho3 denote
Spearman￿ s rho estimates for the pre-FD, post-FD/pre-SOX and post-SOX periods respectively.
First, consistent with the results of the nonparametric tests reported in Table 6 we ￿nd some
evidence of structural shifts in the forecast error-consensus forecast link in the post FD/pre-
SOX period. Secondly, and more important, we ￿nd a strong evidence of a structural shift
in the forecast error-consensus forecast relation in the post-SOX period. More speci￿cally, we
￿nd the upward shift in the estimates of Spearman￿ s rho, a shift which is both statistically and
182economically signi￿cant for all the quintiles. Turning to the forecast error-forecast spread link,
we ￿nd almost no evidence of a structural shift with a ￿rst quintile being the only exception.
On the contrary, we ￿nd an increase in Spearman￿ s rho estimates in the post-SOX period for
all the quintiles. For the ￿rst two quintiles the shift is also statistically signi￿cant. Overall,
these results support the robustness of our ￿ndings, that there has been a structural shift in
the analysts￿forecast bias following the enactment of the SOX.
5.6 Conclusions and Topics for Further Research
In this paper we examine the implications of the Sarbanes-Oxley reform of 2002 for the infor-
mational e¢ ciency of the US stock market and the performance of the stock market analysts.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ￿rst paper that addresses these issues and the ques-
tions raised and studied in this paper are of major importance, both for the policy makers and
practitioners.
To study the impact of the SOX reform on the informational market e¢ ciency we estimate
the partial adjustment model with noise of Amihud and Mendelson (1987) for all the ￿rms
listed on the NYSE/AMEX during the last decade. By applying an endogenous structural
break tests of Andrews (1993) and Andrews and Ploberger (1994), we ￿nd 2002 to be the year
when a lions share of the structural breaks in the speed of adjustment occurred. Further tests
indicate that, following the enactment of the SOX reform, the average speed of adjustment
to the new information has dramatically increased, suggesting that, following the legislation,
investors incorporate more rapidly the information released by the ￿rms in the stock prices,
thus, making the US stock market more informationally e¢ cient.
We also study the implications of the Act of 2002 for the accuracy of the analysts￿forecasts.
By applying non-parametric tests to the large span of I/B/E/S forecasts and actual earnings
data, we ￿nd that both before and after the reform the analysts￿forecasts were signi￿cantly
"overpessimistic". Moreover, we ￿nd that in the post-SOX period the degree of the "overpes-
simism" has not declined, but rather increased. An increase is especially pronounced during
the turbulent periods and/or when "good" news is released. These ￿ndings suggest that an
increase in the magnitude of the forecast errors can be attributed to the analysts becoming
183more cautious following the series of corporate scandals when severe earnings overestimations
were uncovered.
Our ￿ndings also propose a number of promising directions for further research. First, it
may be interesting to dichotomize the analysts￿forecasts into those submitted by the analysts
who work for the underwriting ￿rms and those who do not. Several studies ￿nd that the former
are, in general, "overoptimistic", and, therefore, it is quite possible that their overoptimism
on the one hand, will be balanced by the impact of the corporate scandals on the other hand,
leading to an increase in the analysts￿forecasts accuracy. Secondly, our ￿ndings suggest that
the stock market investors became more e¢ cient in incorporating new information while the
picture is reverse for the analysts, suggesting that the importance of the analysts￿forecasts for
the investors￿valuation of the ￿rm, in particular, using the consensus forecasts as a proxy for
the investors (market) expectations, seems to be overstated. An alternative explanation is that
the investors are sophisticated enough to correct for the analysts￿bias, which seems to be a
promising research direction. Finally, our results suggest that while in a short run investors are
underreacting, the degree of the underreaction. following the reform of 2002 seems to decline.
Therefore, it will be interesting to compare the pro￿tability of "momentum" based strategies
both before and after the reform has been signed into law.
184Figure 5-4: Forecast error vs consensus forecast before and after the enactment of teh SOX.
Dashed lines denote 95% uniform con￿dence bands.
185Figure 5-5: Forecast error vs consensus forecast before and after the enactment of the SOX
(continued)
186Figure 5-6: Forecast error vs consensus forecast before and after the enactment of the SOX
(continued)
187Figure 5-7: Forecast error vs forecast spread before and after the enactment of the SOX. Dashed
lines denote 95% uniform con￿dence bands.
188Figure 5-8: Forecast error vs forecast spread before and after the enactment of the SOX (con-
tinued)
189Figure 5-9: Forecast error vs forecast spread before and after the enactment of the SOX (con-
tinued)
190Figure 5-10: Forecast error vs consensus forecast - 3-period partition. Dashed lines denote 95%
uniform con￿dence bands.
191Figure 5-11: Forecast error vs consensus forecast - 3-period partition (continued)
192Figure 5-12: Forecast error vs consensus forecast - 3-period partition (continued)
193Figure 5-13: Forecast error vs forecast spread - 3-period partition. Dashed lines denote 95%
uniform con￿dence bands.
194Figure 5-14: Forecast error vs forecast spread - 3-period partition (continued)
195Figure 5-15: Forecast error vs forecast spread - 3-period partition (continued)
196Chapter 6
Friday Earnings Announcements and
the Earnings-Returns Relation: A
Temporal Analysis
6.1 Introduction
Strategic timing of earnings announcements is one of the most widely discussed issues in both
the ￿nance and accounting literature. Understanding the links between the timing and the
nature of the earnings announcements is of great importance, both for analysts as a means of
improving their forecasts and for investors in making their investment decisions. Another related
but not less important issue is the link between the timing of the earnings announcement and
the earnings-returns relation. Understanding this link is particularly important for the ￿rm￿ s
management who would prefer to moderate the impact of "bad" news on the value of the ￿rm.
In this paper we study the evolution of the "Friday e⁄ect" over time. By this term we
name two interrelated issues. The ￿rst is the alleged tendency of ￿rms to report "bad" news
on Fridays, while the second is that stock prices are believed to be less sensitive to the Friday
earnings announcements compared to those released during the rest of the week. We focus on
the following issues:
￿ Do ￿rms tend to report "bad" news on Fridays?
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￿ Are investors aware of this strategy and, if so, what are the implications for the earnings-
return relation and its evolution over time?
These questions are particularly important in light of a rapid increase in the information
coverage over the last three decades. An increased accessibility of information makes it more
di¢ cult for the companies to "burry" unfavorable news by releasing the latter close to the
weekends and/or after the market is closed. On the other hand, the enhanced informational
coverage will also make the investors learn about this strategy. Therefore, if investors did
become aware of this strategy we may expect the bene￿ts from shifting "bad" news releases
close to the weekends to disappear over time.
Our ￿ndings suggest that over the period 1989-2006 ￿rms have systematically reported more
"bad" news on Fridays compared to other trading days. Also, we ￿nd that the earnings-returns
relation has undergone a structural shift over time. More speci￿cally, while for the late 80-s and
the beginning of the 90-s the impact of Friday earnings announcements on stock returns was
weaker than during the rest of the week, the picture reversed during the last ten years, with
stock returns becoming more sensitive to Friday announcements. Curiously, the shift is more
pronounced for negative earnings surprises. Finally, we ￿nd that the magnitude of the "Friday
e⁄ect" in the earnings-returns relationship is inversely related to the quality of the informational
disclosure. Overall, these results suggest that the ￿rms￿management tendency to report "bad"
news on Fridays is related to the investors￿distraction as the weekend approaches. Moreover,
based on our ￿ndings we conclude that investors learned about this tendency and, therefore,
the bene￿ts from shifting announcements of "bad" news to Fridays seem to disappear over the
last two decades.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 6.2 we brie￿ y review some of
the existing literature on the subject, Section 6.3 describes the data. In Section 6.4 we study the
distributional properties of the earnings surprises and their evolution over time. In Section 6.5
we test for the presence and examine the dynamics of a "Friday e⁄ect" in the earnings-return
relation. Finally, in Section 6.6 we present our concluding remarks and discuss some directions
for further research.
1986.2 Literature Review
A substantial body of the literature on the earnings announcements documents that there exists
a relationship between the timing of an earnings report and the nature of the news released
in that report. Givoly and Palmon (1982), Chambers and Penman (1984), and Kross and
Schroeder (1984), using a sample of earnings announcements drawn from the 1970￿ s, ￿nd that
if a ￿rm releases its earnings report earlier than expected its stock price rises, on average, while
if the report is released with delay, the stock price declines. A more recent study by Begley and
Fischer (1998) supports their ￿ndings for the period of the 1980-s and early 1990-s.
There is also an increasing amount of evidence concerning the relation between the day of
the week and the nature of the earnings announcements. In particular, a number of studies
￿nd that the ￿rms tend to release more bad news close to and during the weekend. Penman
(1987), who uses a sample of earnings reports for the period of 1971-1982, ￿nds some evidence
that reports released during the middle of the week are more likely to yield signi￿cantly more
positive returns compared to those released on Friday or Monday. Using a sample of earnings
and dividend announcements over the period 1981-1985, Damodaran (1989) ￿nds that the
reports released on Fridays are more likely to contain "bad" news and to be associated with
negative abnormal returns, than those on other weekdays. Della, Vigna, and Pollet (2005)
use a sample of earnings announcements for the period 1995-2004 to study the behavior of
earnings announcements and the response of returns to the earnings surprises on Friday and
other weekdays. They report Friday announcements being associated with a 45 percent higher
probability of a negative earnings surprise and a 50 basis points lower abnormal returns. Also,
they ￿nd that Friday announcements have less immediate and a more delayed stock return
response. A continued dominance of "bad" news on Fridays is reported by Bagnoli, Clement,
and Watts (2006) for the period 2000-2003.
A number of theories have been proposed to rationalize the observed pattern of the earnings
announcements￿timing. Trueman (1990) studies the optimal timing of the information release
in a two-period model with many ￿rms and risk-neutral investors. The ￿rms are assumed to be
owned by the managers during the ￿rst period, who then sell shares in their ￿rms to the investors
before the end of the second period. The managers are assumed to have ￿ exibility to shift the
recognition of economic earnings as accounting income form the second period to the ￿rst.
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management or due to the managements￿desire to ￿rst observe other ￿rms￿earnings. Gennotte
and Trueman (1996) study the optimal intraday timing of earnings announcements. They
propose a two-period model where a distinction is made between noise traders and informed
traders. The latter are better able to make predictions regarding the future pro￿tability of the
￿rm than the former and submit their orders immediately after an announcement is released.
A basic result of this model is that the impact of a disclosure is expected to be stronger if it
occurs during trading hours than after the market is closed.
In this paper we conduct a temporal analysis of the distribution of earnings news and
the properties of the earnings-returns relation over the last two decades. Importantly, we
make a distinction between announcements released on Fridays and those released on other
weekdays, to control for the "Friday" e⁄ect, reported by previous studies. By means of both a
nonparametric and a parametric analysis we study and compare the distributions of Friday and
non-Friday earnings surprises, the response of stock returns to Friday versus non-Friday earnings
announcements, and how they evolved over the last two decades. The contribution of this paper
is twofold. First, we extend the existing earnings-returns relation literature. In particular, this
paper makes an important contribution to a rapidly growing strand of literature studying the
time evolution of the earnings surprise and the earnings response function. These studies include
Brown (2001), who conducts a temporal analysis of median earnings surprise, Landsman and
Maydew (2002), who study the informational content of the earnings announcements for the last
three decades, and Collins, Li, and Xie (2005), who report that over time stock returns became
more sensitive to the Street earnings reported by I/B/E/S, among others. However, none of
these studies conducts a temporal analysis of the "Friday e⁄ect". Thus, the ￿rst purpose of
this paper is to ￿ll this gap in the earnings-returns relation literature.
Second, our paper contributes to the discussion regarding the reasons for strategic tim-
ing of earnings announcements. The conventional wisdom suggests that the investors become
more distracted as the weekend approaches. This, in turn, leads to a lower quality of decision
making and an immediate impact of earnings surprises on stock returns on Fridays becoming
less pronounced. This idea has been formalized by Hong and Stein (1999), who suggest that
individuals are able to "process" only some subset of the available public information. On the
200other hand, an increased intensity of the media coverage as well as the academic literature is
likely to draw the investors￿attention to the "Friday e⁄ect" phenomenon. As a result, investors
may gradually learn about the ￿rms￿announcement strategies which, in turn, may cause the
"Friday e⁄ect" in the earnings-returns relation to disappear, as it happened to other market
"anomalies" (Schwert, 2003). But then the bene￿ts from shifting the announcement of "bad"
news to Fridays are likely to dissipate over time. Therefore, studying the dynamics of the "Fri-
day e⁄ect" over time yields important practical implications for the announcement policies of
￿rms.
6.3 Data Description
We collect quarterly earnings announcements for all ￿rms listed on the US stock markets over
the period 1989-2006. Each ￿rm-quarter observation includes actual earning, median analysts￿
forecast (both in terms of US dollars per share), earnings announcement dates, and the number
of analysts￿forecasts submitted.1 This data has been obtained from the Institutional Broker-
age Estimate System (I/B/E/S). Next, for each ￿rm-quarter observation we match the stock
return at the announcement day, the return on the equally-weighted market portfolio the day
the announcement was made, and the closing stock price from the day before the earnings
announcement. This data has been obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP) tapes. Our initial sample consists of 262,823 ￿rm-quarter observations, with a mini-
mum of 5,856 observations for 1986 and a maximum of 18,390 observations for 1998.
We calculate the forecast error as the actual earnings minus the median analysts￿forecast
(Lim, 2001). Next, we de￿ne the earnings innovation as the forecast error scaled by the stock
price from the pre-announcement day. Thus, both stock returns and the earnings innovations
are measured in a common scale- US dollars per dollar of investment. Following Lim (2001) we
exclude all observations for which the stock price from the pre-announcement day was less than
5 US dollars to avoid "blown up" estimates of the earnings innovations. Also, we exclude all
observations for which the forecast error is larger (in absolute value) than 10 US dollars, which
1As stated in the I/B/E/S glossary "For the US and Canada, earnings reports are culled directly from the
newswires, adjusted for comparability with estimates and reported to subscribers via the Intra Day Surprise
Report, which is delivered ￿ve times each trading day."
201are likely to be due to data input errors. Finally, to reduce the potential impact of outliers, we
exclude all observations in the 2.5 percent tail of the earnings innovation variable. These sample
selection procedures lead us to a ￿nal sample of 212,000 observations. Descriptive statistics of
the earnings innovation series will be discussed in details in the following section.
A note should be made on the de￿nition of actual earnings. Following Bradshaw and
Sloan (2002) and other recent studies we use I/B/E/S reported actual earnings. Bradshaw and
Sloan (2002) report stock returns being more closely related to the Street earnings reported by
I/B/E/S than to the GAAP earnings reported by Compustat. Similar ￿ndings are reported by
a more recent study by Collins, Li, and Xie (2005).
6.4 Friday vs Non-Friday Announcements: A Temporal Analy-
sis
In this section we conduct a temporal analysis of the earnings announcements. More speci￿cally,
by means of both an informal exploratory analysis and statistical tests we examine whether
there exists a substantial di⁄erence between the earnings announcements during the di⁄erent
trading days of the week, and if so, whether this di⁄erence persists over time. In particular,
as this is one of the issues of this study, we focus on the Friday earnings announcements. For
the purpose of further analysis we divide our total sample into eight subsamples: 1986-1988,
1989-1991, 1992-1993, 1994-1995, 1996-1997, 1998-1999, 2000-2001, 2002-2003 and 2004-2006.
We start with a simple exploratory analysis of the Friday versus non-Friday earnings an-
nouncements. For each subsample we plot a quantile-quantile plot of the Friday versus the
non-Friday earnings innovations. Superimposed is the straight line which passes through the
￿rst and the third empirical quantiles of both samples. Under the null that both the Friday
and the non-Friday innovations come from the same distribution the quantile-quantile plots
should be located close to this straight line. However, a visual inspection suggests that there
exist severe deviations from the hypothetical linear relationship between the quantiles of both
variables. In particular, two important ￿ndings should be mentioned. First, the di⁄erence
between the distribution of the Friday and the non-Friday innovations appears to persist over
time, and appears to be substantial over the whole time period examined in our study. Sec-
202ond, the deviations appear to be substantially more severe in the negative part of the earnings
innovations domain. This preliminary ￿nding comes in line and also extends previous ￿ndings
who report that ￿rms tend to report "bad news" on Fridays.
As a formal statistical test for each sub-sample we test the null hypothesis that both Friday
and the non-Friday earnings innovations come from the same distribution using the Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test. The resulting statistics and the corresponding p-values are reported below the
quantile-quantile plots for each sub-period. The results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test support
our ￿ndings based on a visual inspection of the quantile-quantile plots. The null hypothesis of
both the Friday and the non-Friday earnings innovations coming from the same distribution is
strongly rejected for all sub-periods. Interestingly, the di⁄erence between the distributions of
the Friday and the non-Friday earnings innovations appears to be more pronounced in the 90-s
and somewhat more moderate, though still substantial, after the year 2000, at least based on a
visual inspection of the quantile-quantile plots.
The di⁄erence between the distributions of the Friday and the non-Friday detected by the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test can be due to di⁄erences in the mean, the variance, as well as higher
moments. In particular, the deviations of the quantile-quantile plot from a straight line suggest
that higher moments may also play a substantial role in the dispersion of the distributions.
However, since the majority of the existing studies suggests that ￿rms tend to report "bad
news" on Fridays, we proceed with the analysis of the location of the Friday and the non-Friday
distributions. More speci￿cally, we compare two location measures: mean earnings innovation
and the proportion of the "bad news" for each trading day. Following previous studies, we
de￿ne the earnings announcement as "bad news" if the earnings innovations of that particular
announcement was negative.
The results are presented in Table 1. For each sub-period and for each trading day we
estimate the mean earnings innovation, ￿, and the proportion of "bad news", ￿. For each
sub-period the following hypotheses are tested
H0 : ￿Monday = ::: = ￿Friday;
H0 : ￿Monday = ::: = ￿Friday:
203Figure 6-1: QQ plots of the Friday vs non-Friday earnings innovations. KS and p-value are the
statistic and the p-value of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
204Figure 6-2: QQ plots of the Friday vs non-Friday earnings innovations (continued). KS and
p-value are the statistic and the p-value of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
205In Table 1 we report the resulting p-values of the Wald test for each of these hypotheses,
respectively.
Table 1: Tests of the measures of location by day of the week
1989-1991 1992-1993 1994-1995 1996-1997
Day ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Monday -0.27￿￿ 0.437 -0.118￿￿ 0.364 -0.096￿￿ 0.348 -0.067￿￿ 0.299
Tuesday -0.289￿￿ 0.455 -0.09￿￿ 0.363 -0.083￿￿ 0.338 -0.061￿￿ 0.293
Wednesday -0.292￿￿ 0.442 -0.124￿￿ 0.383 -0.095￿￿ 0.351 -0.066￿￿ 0.308
Thursday -0.298￿￿ 0.465 -0.14￿￿ 0.388 -0.091￿￿ 0.355 -0.076￿￿ 0.314
Friday -0.377￿￿ 0.486 -0.146￿￿ 0.405 -0.182￿￿ 0.452 -0.145￿￿ 0.407
p-value 0.004 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
1998-1999 2000-2001 2002-2003 2004-2006
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
Monday -0.109￿￿ 0.295 -0.072￿￿ 0.292 0.022￿￿ 0.245 -0.0005 0.329
Tuesday -0.074￿￿ 0.274 -0.035￿￿ 0.262 0.023￿￿ 0.234 0.028￿￿ 0.295
Wednesday -0.094￿￿ 0.289 -0.043￿￿ 0.284 0.027￿￿ 0.241 0.035￿￿ 0.275
Thursday -0.085￿￿ 0.284 -0.065￿￿ 0.295 0.039￿￿ 0.244 0.025￿￿ 0.292
Friday -0.22￿￿ 0.396 -0.106￿￿ 0.351 -0.017 0.328 -0.019￿￿ 0.386
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000
In this table we present the estimates of the mean earnings surprise ￿ and the
proportion of the negative earnings surprises ￿ by the day of the week
The following null hypotheses are tested : H0: ￿Monday= ::: = ￿Friday and
H0: ￿Monday= ::: = ￿Friday: The p-values of the corresponding Wald statistics
are reported below. ￿(￿￿) denotes 10(5)% signi￿cance
Starting with the analysis of the mean earnings innovation estimates, ￿0s, our ￿ndings
suggest that during the whole period of the 90-s the mean earnings surprise was signi￿cantly
negative, a ￿nding which holds for all trading days of the week. This ￿nding is consistent with
the results of previous studies, in particular, with the results of Fried and Givoly (1982) and
O￿ Brien (1988), and more recent evidence reported by Lim (2001), and suggests that during
206the 1990-s on average analysts tended to submit overoptimistic forecasts. Lim (2001) attributes
this to a "bias-variance trade-o⁄," where the analysts submit overoptimistic forecasts, which
are preferable by the ￿rms￿management in order to improve management access and to gain
more information in order to reduce the variance of the forecast errors. However, the magnitude
of this "overoptimistic" tendency seems to decline gradually, with the estimates of ￿ becoming
smaller in absolute values. Moreover, after the year 2001 there is a shift in the sign of ￿
becoming signi￿cantly positive. This ￿nding is consistent with results by Brown (2001) who
also reports a sign reversion in the mean earnings surprise around the end of the 90-s.2. Visual
inspection of the estimated proportion of the "bad news" ￿ supports the results reported by
Brown (2001) that over time there has been a shift in the location of the distribution of the
earnings innovations. The estimates of ￿ are almost monotonously declining over the whole
time period examined in our study, a decline which is pronounced for all trading days of the
week.
Next, we turn to the main issue of this section, namely, the day-of-the-week comparison
between the measures of location. For each subperiod we test the two hypotheses, as discussed
above. The ￿rst hypothesis states that the mean earnings innovation is the same across all
trading days of the week, while the second one states the same for the proportion of the "bad
news". The resulting p-values of the Wald statistics are reported for each sub-period separately
in the columns with headings ￿ and ￿, respectively. Our results strongly suggest the presence of
a "day-of-the week" e⁄ect in both measures of location. Starting with the analysis of the esti-
mates of ￿, for all sub-periods the mean of the earnings innovations reported on Friday appears
to be substantially lower than during the rest of trading days. This result holds both during
the periods before and after the sign reversion in the mean earnings innovation has occurred.
Even during the last two periods when for the rest of the days the mean was signi￿cantly
positive, the estimate of the mean earnings innovation is still negative. A formal Wald test
for the equality of the means indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at any reasonable
signi￿cance level, suggesting that the "day-of-the week" e⁄ect in the earnings innovations is
also statistically signi￿cant.
2Brown (2001) uses a measure of the market earnings expectations which is di⁄erent from our, the fact which
suggests the robustness of his ￿ndings. This may also explain a small discrepancy between his and our results
regarding the year when the sign reversion has occurred.
207The analysis of the estimated proportion of the "bad news" yields similar results. For all
sub-periods the estimates of ￿ are signi￿cantly larger for the Friday trading session. Though
the di⁄erence between the Friday and the non-Friday estimates of ￿ seems to decline during
the last two periods, compared to the one during the 90-s, it still remains quite substantial.
This ￿nding is supported by the Wald test, which suggests that the null of equal "bad news"
proportion should be rejected.
It is possible that the "day-of the-week" e⁄ect is not only due to Friday announcements,
but also due to di⁄erence between the distributions of the earnings innovations on other trading
days. To check this conjecture, we repeat our analysis, but by excluding the Friday announce-
ments from our analysis. That is, we test the equality of ￿-s and ￿-s for the Monday to Thursday
announcements. In contrast to our previous ￿ndings, our results suggest that, generally, the
null of equal location measures for Monday-Thursday trading sessions cannot be rejected. The
null of equal mean is rejected only for the last sub-period, while the null of equal "bad news"
proportion is rejected for the fourth, sixth, and the last sub-periods 3. Moreover, no consistent
pattern in the di⁄erences between the estimates of either ￿ or ￿ for the Monday-Thursday
trading sessions can be detected. These results suggest that the lion￿ s share of the "day-of-the
week" e⁄ect in the earnings announcements is due to the di⁄erence between the distributions
of the Friday and the non-Friday earnings innovations.
Overall, our ￿ndings support the results of the previous studies, such as Damodaran (1989),
that suggest that ￿rms tend to report "bad news" on Fridays. More importantly for the context
of this paper, our ￿ndings suggest that this announcement strategy has been persistent for the
last two decades. Then the natural question that arises whether stock market investors learned
about this strategy. In particular, if investors have detected the tendency of ￿rms to report
"bad news" on Friday, then we would expect to see a gradual increase in the magnitude of a
reaction by investors to Friday news, which will be re￿ ected in a gradual change in the earnings
response function. This will be the issue of the following section.
3The results are available upon request from the author.
2086.5 Friday vs Non-Friday Earnings Response Function: A Tem-
poral Analysis
In this section we study the evolution over time of the earnings response function of the ￿rms
listed on the US markets over the period 1989-2006. This section consists of two parts. In
subsection 6.5.1 we describe the methodology we use to compare the response of stocks to
earnings innovations due to Friday versus non-Friday announcements. Next, we present and
discuss our ￿ndings in subsection 6.5.2.
6.5.1 Methodology
Nonparametric Analysis
The purpose of this section is to study the evolution over time of the earnings response function,
that is, the function that links the expected stock returns to the earnings innovations. Moreover,
our goal is to conduct statistical tests on the di⁄erence between the earnings response functions
for the Friday versus the non-Friday trading sessions. Clearly, a correct speci￿cation of the
earning response function plays a crucial role in our analysis. To set forth notations, let ri;t
denote the excess return on the stock of the ￿rm i at the day of the earnings announcement
for the period t, which we measure as the return on the stock minus the return on the equalyy
weighted market portfolio. Also, let UEi;t denote the unexpected earning (earnings innovation)
of the ￿rm i for the period t. We measure UEi;t as the di⁄erence between actual earning and the
consensus forecast scaled by a stock price from the last trading day before the announcement.
Furthermore, let the subscripts fr and nfr denote "Friday" and "non-Friday", respectively.
Then, the following model is considered
ri;t = F (UEi;t;Ifr;i;t) + ￿i;t
E(￿i;tjUEi;t;Ifr;i;t) = 0
Here Ifr;i;t is the indicator function which takes the value 1 if the announcement has been
during a Friday trading session and 0 otherwise, F(￿;￿) is the earnings response function, and
￿i;t is the noise which is assumed to have zero mean conditional upon the earnings innovation
209and the Friday dummy variable. Then the question of whether investors respond di⁄erently
to Friday versus non Friday announcements can be transformed into testing the following null
hypothesis
H0 : F(￿;1) = F(￿;0)
To gain a ￿rst impression on the returns-earnings relationship and its evolution over time we
begin with a nonparametric exploratory analysis. For each sub-period we separately estimate
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where K(￿) is a kernel function and h denotes the bandwidth. Throughout this study we shall
use a Gaussian kernel, while the choice of bandwidth will be based on Silverman￿ s "rule of




F(￿;0) are (pointwise) consistent
estimators of the true earnings response functions F(￿;1) and F(￿;0), respectively. Moreover,
our large sample size allows us to estimate F(￿;1) and F(￿;0) with a reasonable degree of
accuracy. Thus, we may draw our ￿rst, though informal, conclusions on the existence of a
"Friday e⁄ect" by comparing the kernel estimates of F(￿;1) and F(￿;0):
Next, we turn to the formal nonparametric test. We use a test proposed by Yatchew (2003).
Let us assume that the ￿rst derivatives of both F(￿;1) and F(￿;0) are bounded and the error
terms ￿i;t are homoscedastic with variance ￿2
￿: This speci￿cation is still fairly general in sense
that we do not impose any other restrictions on the functional form of neither F(￿;1) nor F(￿;0).
Let us divide our sample into two samples, where the sample A includes all earnings an-
nouncements made on Friday while the sample B includes all the non-Friday announcements.
Next, within each sample let us reorder the data so that the earnings innovations UEi;t￿ s are in















Next, let us pool all the data an reorder so that the pooled UEi;t￿ s are in increasing order and








Our testing procedure is based on the following statistic










If F(￿;1) = F(￿;0) then both within and pooled estimators are consistent and should yield
similar estimates. On the other hand, if the null hypothesis does not hold, the "within" estima-
tors are still consistent, while the pooled estimator overestimates the variance. Furthermore, it
can be shown that under the null the limiting distribution of this statistic is normal with zero
mean and the variance being equal to 2￿￿￿4
￿ where ￿￿ is the probability that consecutive obser-
vations in the pooled reordered data set come from di⁄erent populations. Consistent estimators
of ￿ can be easily obtained (see Yatchew, 2003 for further details).
The test proposed by Yatchew (2003) has a number of important advantages. First, being
nonparametric, we do not impose any assumptions regarding the functional form of the earnings
response function. This virtue makes this test more robust compared to standard parametric
tests, where a particular form of the earnings response function has to be assumed. Also, since
the rate of convergence of Yatchew￿ s statistic is the same as parametric tests it is likely to be
more powerfull against the alternatives than other nonparametric tests. On the other hand,
while testing whether two functions F(￿;1) and F(￿;0) are di⁄erent, the test does not allow
4For the proof of consistency of the di⁄erencing variance estimators a reader is re⁄ered to Yatchew (2003).
211us to compare the magnitude and the direction of this di⁄erence. That is, from this test we
are not able to test whether the stock returns are more or less sensitive to the Friday earnings
announcements than during the rest of trading days. Moreover, it does not allow us to analyze
how the di⁄erence between F(￿;1) and F(￿;0) (if detected) has evolved over time. Therefore, in
addition to nonparametric test of Yatchew (2003) we also proceed with a parametric analysis.
Parametric Analysis
We assume that the relationship between the excess stock returns and the earnings innovations
can be described by the following regression model
















Here, I+(I￿) is the indicator function which takes the value 1 if the earnings announcement
is nonnegative (negative). Also, Ifr is the indicator function which takes the value 1 (0) if the
announcement has been made during a Friday (non-Friday) trading session as discussed before,
and ￿, ￿￿ s and ￿￿ s are the parameters to be estimated. This model is an extended version of
the S-shape earnings response function proposed by Freeman and Tse (1992). They show that
this model is superior compared to a standard linear earnings-returns models and that it can
accommodate varying degrees of non-linearity, from approximately linear to highly nonlinear.
Two important di⁄erences between the original model and the one we use in this paper
should be mentioned. First, we introduce an additional degree of freedom to the original
model of Freeman and Tse (1992) by allowing the relation between stock returns and earnings
innovations to be dependent on whether "good" or "bad" news is released. Some evidence
that security returns have a di⁄erent degree of sensitivity to positive and negative earnings
innovations has been reported by a number of the previous studies (see, for instance, Abdel-
khalik, 1990). The distinction between positive and negative earnings innovations is particularly
212important in the context of this study, since Friday earnings announcements are characterized by
a substantially higher proportion of "bad" news, as we have already discussed above. Second,
as this is one of the two main issues studied in this paper, we allow the earnings response





nfr. Thus, we shall examine the question of whether there exists a "Friday e⁄ect" in







via standard Wald tests.
6.5.2 Empirical Results
Nonparametric Analysis
We start with the nonparametric exploratory analysis as described in subsection 6.5.1. For
each sub-period we separately estimate the earnings response function for the Friday and the
non-Friday earnings announcements by using the kernel smoothing method. Both functions are
estimated over the range of (qUE;0:025;qUE;0:975) with qUE;0:025 and qUE;0:975 denoting 2.5% and
97.5% sample quantiles, respectively.
The estimates are depicted in Figures 6.3 and 6.4. Visual inspection of the earnings response
functions suggests that the earnings-return relationship is highly nonlinear. More speci￿cally,
the estimated earnings response functions exhibit more or less the S-shape pattern, with stock
returns being more sensitive to earnings surprises in the moderate (around zero) region, while
turning almost ￿ at for large earnings innovations. These ￿ndings support the results of Freeman
and Tse (1992), and Das and Lev (1994), who report a similar pattern of the earnings-returns
relationship. Moreover, our results suggest that the S-shape pattern is persistent over the last
two decades. This ￿nding complements the results of Freeman and Tse (1992), suggesting that
their results are not driven by sample selection, and also justi￿es the choice of our parametric
model, described in subsection 6.5.1.
A comparison of the Friday versus the non-Friday estimates of the earnings response func-
213tions yields particularly intriguing results. It appears that during the years 1989-1997 the
stock prices were more sensitive to the earnings announcements released during the non-Friday
trading sessions, compared to those released on Fridays, with the estimate of the non-Friday
earnings response function being substantially "steeper". Interestingly, the "Friday e⁄ect" ap-
pears to be more pronounced for the positive earnings innovations, or, in other word, when
"good news" is released. On the other hand, no substantial di⁄erence between the Friday and
the non-Friday estimates is observed for the negative earnings surprises for the ￿rst four peri-
ods. Moreover, while being especially pronounced for the ￿rst two sub-periods, the magnitude
of the "Friday e⁄ect" seems to decay gradually, until 1996-1997 where both estimates almost
coincide. Further, it seems that there has been a reversal in the "Friday e⁄ect" by the end of
90-s. More speci￿cally, starting from the year 1998 the stock returns appear to be more sensi-
tive to the earnings announcements released during Friday trading sessions compared to those
released during non-Friday trading days. Interestingly, for the last four sub-periods, that is, for
the period between 1998-2006, the di⁄erence appears to be more pronounced for the negative
earnings innovations. These preliminary ￿ndings suggest that there has been a structural shift
in the "Friday e⁄ect", which can be potentially attributed to stock market investors learning
the tendency of ￿rms to release "bad news" on Friday.
214Figure 6-3: Kernel estimates of the earnings response function. Dashed line-Friday announce-
ments, solid line-non-Friday announcements.
215Figure 6-4: Kernel estimates of the earnings response function (continued). Dashed line-Friday
announcements, solid line-non-Friday announcements.
216Table 2: Yatchew (2003) di⁄erence-of-variance tests






Friday 0.00141 3953 0.00185 5485 0.0021 2250 0.00243 2516
Non-Friday 0.00137 16605 0.00178 14297 0.00174 23145 0.00207 29218
Pooled 0.00136 20558 0.00179 19782 0.00177 25395 0.0021 31374
￿
￿ -2.05￿￿ -3.41￿￿ -2.99￿￿ 1.57






Friday 0.00361 2230 0.00384 1676 0.00328 1338 0.00233 2139
Non-Friday 0.00326 28204 0.00373 23046 0.00241 21660 0.00186 34238
Pooled 0.0032 30434 0.0038 24722 0.00246 22998 0.00192 36377
￿
￿ -10.86￿￿ -2.37￿￿ -2.77￿￿ 6.39￿￿
￿(￿￿) denotes 10(5)% signi￿cance
Next, we proceed with formal tests of the "Friday e⁄ect". We start with the results of the
Yatchew (2003) nonparametric test. First, a visual inspection of both the "within" and the
pooled variance estimates suggests that at the announcement date the stock returns are charac-
terized by an unusually high variance. For instance, if we consider the pooled variance estimate
from the 1989-1991 period, it translates into a 35 percent variance or about 60 percent standard
deviation in annual terms. These estimates are becoming even larger and reach their maximum
during the 2000-2001 period, which can be due to the collapse of the "dot.com" bubble, as
well as the series of corporate scandals which took place by the end of 2001. These ￿ndings
are consistent with other studies which report the abnormal stock return volatility around the
earnings announcement days (see Ball and Kothari, 1991, Landsman and Maydew, 2002, and
Collins, Zi and Xie, 2005, among others). Moreover, it appears that the stock return volatility
at the announcement day has increased over the last two decades. This observation supports
the results reported by Ladsman and Maydew (2002). Also, note that these are the estimates of
the conditional variance. In other words, the increase in the estimated stock variance that we
observe can be attributed neither to an increase in the variance of the unexpected earnings nor
to a stronger earnings-returns relation, a ￿nding which supports the results of Francis, Schip-
217per, and Vincent (2002), who attribute this increase to an over-time expansion in the amount
of concurrent information disclosed in earnings response press releases.
Next, we turn to the evaluation of the results of the Yatchew (2003) test with the test
statistic denoted by
￿
￿, whose asymptotic distribution should be standard normal under the
null of no "Friday e⁄ect" in the earnings response function. Recall that if the earnings response
functions during Friday and non-Friday trading days are the same, then we would expect
both "within" and pooled variance estimates to be similar, which would cause
￿
￿ to be small.
However, our results suggest that this is clearly not the case: The test statistic
￿
￿ is highly
statistically signi￿cant for all but one sub-period. The only exception is 1996-1997, where
￿
￿ is
marginally signi￿cant with a p-value being equal to 0.11. Overall, based on the results of this
test, two conclusion can be drawn. First, we ￿nd strong evidence for a "Friday e⁄ect" in the
earnings response function, supporting the results of previous studies, such as Della Vigna and
Pollet (2005). Noteworthy, in contrast to these studies we conducted our test in a nonparametric
framework, which suggests that our ￿ndings are robust to di⁄erent assumptions regarding the
functional form of the earnings-returns relation. Second, and more importantly, we ￿nd that
the di⁄erence between the response of stock returns to Friday versus non-Friday announcements
is persistent over time. However, based on the results of this test we still are not able to draw
conclusions regarding either the magnitude or the evolution over time of this di⁄erence. In
addition, since Friday announcements are characterized by a signi￿cantly larger proportion
of "bad news", for a further analysis of the "Friday e⁄ect" it is important to dichotomize
the earnings announcements into positive and negative earnings surprises. Therefore, to gain
further insight into the mechanism and the dynamics of the "Friday e⁄ect", we now turn to a
parametric analysis.
Parametric Analysis
It is straightforward to verify that the marginal impact of an increase in the earnings innovation
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when the earnings surprise is negative. Thus, the analysis of the magnitude of the "Friday






In Table 3 we present the estimation results of the extended Freeman-Tse (1992) model,
described in the previous subsection. The model was estimated for each sub-period covered
in our study using the Gauss-Newton algorithm, following related studies (Freeman and Tse,
1992, Harvey and Beneish, 1998). To examine the numerical stability of our results, we estimate
our model with twenty randomly chosen vectors of starting values and compare the estimates.
Our results suggest that the estimates are numerically stable with respect to di⁄erent starting
values.
We start with a simple visual inspection of the estimated parameters. The large values of the
estimates of ￿ suggest that the relation between the excess returns and the earnings￿innovations
is highly non-linear, a ￿nding which supports the results of Freeman and Tse (1992). This holds
both for negative and positive earnings￿innovations and for all the sub-periods covered in our
study, a ￿nding which suggests that the non-linearity in the returns-earnings relationship is
substantial and also persistent over time. A visual inspection of the estimates of ￿ reveals
that these estimates are gradually increasing over time, in contrast to the estimates of ￿0,
where no such tendency can be detected. This ￿nding suggests that over time the earnings
information is re￿ ected more rapidly in stock prices, resulting in the US markets becoming
more informationally e¢ cient.
Next, we turn to a formal comparison of the Friday versus non-Friday earnings response
functions. As already discussed above, in the extended Freeman-Tse (1992) model the "Friday





nfr ratios from unity. The ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratio measures the "Friday e⁄ect" for positive earn-
ings innovations, while the ￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr ratio measures the di⁄erence between the Friday and the
non-Friday earnings￿response functions for the negative earnings￿surprises.
Ratios lower than one indicate that the stock prices￿response to the earnings surprises is
weaker during a Friday than during a non-Friday trading session, and vice versa. We report
these ratios as well as whether the latter are signi￿cantly di⁄erent from one for each sub-period
examined in our study.
Starting with the analysis of the ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratio our ￿ndings indicate that for the 90-s the
earnings response function was characterized by a substantial "Friday e⁄ect" in the positive
part of the earnings￿innovations domain. The "Friday e⁄ect" is particularly strong during the
￿rst two sub-periods, that is, during the beginning of the 1990-s, with the estimated ratios less
than 0.5. In other words, during these periods the response of the stock prices to the positive
earnings surprises on Fridays was more than twice weaker than the one during the non-Friday
sessions. Interestingly, the estimated ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratios tend to increase over time, though the
increase is not monotonous. More speci￿cally, while during the 1990-s the ratio was signi￿cantly
smaller than one, it becomes larger than one during the last two periods with the deviation
from unity being also statistically signi￿cant for the 2001-2003 period. This ￿nding provides
some preliminary evidence that stock market investors learn over time the strategic information
releases of ￿rms.
220Table 3: Freeman-Tse (1992) extended model





































































nfr 0.49￿￿ 0.46￿￿ 0.86 0.7￿￿
￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr 1.03 1.08 1.19 1.36
Adj. R2 0.034 0.039 0.044 0.034
No.obs 20588 19782 25395 31374






































































nfr 0.65￿￿ 0.81 1.41￿￿ 1.05
￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr 1.55￿ 1.87￿ 1.72￿ 1.43￿
Adj. R2 0.029 0.022 0.037 0.055
No.obs 30434 24722 22998 36377
￿(￿￿) denotes 10(5)% signi￿cance
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
221The analysis of the estimates of ￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr yields particularly intriguing results. Already
from the beginning of the 90-s the estimated ratio is greater than one, though for the ￿rst
sub-periods the di⁄erence is not statistically signi￿cant. Thus, for all the periods examined
in our study the response of the stock prices to the negative earnings surprises appears to be
stronger during Fridays than during non-Friday trading days. Moreover, this di⁄erence becomes
statistically signi￿cant, starting from 1998. Also, the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" is almost
monotonously increasing over time. While during the 1989-1991 period the "Friday e⁄ect" could
be considered as negligible, with the estimated earnings response ratio being equal to 1.03, it
becomes economically signi￿cant by the end of 90-s with the average estimated earnings response
ratio of about 1.6 for the last four sub-periods. In other words, during the last eight years the
response of the stock prices to the negative earnings￿surprises was on average stronger by 60%
during Friday than during non-Friday trading days. These ￿ndings suggest that over time the
investors learned the ￿rms￿strategy of releasing "bad news" on Fridays and started following
the Friday information releases more carefully. Moreover, it appears that during the last periods
the investors tend to overreact to "bad news" announcements released on Fridays compared to
"bad news" released during the non-Friday trading sessions. It is likely that the investors tend
to interpret the losses reported on Fridays as those that the ￿rms particularly would like to hide
from the pubic, and, thus, investors will treat these announcements as particularly important
ones.
To gain some further insight into the dynamics of the "Friday e⁄ect," we estimate the
extended Freeman-Tse (1992) model year-by-year. This way we obtain 18 estimates of the
earnings response ratio, both for the positive and the negative earnings innovations. We plot
these estimates in Figure 3, where the dashed line depicts the estimates of the ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratios,
and the solid line denotes the time path of the estimates of ￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr ratios. The time path
of the earnings response ratios will serve as a crude proxy for the investors￿"learning curve"
of the "Friday e⁄ect". A visual inspection of the ratios suggests that both are increasing over
time. Formal tests suggest that this trend is both economically and statistically signi￿cant.
A simple linear regression with a time trend explains about 26% of the total variance of the
estimated ￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr ratios (slope=0.0474 with p- value=0.04, R2 = 0:26). The results for
the ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratios are even more impressive, where the same regression explains more than
22250% of the ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratio￿ s total variance (slope=0.0475 with p-value<0.01, R2 = 0:55). The
estimate of the ￿+
fr=￿+
nfr ratio was about 0.5 during 1989, or, in other words, the response of
stock prices to positive earnings announcements was about twice weaker during Friday sessions
compared to non-Friday trading days. This ratio was gradually increasing until it reached the
level of 1 by the year 2006, suggesting that during the recent period no "Friday e⁄ect" in the
earnings response function for the positive earnings innovations is detected. Turning to the
estimates of the ￿￿
fr=￿￿
nfr ratio, we ￿nd that the latter was about 0.75 during 1989, suggesting
that the response of stock prices to negative earnings announcements released on Fridays was
substantially weaker than the ones on non-Friday trading days. However, this tendency rapidly
reverts and already by the beginning of 90-s we ￿nd the earnings response being slightly above
the level of 1. Further, the earnings response ratio experienced a sharp increase with a peak
of 2.2 during 1999. This is possibly due to the stock market investors concentrating on the
￿rms￿losses, following the collapse of the "internet bubble". By the year 2006 the estimated
earnings response ratio for the negative earnings innovations was 1.69, suggesting that recently
the stock price response to the ￿rms￿announced losses is about 70% stronger than the one
during the non-Friday trading days. Overall, the analysis of the investors￿"learning curve"
supports our conclusions, drawn from the extended Freeman-Tse (1992) model, that over time
investors learned the ￿rms￿announcement strategy of releasing the "bad news" during Friday
trading sessions.
"Friday e⁄ect" and the Pre-Announcement Uncertainty
The last aspect we study in this paper is the relation between the analysts￿forecast uncertainty
and the "Friday e⁄ect". A substantial body of academic literature reports a positive relationship
between the magnitude of the response of the stock prices to the earnings innovations and the
level of the informational disclosure (Freeman, 1987; Imho⁄ and Lobo, 1992; Ng et al., 2006).
Understanding the role of the level of the informational disclosure and, in particular, the level
of the pre-announcement uncertainty is crucial for a deeper understanding of the nature of
the "Friday e⁄ect". If the "Friday e⁄ect" is caused by the investors￿distraction during the
Friday trading sessions, then it is likely that its magnitude will vary with the accuracy of the
informational disclosure and, in particular, the accuracy of the analysts￿forecasts before the
223Figure 6-5: Temporal analysis of the "Friday e⁄ect" by year. Dashed line denotes earnings
response ratios for the positive earnings innovations, solid line depicts earnings response ratios
for the negative earnings innovations.
actual earnings announcement is released. More speci￿cally, we would expect the magnitude of
the "Friday e⁄ect" to be decreasing in the level of the analysts￿forecasts inaccuracy.
Following Imho⁄and Lobo (1992) we use the standard deviation of the analysts￿forecasts as
a proxy for the pre-announcement uncertainty. The estimates of the standard deviations of the
analysts￿forecasts were obtained from the I/B/E/S for each ￿rm-quarter observation included
in our sample. To study the impact of the pre-announcement uncertainty on the "Friday e⁄ect"
the following version of the extended Freeman-Tse (1992) model is estimated






































where the level of the pre-announcement uncertainty, denoted by UNCi;t, is measured by the
standard deviation of the analysts￿forecasts, measured during the last month before the actual
announcement has been released. The impact of the pre-announcement uncertainty on the earn-
ings response function comes via two channels. First, we allow pre-announcement uncertainty
to a⁄ect the earnings-returns link via the parameters ￿+ and ￿￿. This controls for a potential
relationship between the sensitivity of the stock returns to the earnings innovations and the pre-
announcement uncertainty, as reported by Imho⁄ and Lobo (1992). These parameters link the
level of the pre-announcement uncertainty and the "absolute" sensitivity of stock returns to the
earnings innovations. Second, we allow the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" to be dependent
on the level of the pre-announcement uncertainty via the ￿+
1 and ￿￿
1 parameters. That is, the
earnings response ratio are allowed to vary with the level of the pre-announcement uncertainty.
For instance, if ￿+
0 and ￿￿
0 are greater than 1 and ￿+
1 and ￿￿
1 are negative, then the earnings-
returns link is weaker during Fridays than during the rest of the days for the ￿rms with low
pre-announcement uncertainty, but this di⁄erence decays as the level of the pre-announcement
uncertainty is increasing. On the other hand, if both ￿+
0 and ￿￿
0 are smaller than 1 and ￿+
1
and ￿￿
1 are negative, then the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" is increasing with the level of
pre-announcement uncertainty.
This further extension of the Freeman-Tse (1992) model nests a number of important models
as special cases which can be formulated as follows
No "Friday e⁄ect" H0 : ￿+
0 = ￿￿
0 = 1 and ￿+
1 = ￿￿
1 = 0
Constant "Friday e⁄ect" H0 : ￿+
1 = ￿￿
1 = 0
The ￿rst hypothesis simply states that the Friday and the non-Friday earnings response func-
tions coincide. Note that in this case we still allow the earnings response function to be a⁄ected
by pre-announcement uncertainty via the parameters ￿+
fr and ￿￿
fr. The second hypothesis al-
225lows for a "Friday e⁄ect" which does not depend on the level of pre-announcement uncertainty.
Note that this scenario yields constant earnings ratios ￿+
0 and ￿￿
0 for the positive and negative
earnings surprises, respectively. That is, the model boils down to the extended Freeman-Tse
(1992) model we estimated before.
The estimation results of this model are presented in Table 4. The estimation procedure is
similar to the one we followed while estimating the extended Freeman-Tse (1992) model without
uncertainty. The only di⁄erence is that we use only those ￿rm-quarter observation for which at
least two di⁄erent analysts submitted their forecasts. This leads to a further reduction of the
sample size, in particular, for the ￿rst two sub-periods, but still leaves us with a substantial
number of observations for the statistical analysis.
226Table 4: Freeman-Tse (1992) extended model with uncertainty







































































































No "Friday e⁄ect" 0.036 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Constant "Friday e⁄ect" 0.019 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Adj. R2 0.036 0.044 0.049 0.038
No.obs 15697 15226 20670 24896
￿(￿￿) denotes 10(5)% signi￿cance
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
p-values of no "Friday e⁄ect" and constant "Friday e⁄ect"
hypotheses tests are reported under the "No "Friday e⁄ect"" and
"Constant "Friday e⁄ect"" headings, respectively
227Table 4 (continued): Freeman-Tse (1992) extended model with uncertainty







































































































No "Friday e⁄ect" <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
Constant "Friday e⁄ect" <0.01 <0.01 0.023 <0.01
Adj. R2 0.032 0.023 0.039 0.059
No.obs 25241 20670 19497 31424
￿(￿￿) denotes 10(5)% signi￿cance
White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses
p-values of no "Friday e⁄ect" and constant "Friday e⁄ect"
hypotheses tests are reported under "No "Friday e⁄ect"" and
"Constant "Friday e⁄ect"" headings, respectively
Our estimation results strongly suggest that the pre-announcement uncertainty plays an
important role in the earnings-returns relation. Moreover, we ￿nd strong evidence that the
pre-announcement uncertainty a⁄ects not only the sensitivity of stock prices to the earnings
surprises ("absolute" sensitivity), but also the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect", that is, the
relative sensitivity of stock prices to the Friday announcements compared to those released
228during other trading days.
We begin with the analysis of the link between the pre-announcement uncertainty and
the "absolute" sensitivity of stock returns to the earnings innovations, measured by ￿+ and
￿￿: Our ￿ndings suggest that there exists a negative relationship between the level of the
pre-announcement uncertainty and the strength of the earnings-return association with the
estimates of both ￿+ and ￿￿ being signi￿cantly negative. This negative relation is also eco-
nomically signi￿cant. For instance, let us consider the estimates for the years 2004-2006 to
gain some impression on the role of the pre-announcement uncertainty during the last sub-
period. For positive earnings surprises the marginal impact of an increase in the earnings
innovation on the expected excess return with no pre-announcement uncertainty is 1.14 times
larger compared to the one with forecast dispersion of 0.15 (95% quantile). The impact of the
pre-announcement uncertainty is even more pronounced for the negative earnings innovation,
where the stock returns appear to be 1.61 times more sensitive to the earnings surprises with
no pre-announcement uncertainty compared to the earnings announcements with high level of
the forecasts￿dispersion.
Next, we turn to the impact of the pre-announcement uncertainty on the "Friday e⁄ect" in
the earnings response function, which is measured by the parameters ￿+
1 and ￿￿
1 for the positive
and negative earnings surprises, respectively. For a given level of the pre-announcement uncer-
tainty the earnings response ratios are given by 1
￿+
0 +￿+
1 UNC and 1
￿￿
0 +￿￿
1 UNC for the "good" and
"bad" news, respectively. Our results indicate that by the end of the 1980-s and the beginning
of the 1990-s there was a pronounced "Friday e⁄ect" for both "good" and "bad" earnings an-
nouncements. More speci￿cally, our ￿ndings suggest that during the above mentioned period
stock prices were substantially less sensitive to the news released on Fridays compared to the
earnings announcements released during the non-Friday trading sessions. Moreover, our results
suggest that for this period the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" was inversely related to the level
of the pre-announcement uncertainty, proxied by the analysts￿forecast dispersion. This e⁄ect
is especially pronounced for the 1989-1991 period. For instance, for the earnings announcement
with no analysts￿forecast dispersion the estimated earnings response ratios are 0.43 and 0.88
for the positive and negative earnings surprises, respectively. That is, at the beginning of our
sample period the stock prices of the ￿rms with high quality of information disclosure were
229about twice more sensitive to the "good" news released during the non-Friday trading days.
Similarly, for the "bad" earnings announcements not accompanied by pre-announcement un-
certainty the estimated earnings-returns link is 12% stronger for the news released during the
non-Friday trading days. The magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" also seems to decline over time.
However, the magnitude of "Friday e⁄ect" seems to be drastically declining as we move
to the earnings announcements with a high levels of pre-announcement uncertainty, with the
estimates of ￿+
1 and ￿￿
1 being signi￿cantly negative for all the sub-periods examined in our
study. For instance, for the same 1989-1991 period the earnings response ratios for the earnings
announcement with forecast dispersion of 0.15 are 0.52 and 1.07 for the positive and negative
earnings surprises, respectively. A comparison of the earnings response ratios for the positive
and negative earnings surprises provides us with a further insight into the evolution of the
"Friday e⁄ect" over time. Note that for the positive unexpected earnings for all but one sub-
period the estimates of ￿+
0 are greater that one. This ￿nding suggests that over the last two
decades the stock prices of the ￿rms with a high quality of information disclosure were less
sensitive to the "good" news released on Friday, compared to those released during the rest of
the week. At the same time, for these stocks the impact of the pre-announcement uncertainty
on the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" is both statistically and economically signi￿cant. A
di⁄erent picture unfolds when we examine the earnings response ratios for the negative earnings
surprises. Note that starting from the year 1996 the estimates of ￿￿
0 turned out to be smaller
than one. At the same time there was a substantial decline in the magnitude of the estimates of
￿￿
1 which, though remaining statistically signi￿cant, lost their economical signi￿cance, with the
2002-2003 sub-period being the only exception. This ￿nding supports our hypothesis that, as
the level of the pre-announcement uncertainty increases, the relative sensitivity of stock prices
to non-Friday earnings announcements tends to disappear. In other words, the magnitude of
the "Friday e⁄ect" appears to be strongly related to the quality of the information disclosure.
6.6 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we study the evolution of "Friday e⁄ect" over time. We focus on two equally
important questions:
230￿ Was the strategy of reporting "bad" news on Friday persistent over time?
￿ If so, did the investors learn about this strategy and how was it re￿ ected in the earnings-
returns relation?
Our results strongly suggest that the ￿rms continued to report "bad" news on Fridays during
the last two decades. The mean earnings surprise is signi￿cantly lower and the proportion of
"bad" earnings announcements is signi￿cantly higher for the Friday earnings announcements
compared to other trading days. This tendency persists over the whole time span of our study.
On the other hand, we also ￿nd strong evidence of a structural shift in the earnings-response
relation. More speci￿cally, we ￿nd a reversal in the "Friday e⁄ect" in the earnings-returns re-
lation with stock prices becoming eventually more sensitive to Friday earnings announcements.
Interestingly, the reversal appears to be substantially more pronounced when "bad" news is re-
leased. Further analysis indicates that the magnitude of the "Friday e⁄ect" is inversely related
to the level of the pre-announcement uncertainty proxied by the analysts￿forecast dispersion.
Overall, our ￿ndings suggest that over time investors learned about the tendency of the
￿rms to release "bad" news on Fridays. The association between stock returns and earnings
innovations released on Fridays became stronger over time. Moreover, our ￿ndings suggest that
for the last ten years the investors systematically overreact to the "bad" earnings announcements
released on Fridays, compared to their response to the "bad" news released during other trading
days. A potential explanation of this ￿nding is that investors, who learned about the ￿rms￿
strategy to report "bad" news on Fridays, consider negative earnings announcements released
on Fridays as particularly important ones which ￿rms are attempting to "hide". This may lead
to a closer association between the negative earnings surprises released on Fridays and the stock
returns compared to the rest of the week.
Our ￿ndings suggest a number of important implications. First, our results shed an addi-
tional light on stock market e¢ ciency, by showing how the stock market participants gather
all available information to form their expectations. Second, our ￿ndings are of particular
interest to ￿rms and, in particular, to their earnings announcement policies. The results of
our study suggest that the bene￿ts from reporting "bad" news on Fridays disappeared over
time. Moreover, our results suggest that since stock prices became more sensitive to Friday
231announcements, the strategy of reporting "bad" news on Friday misses its target. In light of
our ￿ndings shifting the announcement of "bad" news from Friday to other trading days seems
to be a reasonable step to follow.
Finally, we suggest a number of possible directions for further research. One of the possible
extensions of this research would be to study the evolution of the "Friday e⁄ect" controlling
for investors￿sophistication, which could be proxied by, for instance, the share of institutional
holdings. It is likely that investors￿sophistication is an important factor a⁄ecting the magnitude
of the "Friday e⁄ect" and the dynamics and the speed of investors￿learning about this e⁄ect.
It would also be interesting to conduct a similar study for stock markets other than the US,
to study how the di⁄erence in trading regulations and the information disclosure policies a⁄ect
the magnitude and the evolution of a "Friday e⁄ect" over time.
232Chapter 7
Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Gedurende de recente decennia was er sprake van een snelle convergentie van de nationale
economieºn naar een globale markt. De serieuze ￿nanciºle crises waarvan we in het laatstse de-
cennium getuige zijn geweest, benadrukken het belang van het beter begrijpen van de verbanden
tussen de nationale economieºn alsmede de noodzaak om de gevolgen van de globalisatie voor
de verbreiding van ￿nanciºle crises over de wereld beter te begrijpen. Echter, er bestaan nog
diverse gaten in de literatuur over de gevolgen van de globalisatie op het gemeenschappelijk be-
wegen van de internationale aandelenmarkten. Het eerste deel van dit proefschrift bestudeert
de dynamiek van de overdracht over grenzen heen van prijsinformatie tussen internationale
aandelenmarkten.
Onze analyse laat zien dat de aandelenmarkten signi￿cant meer zijn ge￿ntergreerd gedurende
de laatste twee-en-een-halve decennia. We vinden eveneens sterk bewijs van ￿contagion￿ , het
negatief be￿nvloed worden van de ene economie door de koersen van ￿nanciºle activa op de
￿nanciºle markten van een andere economie. Dit "contagion e⁄ect" lijkt asymmetrisch, veel
signi￿canter voor negatieve prijsschokken, en lijkt gerelateerd aan de aandelenmarktvolatiliteit
en economische condities. Deze bevindingen benadrukken een belangrijke rol van deze fac-
toren in de internationale verbreiding van aandelenmarktcrises. De economische kosten van
het negeren van contagion of het asymmetrische karakter ervan zijn ook signi￿cant. Door
het benadrukken van het belang om rekening te houden met de veranderingen in de afhanke-
lijkheidsstructuur tussen de ￿nanciºle activa hebben deze resultaten tevens belangwekkende
implicaties voor strategieºn om portefeuilles te beheren.
233Vervolgens richten we onze aandacht op het informatie-overdrachts-mechanisme tussen waarde-
papieren waarvan de koersen zowel op de beurs van New York als die van Tokio staan geno-
teerd. Deze twee aandelenbeurzen zijn de twee grootste en meest invloedrijke beurzen ter wereld.
Zulke waardepapieren, die op verschillende beurzen worden verhandeld, terwijl ze eenzelfde fun-
damentele waarde representeren, vormen een unieke gelegenheid om de informatie-overdracht
tussen markten te begrijpen. Met name helpen zulke waardepapieren om het prijsonthulling-
sproces te begrijpen in een wereld waarin ￿nanciºle systemen meer en meer ge￿ntegreerd raken.
We vinden duidelijk empirisch bewijs van informatie-asymmetrie waarbij de beurs van Tokio
domineert in termen van informatie, aangezien het leeuwendeel van het prijsonthullingsproces
daar plaats vindt. Het duurt langer voordat prijsschokken op de markt van Tokio zich hebben
verspreid op de markt in de VS dan omgekeerd, een bevinding die lijkt te suggereren dat
het gedrag van de VS-helft van de waardepapieren-tweeling kan worden voorspeld op basis
van de informatie die beschikbaar komt tijdens de handelsuren in Tokio. Dit impliceert dat
er mogelijkheden zouden kunnen bestaan om winstgevende grensoverschrijdende strategieºn te
ontwikkelen. Daarnaast lijkt de prijsonthulling te zijn gerelateerd aan het niveau van de handel-
sactiviteiten, die we benaderen met behulp van het handelsvolume. Dit resultaat ondersteunt
andere studies, zoals Blume, Easley en O￿ Hara (1994), die suggereren dat het handelsvolume
extra informatie verschaft bovenop de informatie al impliciet aanwezig in de aandelenprijzen.
In het tweede deel van het proefschrift wordt de aandacht gericht op markste¢ ciºntie, met
name hoe snel de informatie wordt opgenomen in de aandelenprijzen. Het belang om het
mechanisme te begrijpen hoe nieuws wordt gere￿ ecteerd in prijzen van waardepapieren kan
nauwelijks worden overschat. Het is essentieel voor investeringsbeslissingen in de ￿nanciering-
spraktijk, voor het beleid van het management van bedrijven hoe bedrijfsnieuws naar buiten te
brengen, alsmede voor beleidsmakers van wie de beslissingen vaak een grote impact hebben op
het functioneren van de aandelenmarkten.
We beginnen met het bestuderen van de dynamische relatie tussen aandelenrendementen,
handelsvolume en volatiliteit. We toetsen diverse theoretische modellen die deze variabelen in
verband brengen met de dynamiek van de aandelenrendementen op basis van een steekproef
van zowel koersen van geaggregeerde aandelenindices als koersen van individuele aandelen. We
vinden dat de omvang van de aandelenrendementen-omkeringen en ￿momentum￿(verdergaan
234volgens een trend) voornamelijk gerelateerd is met de aandelenmarktvolatiliteit en niet het
handelsvolume, zoals gesuggereerd is door voorgaande studies. Echter, het handelsvolume lijkt
een belangrijke rol te spelen in het prijsonthullingsproces alsmede in het gelijk op bewegen van
aandelenkoersen, een bevinding die het belang laat zien van de informatie die bevat is in het
handelsvolume. Deze bevindingen verscha⁄en ook een alternatieve verklaring voor de ￿hoge
volume premie￿ , zoals gedocumenteerd door Gervais et al. (2001).
Vervolgens onderzoeken we het verband tussen voorschriften hoe bedrijfsinformatie naar
buiten te brengen en markte¢ ciºntie. We bestuderen de implicaties van de Sarbanes-Oxley Wet
￿beoogd om een antwoord te geven op een reeks zware bedrijfsschandalen￿ voor de markte¢ -
ciºntie en de nauwkeurigheid waarmee analisten bedrijfsinkomsten kunnen voorspellen. We on-
derzoeken of de wetgeving van stringentere voorschriften over hoe bedrijfsinformatie naar buiten
te brengen het vertrouwen van investeerders en beursanalisten heeft hersteld, een vertrouwen
dat behoorlijk was geschaad door de talloze gevallen van bedrijfsfraude gedurende de periode
2001-2002.
We vinden als resultaat dat na de invoering van de Sarbanes-Oxley wetgeving er een substan-
tiºle toename gemeten kan worden in de coº¢ ciºnten die de snelheid van informatie-aanpassing
meten. Deze bevinding lijkt te suggereren dat als gevolg van de wetgeving de aandelenmarkten
in de VS vanuit het oogpunt van informatie e¢ ciºnter geworden zijn. Maar we vinden ook
overtuigend empirisch bewijs dat de beursanalisten meer bovenmatig pessimistisch geworden
zijn in termen van hun voorspellingen van de bedrijfsinkomsten. We interpreteren deze bevin-
ding als bewijs dat de analisten voorzichtiger geworden zijn in het interpreteren van informatie
vrijgegeven door het management van bedrijven. Over het geheel genomen laten deze bevin-
dingen een sterk verband zien tussen de kwaliteit van informatieverscha¢ ng en het e¢ ciºnt
functioneren van de aandelenmarkten.
Het laatste hoofdstuk van het proefschrift gaat over het strategisch kiezen van het moment
waarop informatie bekend wordt gemaakt en de reactie van de aandelenkoersen op die infor-
matie. We bestuderen de veronderstelde tendens van bedrijven om ￿slecht￿nieuws tegen het
weekeinde bekend te maken, met name op vrijdagen, zo gebruikmakend van de verslapte aan-
dacht van investeerders vanwege het naderende weekeinde. We vinden dat gedurende de laatste
twee decennia bedrijven consequent meer ￿slecht￿ nieuws op vrijdagen naar buiten hebben
235gebracht dan op andere weekdagen. We constateren ook dat de gevoeligheid van aandelenren-
dementen op vrijdag-aankondigingen, vergeleken met andere weekdagen, langzaam maar zeker
is toegenomen, een toename die met name uitgesproken lijkt te zijn als er sprake is van ￿slecht￿
nieuws. Bovendien vinden we een sterk verband tussen het ￿vrijdage⁄ect￿en het niveau van de
onzekerheid voorafgaand aan een nieuwsaankondiging. Deze bevindingen suggereren dat de ten-
dens van bedrijven om ongunstige aankondigingen op vrijdagen te doen inderdaad gerelateerd
is aan de verslappende aandacht van investeerders vanwege het naderende weekeinde, maar ook
dat de voordelen van deze strategie in de loop der tijd minder is geworden, een resultaat met
belangwekkende implicaties voor het beleid van bedrijven inzake nieuwsaankondigingen.
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